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I NTRODUCTI ON
The matter of contract third party beneficiary rights is not simply a topic for
academic discussion but is a subject that should be of measurable concern to every
practicing lawyer whose clients have even a minimal involvement in t he American socio-
economic environment. Contract law impacts in a most pervasive way not only upon
business transactions but also upon such personal things as terms of employment, the
purchase of a home and other necessities of life, and even the enjoyment of most luxuries.
And whenever a contract exists between parties, whether business or personal in nature,
sonic third party - will almost always be affected by the performance or non-performance
of the agreement. In the event of non-performance or breach, the third party may
endeavor to bring suit for enforcement of the contract made between the other parties.
Consequently lawyers planning contractual relations should he concerned with the possi-
bility of bird party beneficiary claims and the changing nature of the law in this area.
Any doubt about the vast potential for assertion of third party beneficiary standing is
quickly dispelled by a cursory review of recently reported cases. Such a survey uncovers a
wide range of cases that includes not only the expected construction, real estate sales, and
employment contract cases but also such diverse claims as those related to resell lenient of
refugees,' disposal of nuclear waste, the building of nuclear power plants,' the care of
' Nguyen v, U.S. Catholic Conference, 548 F. Supp. 1333 (W.D. Pa. 1982). This case involved a
claim by Vietnamese refugees that the defendant relief agency had not properly administered a
resettlement program pursuant to a grant agreement between the relief agency and the United
States Government, The court denied relief' on the grounds that t he agreement included no
assumption of direct liability to the refugees by the relief agency nor evidence that any rights were
intended to vest directly in individual refugees. Id. at 1348 -49.
New York State Energy Research and Development Authority v. Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc.,
561 E. Supp, 954 (W.D. N.Y. 1983). In this case the court denied the contract third party beneficiary
claim on the curious grounds that the same relief sought was available on alternative theories of
trespass and unjust enrichmem. Id. at 980.
The case focused on an attempt by the owner-lessor of a nuclear fuels disposal and reprocessing
center to require the removal of spent nuclear fuel by those utility customers who had stored spent
fuel at the center under agreements with the former lessee-operator of the center, Nuclear Fuel
Services Inc. (NFS). The contracts between NFS and the utilities included provisions which required,
in essence, that t he utilities remove the spent fuel at the request of NFS in the event its lease should
be terminated by the owner. Id. at 961.
After some equivocation the court concluded that the owner was not a third party beneficiary of
t he contracts between NFS and the utilities because the relief sought was available on alternative legal
theories. Id. at 980. There can he no doubt that NFS contracted with a concern that it should be able
to require removal of the spent fuel if it lost the lease and that the utilities should have been aware of
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adopted children.' the strikes of public employees,5 the provision of family planning
services," the rights of international air passengers,' liability in asbestosis cases," and
student eligibility for collegiate athletics." The practical and academic interest in third
party beneficiary rights, however, should spring not only from the inherent potential for
third party claims in contractual arrangements, but also from the possibilities for the
this concern and the intent to accommodate the interest of the owner. Under even the most
restrictive intent standards as set out below, see infra notes 74-96 and accompanying text, the decision
and reasoning in this case arc at best extremely questionable and almost certainly incorrect.
3 County of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 554 F. Supp. 399 (E.D. N.Y. 1983), aff'd, 728
F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1984). The county sought to advance a claim based on the defendants' alleged
breach of their construction permit agreement with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and
its predecessor, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), governing the construction of the Shoreham
Nuclear Power Station. The court held, inter (ilia, that the county was not a third party beneficiary of
the construction permit agreement. Id. at 409.
4 Bradford v. Davis, 290 Or. 855, 626 P.2d 1376 (1981). A foster child brought suit against the
Oregon Department of Human Services and others alleging, inter alia, that he was a third party
beneficiary of a contractual promise by the defendant I hat he would be placed in an adoptive home in
consideration for his parents relinquishment of their parental rights. In reversing the lower court
denial of the contract claim and remanding for further consideration the Supreme Court of Oregon
distinctly left open the possibility that the foster child might indeed be a third party beneficiary with
standing to sue the defendants for failure to provide adoptive care. Id. at 866, 626 14 .2d at 1383. But
cf. Rubin by Rubin v. Hainst Medical Center, 478 A.2d 869, 872 (Pa. Super. 1984) (court held that
child born with birth defect could not recover as third party beneficiary for alleged breach by medical
laboratories and physicians of contracts with parents for medical testing services).
• Burns Jackson Miller Summit & Spritzer v. Linder, 88 A.D.2d 50, 452 N.Y.S.2d 80 (1982),
of 'd, 59 N.Y.2d 314, 464 N.Y.S.2d 712 (1983); Burke & Thomas, Inc. v. International Organization
of Masters, 92 Wash. 2d 762, 600 P.2d 1282 (1979). In both these cases suits were brought against
transit workers' unions by injured businesses for breach of "no-strike - clauses in their contracts with
the transit authorities. Similar decisions were readied in both cases that the transit unions assumed
no direct liability to the businesses that might be adversely affected by illegal strikes. Burns Jackson, 88
A.D.2d at 75-76, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 95; Burke & Thomas, Inc., 92 Wash. 2d at 757-68, 600 P.2d at
1285-86.
6 McFarland v. Atkins, 594 P.2d 758 (Okla. 1978). Dismissal of the third party beneficiary claim
brought by the plaintiff-citizen was affirmed in the absence of an allegation that the plaintiff-citizen
was an express beneficiary of the contract between the Planned Parenthood charitable organization
and the state health agency for the provision of family planning services. Id. at 763. Plaintiff had
alleged that the Planned Parenthood organization breached its contract and violated state law by
distributing birth control information and services to minors in an improper manner. Id. at 760,
• in re Air Crash Disaster at Warsaw, Poland, 535 F. Supp. 833 (E.D. N.Y. 1982). American
passengers and their heirs were found to he third party contract beneficiaries of an international
agreement providing terms for liability of airlines resulting from air crash and death of qualifying
passengers. Id. at 836.
• Oman v. Johns-Maosville Corp., 482 F. Supp. 1060 (E.D. Va. 1980), vacated, 652 F.2d 234 (4th
Cir. 1981). The manufacturers of asbestos products were sued by employees of a shipbuilding firm
which purchased and used the asbestos products. The employees sought to recover from the
manufacturers for injuries resulting from the acquisition or aggravation of asbestosis through
exposure to dust from the asbestos products. In turn, the manufacturers sought indemnification
from the employers on the reasoning that they, the manufacturers, were third party beneficiaries of
an employment contract requirement that the employer provide employees with a safe place to work,
including proper handling of the asbestos products. The court held that the employment cont ract
revealed no intent to confer a benefit upon the asbestos products manufacturers. Id. at 1063-64.
• English v. National Collegiate Athletics Association, 439 So. 2d 1218 (1.a. 1983). The plaintiff
was a student-athlete who sought to be declared eligible for a last year of competition despite a ruling
by the National Collegiate At hletic Association (NCAA) that he was ineligible. In the law suit, the
student unsuccessfully sought third party' beneficiary standing on the participation contract between
the college and the NCAA. Id. at 1223.
922	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 [Vol. 25:919
deliberate and strategic use of third party beneficiary arrangements in structuring trans-
actions or pursuing remedies for wrongful conduct.'" Present developments in the law
governing third party beneficiary standing, including 1 he adoption of new rules in some
states" and the recent emergence of a new standard in Sect ion 302 of the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts, 12 render this topic timely for consideration.
1 " The variety of uses include the transfer of property after death without use of a will, see, e.g.,
Baker v, Bank of Northeast Arkansas, 271 Ark. 948, 951, 611 S.W,2d 783, 785 (1981); Marosites v.
Proctor, 59 N.C. App. 353, 354, 296 S.E.2d 526, 527 (1982); the avoidance of shorter statutory
aticin periods that may apply to tort actions, Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Massman Con-
struction Co., 402 A.2d 1275, 1277-78 (D.C. 1979); see e.g., Millwright v. Romer, 322 N.W.2d 30,
33-34 (lowa 1982); the establishment of standing under federal programs where no statutory private
cause of action can he had, see, e.g.. Beverly v. Macy, 702 F.2d 931, 942-43 (1 1 t It Cir. 1983); Zig -as v.
Superior Court of San Francisco, 120 Cal. App. 3d 827, 834-35, 174 Cal. Rptr. 806, 809-10 (1981);
and, as generally used, the establishment of standing against a remote party when a more immediate
party is absent, judgment proof, or simply not in breach of a contract.
" See inure notes 25-27 and ;tccompanying text.
12 The American Law Institute thereinafter "ALI - I began its mirk on the Restatement (Second)
of Contracts in 1962 and completed it in 1979, See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, Volume
1-Forward at VII (1981). The earliest revision of RESTATEMENT or CONTRACTS Section 133 (1932),
pertaining to third party beneficiary standing, appeared in Tentative Draft No. 3 (1967) as Section
133. The current text first appeared in the revised and edited version of Tentative Drafts Nos. 1-7
(1973), still at Section 133, but was finally published as Section 302 in 1981. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302, Reporter's Note (1981),
The text of Section 302 is:
§ 302. Intended and Incidental Beneficiaries
(1) Unless otherwise agreed between promisor and promisee, a beneficiary of a pro-
mise is an intended beneficiary if recognition Of a right to performance in the be-
neficia•y is appropriate to effectuate the intention of the parties and either
(a) the performance of the promise will satisfy an obligation of the promisee to pay
money to the beneficiary; or
(h) the circumstances indicate that the promisee intends to give the beneficiary the
benefit of the promised performance.
(2) An incidental beneficiary is a beneficiary who is not an intended beneficiary,
The text of RESTATEMENT or CONTRACTS Section 133 (1932) is:
133. Definition of Donee Beneficiary, Creditor Beneficiary, Incidental Beneficiary.
(1) Where performance of a promise in a contract will benefit a person other than the
promisee, that person is, except as stated in Subsection (3):
(a) a donee beneficiary if it appears from the terms of the promise in view of the
accompanying circumstances that the purpose of the promisee in obtaining t he
promise of all or part of the performance thereof is to make a gift to t he
beneficiary or to confer upon him a right against the promism: to some per-
formance neither due nor supposed or asserted to be due front the promisee to
the beneficiary;
(b) a creditor beneficiary if no purpose to make a gift appears from the terms of
the promise in view of the accompanying circumstances and performance of
the promise will satisfy an actual or supposed or asserted duty of the promisee
to the beneficiary, or a right of the beneficiary against the promisee which has
been barred by the Statute of Limitations or by a discharge in bankruptcy, or
which is unenforceable because of the Statute of Frauds;
(c) an incidental beneficiary if neither the facts stated in Clause (a) nor those stated
in Clause (h) exist.
(2) Such a promise as is described in Subsection (1)(a) is a gill promise. Stich a promise
as is described in Subsection (1)(b) is a promise to discharge the prontisee's duty.
(3) Where it appears from the terms of the promise in view of the accompanying
circumstances that the purpose of the promisee is to benefit a beneficiary under a trust
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The claimants in the rather unusual cases referred to in the preceding paragraph
were mostly unsuccessful in seeking standing as third patty beneficiaries, and properly
so.'' In the more common cases, however, the decisions of the courts are often not so
clearly correct. Indeed, both of the late Professors Arthur Linton Corbin and Samuel
Williston, authors oft he two classic treatises on cont ract law," singled out the area oft bird
party beneficiary rights as one involving particular inconsistency and uncertainty.'"' Nev-
ertheless, as Professor Corbin noted in his writing on t his subject, a discernible trend does
exist in the cases." Very simply put, nearly all jurisdictions have agreed that t he test for
recognizable third party beneficiary rights is evidence that the contracting parties in-
tended the third party to benefit substantially from the promised performance,' The
premise is that only when such intent to benefit is present should a person who is not a
party to the contract have standing to seek legal enforcement of the promised perfor-
mance.
The intent to benefit rest, although seemingly straight forward, has prOven to be very
difficult to apply in a consistent manner."' Problems encountered in applying the basic
lest have resulted in the development of subsidiary or collateral rules in the individual
states which vary to a significant degree."' The combination of the difficulty in applying
the intent to benefit test plus the variance in collateral state rules has produced a good
amount of inconsistency among the states in decisional law and has also given rise to
decisions within single jurisdictions that are noticeably at odds." These difficulties have
undoubtedly contributed to the occasional inclination of courts to avoid third party
standing questions if another basis for decision is available,' Moreover, the courts have
found it difficult to be precise in the reasoning of third party beneficiary cases and have
occasionally decided that third party rights did not exist when the decision ought to have
been that relief was not warranted for some other reason," The imprecise decisions
and the promise is to render performance to the trustee, the trustee, and not the
beneficiary under the trust, is a beneficiary within the meaning of this Section.
13 See supra notes 1 -9. Only the case of New York State Energy Research and Development
Authority v. Nuclear fuel Services, 561 F. Supp. 954, 979 (W.D. N.Y. 1983), is clearly questionable in
its conclusion on and reasoning of the third party beneficiary claim when examined in light of the
prevailing rules as discussed byre./ at notes 41-122 and accompanying text. See supra note 2.
a A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS (1951) [hereinafter cited as A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS]; S.
WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (3d ed. 1959).
1 ' 2 S, WILLIS•ON, CONTRACTS § 347 (3d ed. 1959); 4 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 772 (1951).
14' 4 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 772 (1951).
17 See 2 5. Witits -rox, CONTRACTS § 356A (Med. 1959); 4 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 776 n.21; 17
AM. JUR. 2d Contracts § 304 (1964).
18 For ether discussions of the difficulties, see Jones, Legal Protection of Third Party Beneficiaries;
On Opening Courthouse Doors, 46 U. CIN. L. Rev, 313 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Jones];`Note, Third
Party Beneficiaries and the Intention Standard: A Search for Rational Contract Decision-Making, 54 VA. L.
Rev. 1166 (1968); Note, The Third Party Beneficiary Concept: A Proposal, 57 Como, L. Rev. 406 (1957).
See infra notes 41-122 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 123-331 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., New York State Energy and Research Development Authority v. Nuclear Fuel
Services, Inc., 561 F. Supp. 954 (W.D. N.Y. 1983) (discussed supra note 2); Needham v. Hamilton,
459 A.2d 1060, 1062 (D.C. 1983) (preferring to allow intended beneficiary of ineffective will to sue
drafting attorney on malpractice theory rather than decide whether third party contract beneficiary
rights existed).
22 Even when a party is able to satisfy the test for third party standing by showing the requisite
intent to benefit, other questions must be addressed before recovery will be proper. As ;1 preliminary
matter, the contract must be valid as between the contracting parties because the third party cannot
enforce a contract that the promisee could not enforce against the promisor. See, e.g., State v.
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establish bad precedent and amplify the other difficulties in third party beneficiary law.
These compounded difficulties have given rise to efforts to improve and clarify the
law in two arenas. First, some state courts, most noticeably in Massachusetts, Minnesota,
Pennsylvania, and West Virginia, as well as federal courts applying federal common law,
have begun to move toward improved third party beneficiary standing rules. Second, the
draftsmen of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts acknowledged the difficulties in-
volved in applying the test embodied in Section 133 of the original Restatement of
Contracts" and therefore revised the standard." These two developments are related. In
Pennsylvania the prior law was supplemented by adoption of the new Section 302
formulation," and in Massachusetts the prior law, which denied explicit recognition to
third party rights, was overruled by adoption of Section 302." The Supreme Court of
Minnesota recently adopted the new approach of Section 302 in place of its former law
which had incorporated Section 133 of the first Restatement of Contracts." The Supreme
Court of West Virginia has indicated it will adopt a new rule at the next opportunit y28 and
one can confidently predict that the formulations found in the original and newer
Restatements will be considered by the court at that time. Finally, although the federal
Osborne, 607 P.2d 369, 371 (Alaska 1980) (citing RESTATEMENT (SF.CONO) OF CONTRACTS § 140 (Tent.
Draft 1973)) (now found at RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 309 (1981)). See also 4 A.
Colons, CoNTRActs § 773 (1951).
Another requirement for third party recovery is a breach of a relevant provision of the contract.
For an example of confusion about this requirement, see Clearwater Key Association — South
Beach, Inc. v. Thacker, 431 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 1983). In this case the plaintiffs were owners of two
contiguous condominium units. The original management company had assessed only one manage-
ment fee against the plaintiff's under a provision in the agreement between the management
company and the condominium association which specifically indicated that these two units would he
subject to only one management fee. After proper termination of the original management agree- .
mem, subsequent managers assessed two management fees against t he plaintiff. The appellate court
held, infer alio, that the plaintiffs were not intended beneficiaries of the original management
agreement. Id. at 645. While proper termination of the original management agreement would
properly extinguish the rights of third party beneficiaries of the agreement, it was undeniably poor
reasoning for the court to indicate that the plaintiffs were not third party beneficiaries of a contract
which included a specific provision inserted to limit their monetary obligations under the con-
dominium arrangement.
22 See infra notes 351 -54 and accompanying text.
2-1 See supra note 12.
22 Guy v. Liederbach, 501 Pa. 47, 459 A.2d 744 (1983). The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
overruled prior law to the extent that it stated the exclusive test for third party beneficiaries and
adopted the Restatement (Second)'of Contracts, Section 302 as an alternative test supplementing the
prior law. Id. at 59-60, 459 A.2d at 751.
'" Choate, Hall & Stewart v. SCA Services, Inc., 378 Mass. 535, 536, 392 N.E.2d 1045, 1051
(1979). For a discussion of the prior Massachusetts law expressly denying third party rights while
allowing exceptions so substantial that its decisions were largely consistent with those states recogniz-
ing the right see Note, The Third Party Beneficiary Rule in Massachusetts, 8 SUFFOLK U.I.. REV. 130
(1973).
" Cretex Companies, Inc. v. Construction Leaders, Inc., 342 N.W.2d 135, 139 (Minn. 1984).
The Supreme Court of Minnesota adopted the "approach outlined in Restatement (Second) of
Contracts Section 302" in lieu of its prior law which had relied on the categorization test of the first
Restatement of Contracts Section 133. Id. at 138-39.
2" Woodford v. Glenville State College Housing Corp., 225 S.E.2d 671, 674-75 (W. Va. 1976).
The current West Virginia law is that the contract must exist for the sale benefit of the third party
before standing may he had. The majority of the court questioned this restrictive rule in the above
case but failed to adopt a new rule because the contract was not at all intended for the benefit of the
plaintiff and he could not have recovered under even the most liberal standard. Id.
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courts are far from uniform in applying third party beneficiary rules under federal
common law, some courts have made use of Section 302 in recent cases in conjunction
with or in lieu of more traditional tests."
These efforts to improve the law through adoption of Section 302 will be successful
only if that formulation proves to be an improvement over prior law and lends itself to a
construction which'alleviates present difficulties. To date, those courts which have consid-
ered the newer Restatement formulation have not been uniform in accepting or constru-
ing the section and the changes it embodies." Some courts have perceived a significant
change from the original Restatement while others have not; 31 some courts have evi-
denced a willingness to adopt Section 302 while others have expressly or implicitly
indicated a continuing preference for the original Section 133 formulat
At this juncture, when t he use of third party claims continues to be substantial and
diverse, when courts are either making wholesale changes in third party beneficiary law or
changing pre-existing rules in a slower, less visible manner, and when Section 302
remains amenable to beneficial, interpretative construction, a review of the prevailing
state rules and their recent applications would be helpful in establishing an interpretation
of Section 302 which would best alleviate current problems and achieve greater harmony
among the states. This article analyzes the components of the various formulations of
third party beneficiary rules currently found in state and federal common law" and
surveys the results of applying such rules to ordinary types of cases. 34 In addition, the
article assesses the changes made in the Restatement formulation of the third party
beneficiary standing rule35 and proposes a construction of Section 302 which would result
in inure consistent decisions both within and among those jurisdictions that choose to
adopt, or are influenced by, the new rule."
" See infra Appendix. See also Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25, 31-32 (1977) (for rule on
when federal common law should apply).
" See infra Appendix.
31 Compare Weems v. Nanticoke Homes, Inc., 37 Md. App. 544, 556-57, 378 A.2d 190, 197
(1977) (viewing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) Or CONTRACTS § 302 as containing "liberalized principles")
with Reidy v. Macaulcy, 57 N.C. App. 184, 186, 290 S.E.2d 746, 747 (1982) ("the 1932 Restatement
test for determining third party beneficiaries remains the same under the 1979 Restatement"); and
People ex rel. Resnik v. Curtis & Davis, Architects & Planners, Inc., 78 Ill. 2d 381, 400 N.E.2d 918,
919-20 (1980) (citing REsTATEmENT (SEcosn) or CONTRACTS § 302 in support of Illinois slate rule as
established in Carson Pirie Scott & Co. v. Parrett, 346 Ill. 252, 178 N.E. 498 (1931), implying no
change in the new Restatement standard). Also compare Clark v. American Standard, Enc., 583 P.2d
618, 620 (Utah 1978) (the Supreme Court of Utah uses Section 302 formulation as establishing
improved standard used in lieu of older creditor and donee test) with Tracy Collins Bank & Trust v.
Dickamore, 652 P.2d 1314, 1315 (Utah 1982) (the Supreme Court of Utah cites Section 302 in
support of application of creditor and donee test).
32 Compare Choate, Hall & Stewart v. SCA Services, inc,, 378 Mass. 535, 545-46, 392 N.E.2d
1045, 1051 (1979) and Guy v. Liederbach, 501 Pa. 47, 51, 459 A.2d 744, 746 (1983), (accepting new
Section 302) with Khahbaz v. Swartz, 319 N.W.2d 279, 285 n.8 (Iowa 1982) and Weems v. Nanticoke
Homes, Inc., 37 Md. App, 544, 566-67, 378 A.2d 190, 197 (1977) (declining to adopt changes
embodied in Section 302). For cases continuing to apply original Restatement formulation without
mention of Section 302, see, e.g., U.S. v. Dairyland Insurance Company, 513 E. Supp. 1017, 1019 (D.
N.D. 1981), moded, 674 F.2d 750 (10th Cir. 1982), New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. City of Madera, 144
Cal. App. 3d 298, 308-09, 192 Cal. Rptr. 548, 555 (1983); and Wilson v. General Mortgage Co., 638
S.W.2d 821, 823 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
" See infra notes 41-122 and accompanying text.
". See infra notes 124-331 and accompanying text.
35 See infra notes 332-456 and accompanying text.
36 See infra notes 457-94 and accompanying text.
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1. COMMON LAW RULES ON THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY RICHTS 37
Since the appearance of Section 302 in 1973," the courts have been active in Iwo ways
relevant to this discussion. First, sonic state courts have either changed their law on third
party beneficiary rights or indicated a willingness to change it ,'° and second, other state
and federal courts have begun to respond to the new formulation found in Section 302 as
either being different from or consistent with their existing law." Before considering
whether such responses to Section 302 have been correct, this article will examine recent
case law to ascertain the elements of' third party beneficiary rules traditionally employed
by the courts. This examination will attempt to identify and evaluate those elements upon
which the various jurisdictions agree and those upon which the)' do not.
A. Pre,cumplions and Sufficiency of Evidence
One aspect of third party beneficiary law that appears to he generally accepted by the
courts is a presumption against third party beneficiary standing. When phrased as a rule
this presumption generally takes the form of either an exact statement that "parties arc
presumed to contract for themselves . " or other language indicating that doubts are to be
construed against an intent to contract for third party rights,' Alt bough only a portion of
the states expressly recognize this presumption, a review of the rules of the other states
finds the presumption recognized implicitly. More specifically, states have adopted strict
rules concerning the sufficiency of the evidence of intent required to establish third party
standing. These subsidiary rules generally require that the intent be "clear," "express" or
"definite.' In this same vein, some states also require that the necessary intent be
expressed CHI irely or partially in the contract itself rather than indicated by I he surround-
ing circumstances:"
" Many states have statutes embodying prior common law rules on third party beneficiary
rights. See 2 S. W ► t,[.[Frox, Coscritaurs § 367 (3d. 1959 & Stipp. 1983), The statutory enactments,
however, have not significantly changed the application of the common law rules. Reference to the
statutes are made as necessary herein.
" See supra note 12.
" See supra notes 25-28.
" See supra notes 31-32 and infra Appendix.
" See, e.g., King v. National lnd UM ries, Inc., 512 F.2d 29, 32 (6th Cir. 1975) (applying Kentucky
law); Brown v. Summerlin Associates, Inc., 272 Ark. 298, 301, 614 S.W.2d 227, 229 (1981); Midwest
Concrete Products Company v. LaSalle National Hank, 94 111. App. 3d 394, 396, 418 N.E.2d 988, 990
(1981); Lewis v. Globe Construction Co., Inc., 6 Kan. App. 2d 478, 486, 630 P.2d 179, 185 (1981);
Volume Services, Inc. v. C. F. Murphy & Assoc., inc., 656 S.W.2d 785, 795 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983);
Clearwater Construction Co. v. Gutierrez, 626 S.W.2d 789, 791 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981).
" See, e.g., American Horne insurance Company v. Travelers Indemnity Company, 122 Cal.
App. 2rf Stipp. 951, 967, 175 Cal. Rptr. 826, 834 (1981); Canyon View Irrigation Co. v. Twin Falls
Canal Co., 101 Idaho 604, 612-13, 619 P.2d 122, 130-31 (1980).
" See, e.g., Montezuma Plumbing Heating, Inc. v. Housing Authority of Montezuma County,
651 P.2d 426, 428 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982) (17)he promise to be enforced is apparent from express
provisions of the agreement."); Securit y  Mutual Casualty Co. v. Pacura, 41)2 So. 2d 1266, 1267 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1981) ("[R]ight is limited to those situations where the provisions of the contract clearly
show an intention to benefit the individual... f'); Donalson v. Coca-Cola Co., 164 Ga. App. 712,
713, 298 S.E.2d 25, 27 (1982) (lilt must clearly appear from [he contract that it was intended for his
benefit."); Keel v. Titan Construction Corp., 639 1'.2d 1228, 1231 (Okla, 1982) ("expressly for [the]
benefit of the third person"); Kelly Health Care, Inc., v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America. Inc., 226 Va.
376, 309 S.E.2d 305, 307 (1983) (intent must "clearly and definitely" be shown).
" See, e.g., American Financial Corp. v. Computer Sciences Corp., 558 F. Supp. 1182, 1184-85
(D. Del. 1983) (applying Delaware law); Norton v. First Federal Savings, 128 Ariz. 176, 178, 624 P.2d
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The thrust behind the presumption against third party rights, at least in part, is the
notion that finding such rights exposes t he promisor to potential liability to a "stranger" to
the contract, a person who has paid no price and given no consideration for the rights. 43
Unless the contract can be read as expressly or definitely including the rights in the third
party as a part of'the bargain, the promisor is envisioned as being required to give more
than he bargained for in the exchange.
In tipping the balance toward denying third party rights, the courts are making a
judgment that exposing a promisor to potential liability to a third party when the
promisor has not explicitly contracted to assume that obligation is more undesirable than
allowing a party to completely escape the consequences of a breach of contract when the
promisee is disabled from or not interested in enforcing the promise. At first glance this
presumption does seem to have merit because it gives preference to a party who has given
consideration rather than a party who has not. One primary challenge to the presump-
tion, however, is the likelihood that it may riot be necessary since courts may be able to
decide such cases fairly without resorting to it. Without resort to this presumption, the
courts would simply need to reach a decision based on the normally applicable standards
of proof, namely, "preponderance or greater weight of the evidence."" In applying this
normal standard for third party claimants, the worst possible fate of the promisor would
be that he be required to complete his promised performance or pay damages for breach.
In this sense, the promisor is not being required to give more than he bargained to give
but is merely being forced by the hand of someone other than the promisee. A second
basis for challenging the presumption is that it is not applied consistently. in some
categories of cases the courts seem to disregard the presumption and allow third party
standing, even its the absence of a "clear," "express" or "definite" expression of intent to
create third party rights, when the alternative would be to allow the promisor to escape
854, 856 (1981) (en bane); Alievogt v. Brinkoetter, 85 111. 2c1 44, 54-55, 421 N.E.2d 182, 187 (1981);
Waterford Condominium Association v. Dunbar Corp., 104 Ill. App. 3d 371, 373, 432 N.E.2d 1009,
1011 (1982); Hawkinson Beaty Co. v. Inland ins. Co., 216 Neb. 426, 431, 344 N.W.2d 454, 458
(1984); Hall v. Goodman Co., 310 Pa. Super. 465, 476, 456 A.2d 1029, 1035 (1983).
' See German Alliance Insurance Co. v. Home Water Supply Co., 226 U.S. 220, 230 (1912); 2 S.
Wit,1.1STON § 347 n.4 (3d ed. 1959) (citing Northern National Bank v. Northern Minnesota National
Bank, 244 Minn. 202, 70 N.W.2d 118 (1955)).
The U.S, Supreme Court stated in 6'ennan Alliance:
In many jurisdictions a third person may now sue for the breach of a contract made
for his benefit. The rule as to when this can be done varies in the different States. In
sonic he must be the sole beneficiary. In others it must appear that one of the parties
owed Inns a debt or duty, creating the privily, necessary to enable him to hold the
promisor liable. Others make further conditions. But even where the right is most
liberally granted it is recognized as an exception to the general principle, which
proceeds on the legal and natural presumption, that a contract is only intended for the
benefit if those who made it. Before a stranger can avail himself of the exceptional
privilege of suing for a breach of an agreement, us which he is not a party, he must, at
least show that it wins intended for his direct benefit. For, as sa id by this court, speaking
of the right of bondholders to sue a third party who had made an agreement with the
obligor to discharge the bonds, they may have had an indirect interest in the perfor-
mance of' the undertakings, but that is it very different thing from the privity necessary
to enable them to enforce the contract by suits in their own names. National Bank v.
Grand Lodge, 98 U.S. 123, 124: Hendrick v. Lindsay, 93 U.S. 143, 149; National
Savings Bk. v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195, 202, 205.
226 U.S. at 230.
46 See F. JAMES & G. 1-1,w.Axn, Civn. PROCEDURE §7.6, at 243 (2d ed. 1977).
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liability For breach:" A third and very important basis for challenging t he presumption
against third part y rights is I hat the presumption is related to an unrealistic notion that
generally the parties actually have some discoverable intent concerning third party
rights. 4 ' The presumption against standing ostensibly can he overcome only by clear
evidence of the parties' actual, express intent to confer an enforceable right upon the
third party. Since actual, express intent is not likely to be found in the majority of litigated
cases,'" I he presumption, if strictly applied, would stand as an insurmountable bar to most
third party beneficiary claims.
Even if a state rationally chose to adopt the presumption against third party standing,
to reflect t hat prejudice in a requirement t hat the rebutting evidence of intent appear in
the contract itself, as some states presently do, 3° would be patently unreasonable. Al-
though the relevant courts have not consistently applied this requirement in the reported
cases,' it vet stands as a bar not only to those cases which may be summarily dismissed but
47 For a prime example, see the will drafting cases cited below at notes 153-63 and accompany-
ing text. The presumption also is not applied in true creditor beneficiary cases. See infra notes 77,
126-30 and accompanying text.
" Two potentially conflicting theories that should be carefully considered converge in many of
the cases. One is that the courts should limit their role to interpreting or construing the agreement of
the parties and not add to its terms at all. See, e.g., Waterford Condominium Association v. Dunbar
Corp., 104 III. App. 3d 371, 373, 432 N.E.2d 1009, 1011 (1982); Alva v. Cloninger, 51 N.C. App.
602, 608 -09, 277 S.E.2d 535, 539 (1981). This restrictive approach suggests that the parties must
actually contemplate and provide for the possibility that a third party may seek to enforce the
contract and that the court's role is to find and discern this actual intent of the parties. In some cases,
such as the classic creditor beneficiary cases discussed infra at notes 76-77, even the more restrictive
courts would assign to the parties, by means of interpretation, an intent to create rights in the third
person even though the contract has no express statement concerning third party rights. The
interpretive process obviously involves a degree of inference.
The other t heory  is that parties generally leave "gaps" in a contract, often including among them
the failure to provide for the rights that may accrue in third persons. When a court is faced with such
a gap it can properly be said that the court's role is to supply a term if supplying the term would be
consistent with the contracting parties' goals and expectations. See E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS §§
7.16 and 10.3 (1982). In filling such a gap the court is making perhaps a somewhat greater degree of
inference than in those cases of "interpretation" mentioned above.
The point of convergence of the two theories, interpretation and gap filling, is when the
evidence of intent is very minimal, conflicting or inconclusive. The distinction between interpretation
and gap filling then becomes very uncertain. Rather than attempt to distinguish between these two
functions, courts might find it more effective and efficient to establish clear standards for what
factors and circumstances will support an inference, whether it be interpretive or supplementary,
that third party rights should be permitted as consistent with the manifest terms and goals of the
contracting parties. Attempts to restrict third party rights to those instances where actual intent to
confer rights supposedly can be found will lead the courts to engage in unproductive and distractive
exercises.
" See E. Fmusswoicru, CONTRACT'S § 10.3. I f the contracting parties do clearly provide for third
party rights, the courts' task of enforcing the terms is straightforward. For most litigated cases, as
with practically every case cited in this article, the parties have failed to include clear provisions
concerning third party standing, probably because there was no contemplation of that issue.
The drafters of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts also seem to have viewed these cases as
largely involving instances in which the contracting parties did not consider or possess any actual
intent concerning third party standing. See infra notes 372-75,
" See supra note 44.
S' See, e.g., Norton v. First Federal Savings, 128 Ariz. 176, 178, 624 P.2d 854, 856 (1981) (en
bane) (the court went on to look to other extrinsic evidence after stating the intent must be found in
contract and having concluded that the contract evidenced no intent); Local 80 Sheet Metal Workers
International Association, AFL-C10 v. Tishman Construction Corp., 103 Mich, App. 784, 789, 791,
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also to potential claimants who may refrain from pursuing actions in the face of the
requirement. Indeed, cases exist in which courts have abbreviated their consideration of
the third party standing question in light of this requirement.' The major fault in such a
process is that it applies a rather arbitrary and wooden rule rather than encouraging a
search for a course of performance that fairly comports with the discoverable intent of the
pat-ties.
Two cases stand as particularly good examples of the unreasonableness of the
requirement that intent appear in the express terms of the contract. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit decided the case of Beckman Cotton Company v. Fin/
National Bank of Atlanta" applying Georgia law. At issue in Beckman was a claim of third
party standing by a person not listed as payee under a letter of credit because of a federal
financing program requirement, but who was unquestionably the real party interested in
performance by the defendant bank!" The Georgia state courts had recently reaffirmed
303 N.W.2d 893, 895-96 (1981) (after indicating that "the intention as disclosed by the terms of the
contract, governs," the court decided that the provisions of a different contract than the contract
sued upon were "diapositive of thethird-party beneficiary action"). Compare Montezuma Plumbing &
Heating, Inc. v. Housing Authority of Montezuma County, 651 P.2d 426, 428 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982)
(Colorado rule stated to be that third party standing must be apparent from express provisions), with
Concrete Contractors, Inc. v. E.B. Roberts Construction Co., 664 P.2d 722, 725 (Colo. 1983) (proof
of intent to benefit third party was not present in contract but derived entirely from surrounding
circumstances and conduct of parties).
Also compare statements of Illinois law requiring intent to be determined from "within the
language of the contract," Securities Fund Services, Inc. v. American National Rank and Trust
Company of Chicago, 542 F. Supp. 323, 329 (N.D. 111. 1982), with those apparently allowing
reference to extrinsic evidence, e.g., People ex rel. Resnik v. Curtis & Davis, Architects & Planners,
Inc., 78 111. 2d 381, 385, 400 N.E.2d 918, 919 (1980) (quoting Carson Pirie Scott & Co. v. Parrett, 346
III. 252, 257-58, 178 N.E. 498, 501 (1931)) ("the intention is to be gleaned from a consideration of all
the contract and the circumstances surrounding the parties at the time of its execution"). For
seemingly conflicting statements within a single paragraph of an opinion, see Illinois Housing
Development Authority v. Sjostrom & Sons, Inc., 105 111. App. 3d 247, 254-55, 433 N.E.2d 1350,
1356 (1982) ("intention is to be gleaned from a consideration of all or the contract provisions and the
circumstances ... [t]he liability of the promisor to the third party must affirmatively appear in the
language of the contract [and] cannot he extended or enlarged on the sole ground I hat the situation
and circumstances of the parties justify or demand further or other liability"). The Kansas, Louisi-
ana, and North Carolina courts have made similar, apparently inconsistent statements about the use
of extrinsic evidence. See Martin v. Edwards, 219 Kan. 466, 473-74, 548 P.2d 779, 785-86 (1976)
(stating in one paragraph that the intent "must clearly be expressed in the contract" and in the next
paragraph that "facts and circumstances surrounding execution become competent in the event the
instrument is ambiguous"); New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 732 F.2d
452, 467-68, (5th Cir. 1984) (discussion of' inconsistent statements and practice of the Louisiana
courts); CF Industries, Inc. v. Transcontinental Gas l'ipe Line Corp., 448 F. Supp. 475, 479-480
(W.D.N.C. 1978), (discussion of inconsistent statements and practice of North Carolina courts).
52 See, e.g., Slate Printing Co. v. Metro Envelope. Co., 532 F. Supp. 431, 433 (N.D. Ill. 1982);
Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 519 F. Stipp. 60, 72.73 (S.D. Ga. 1981)
(applying Georgia law); Donalson v. Coca-Cola Co., 164 Ga. App. 712, 713, 298 S.E.2d 25, 27 (1982);
Alva. v. Cloninger, 51 N.C. App. 602, 607-09, 277 S.E.2d 535, 538-39 (1981); Duncan-Lagnese and
Associates, Inc. v. Stoney Creek Valley Sewer Authority, 303 Pa. Super. 236, 241, 449 A.2d 666, 668
(1982); General State Authority v. Sutter Corp., 44 Pa. Commw. 156, 165, 403 A.2d 1022, 1026-27
(1979).
" 666 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1982).
t4 The unusual facts of the case are found at 666 F.2d at 182-83. The plaintiff, the putative third
party beneficiary, negotiated a sale of' cotton to a Phillippine purchaser. The purchaser desired to
complete the purchase through a United States government program which would provide immedi-
ate payment to the seller and would allow the purchaser three years to pay. As part of the program,
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the requirement that evidence of the intent to benefit must a ppear  in the contract.'"
Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit did not cite such a requirement as part of Georgia law and
found third party standing for the plaintiff even though a government agency, rather
than the plaintiff, was listed as payee on the letter of credit. An injustice would certainly
have occurred had standing been denied to the plaintiff because of an omission in the
letter of credit when the intent to benefit him .was so evident from the circumstances.'"
Anot her case arguing against the propriety of the requirement of an express contract
provision is Kary v. Kary. 57 In Kary, a decedent had entered into a contract to purchase
land which provided that title should be given jointly to his brother and son.'" The
express terms seemed to provide t hat the brother was to benefit by gaining part own-
ership. An inquiry into the surrounding circumstances, however, revealed that the dece-
dent had intended t he brother only to assume a position of trust for the ultimate benefit
of the decedent and his son.'" Here the apparent express intent to benefit was negated by
reference to the surrounding circumstances.
As these cases illustrate, the requirement that the evidence of intent he found in t he
express terms of the contract is an unreliable test"" and ought to he rejected. Fortunately,
many states either expressly allow reference to extrinsic evidence as a general matter" or
permit reference to extrinsic evidence if the contract is not clear." The remaining states
simply fail to enunciate a rule so that use of extrinsic evidence may be fairly inferred to be
permissible.
On balance, the courts have not been inclined to grant third parry standing freely and
in the most recent cases furnish no sign that this bias against third party standing is
the purchaser was required to obtain a letter of credit naming a United States government agency as
payee; upon notice that the letter was effective the government would pay' the plaintiff-seller. The
defendant bank breached its obligations by failing to give notice that the letter of credit was effective
and as a result the plaintiff was forced to sell the cotton at a price that was $45,490 less than the
contract price. Plaintiff then sued the bank for this amount, claiming to be a third party beneficiary
of the letter of credit agreement between the purchaser and the bank even though the United States
government agency was listed as the payee. The court found that circumstances showed "that the
parties contemplated Beckman as an intended beneficiary of the contract."
See Backus v. Chilivis, 236 Ca. 500, 502, 224 S.E.2d 370, 372 (1976); Donalson v. Coca-Cola
Co., 164 Ga. App. 712, 713, 298 S.E.2d 25, 27 (1982).
se The Court noted that the bank had sent a copy of t he credit letter to the plaintiff and had
equated "beneficiary" with the plaintiff as seller-exporter in its own letter of credit procedures. 666
F.2d at 183.
'7
 318 N.W.2d 334 (S.D. 1982).
" Id. at 335.
" Id. at 337.
ea
	Note, Barriers to Recovery in Pennsylvania Third Party Beneficiary Law, 82 DICK. L. REV. 143,
161 (1977) (discussing the unfairness of the Pennsylvania law requirement that the obligation to the
beneficiary appear in the contract itself).
Just' s, Eric. v. Arrington Construction Co., Inc., 99 Idaho 462, 464, 583 P.2d 997, 999
(1978); Buchman Plumbing Co., Inc. v. Regents of the University of Minnesota, 298 Minn. 328, 334,
215 N.W.2d 479, 483 (1974); Kary v. Kary, 318 N.W.2d 334, 336 (S.D. 1982); Canipe v. National
Loss Control Service Corp., 566 F. Supp. 521, 528-29 (N.D. Miss. 1983) (applying Tennessee law);
Suthers v. Booker Hospital District, 543 S.W.2d 723, 727 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976); Tracy Collins Bank
& Trust v. Dickamore, 652 P.2d 1314, 1315 (Utah 1982); Simons v. Tri-State Construction Co., 33
Wash. App. 315, 323, 655 P.2d 703, 709 (1982).
' 2
 Laclede Investment Corp. v. Kaiser, 596 S.W.2d 36, 41 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); Broadway
Maintenance Corp. v. Rutgers, 90 N.J. 253, 260, 447 A.2d 906, 909 (1982); Stotlar v. Hester, 92 N.M.
26, 30, 582 P.2d 403,407 (1978); O'Connell v. Entertainment Enterprises, Inc., 317 N.W.2d 385, 388
(N.D. 1982).
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changing. The propriety of this stance is questionable, however, particularly since a third
party must still prove that a breach has occurred after standing is granted.° The more
liberal granting, of standing should have an unfavorable effect only on those promisors
who fail to properly perform under their contracts. Third party beneficiaries seek no
more than to have the promisor render the performance for which the promisor received
consideration from the promisee.
B. The Parties' Intent
Closely related to the question of what proof of intent is required to establish third
party standing is the question of whose intent is required.!" On this issue the different
jurisdictions fall into three categories: jurisdictions which deem proof of the promisee's
intent sufficient,' jurisdictions which require proof of the individual intent of both
parties," and those jurisdictions satisfied with proof that the promisor had reason to know
of the promisee's intent to contract for third party rights."
This aspect of third party beneficiary law has been the subject of some judicial and
academic discussion. Those courts and commentators favoring a requirement of intent by
the promisee alone generally follow the reasoning of Professor Corbin that since the
promisee gives the consideration upon which the promise to benefit t he third party is
founded, the promisee's intent should govern." This approach lends itself to easy appli-
cation where the promisee's intent is clear but the contract and surrounding circum-
stances lack any express evidence of an affirmative intent on the part of the promisor to
63 See Jones, supra note 18, at 317 - 18. One of the factors causing courts to be restrictive in
granting third party rights is a fear that contracting parties may be exposed to liability to an overly
broad group of third persons. This fear appears unfounded in light of the "screening" devices, such
asthe need to prove a valid contract and a breach. Id. Of course, the basic screening device is that the
parties may expressly deny third party beneficiary rights. See Nepco Forged Products Inc. v.
Consolidated Edison, Inc., 99 A.D.2d 508, 470 N.Y.S.2d 680, 681 (1984); Broadway Maintenance
Corp. v. Rutgers, 90 N.J. 253, 260, 447 A.2d 906, 909 (1982).
61 All states will normally speak of the "intent of the parties." The states mentioned in the
ensuing categories go on to specify more exactly the intent required from the promisor or promisee.
For the states which do not elaborate, the cases may he fairly read to require some intermediate
showing of mut ual intent that would fall between those states allowing hat the intent of the promisee
is most important and states requiring that the intent of both panics be manifest,
" See, e.g. State v. Osborne, 607 P.2d 369, 371 (Alaska 1980); Stowe v. Smith, 184 Conn. 194,
196 n.1, 441 A.2d 81, 83 n.1 (1981); Khahhaz v. Swartz, 319 N.W.2d 279, 285 n.9 (Iowa 1982); Little
v. Union Trust Co. of Maryland, 45 Md. App. 178, 181, 412 A.2d 1251, 1253 (1980); Goodman-
Marks Associates v. Westbury Post Association, 70 A.D.2d 145, 148, 420 N.Y.S.2d 26, 29 (1979); ITT
Industrial Credit Co. v. L.P. Gas Equipment, Inc., 453 E. Supp. 671, 675 (W.D. Okla. 1978) (applying
Oklahoma law); nary' v. Karv, 318 N.W.2d 334, 336 (S.D. 1982).
" See, e.g., American Financial Corp. v. Computer Sciences Corp., 558 F. Supp. 1182, 1185 (D.
Del. 1983) (applying Delaware law); 1.1)11 Properties v. Morgan Trust Co., 145 Ga. App. 132, 133,
243 S.E.2d 278, 279-80 (1978): Murphy v. Villanova Univ., 547 F. Supp. 512, 521 (E.D. Pa. 1982)
(applying Pennsylvania law); Clearwater Constructors, Inc. v. Gutierrez, 626 S.W.2d 789, 791 (Tex.
1981); Professional Realty Corp. v. Bender, 216 Va. 737, 739; 222 S.E.2d 810, 812 (1976). See also
Williams v. Virgin Island Water & Power Authority, 672 F.2d 1220, 1228 (3d Cir. 1982) (applying
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 and requiring that both parties' intent be present).
67
 See, , Zigas v. Superior Court, 120 Cal, App. 3d 827, 838, 174 Cal. Rptr. 806, 811 (1981);
Tamposi Associates, Inc, v. Star Market Co., Inc., 119 N.H. 630, 633, 406 A.2d 132, 134 (1979);
Storlar v. Hester, 92 N.M. 26, 30, 582 P.2d 403, 407 (1978).
" 4 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 776 (1951).
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benefit the third party. In these situations, jurisdictions that require only the promisee's
intent have no problem recognizing standing for the third party. 69
In jurisdictions that require an actual showing of individual intent by both parties,
the situation described in the preceding paragraph results in a denial of third party
standing because evidence of intent of the promisor is absent. The requirement that both
parties must intend a benefit is usually coupled with a requirement that the intent
expressly appear in the contract.' This combination of requirements may result in a
premature termination of consideration of third party claims by the courts.'' In such
circumstances, finding no evidence of the promisor's intent in the contract terms, courts
typically fail to go on to consider whether the contract, as read in the light of contracting
circumstances, would support a conclusion that the parties actually intended to confer
rights upon the third party or whether inferring such rights would be reasonable and
consistent with the contracting parties' purposes.
Again, as with the rule requiring that evidence of intent be found in the contract
itself," only a minority of states require that a showing of intent by both parties be
expressed in the contract. Most stales either require only a showing of the promisee's
intent or a showing that the promisor had reason to know of the promisee's intent. Of' he
three approaches, the latter one is preferable, since it requires both that some intent to
benefit be attributable to the promisee and that this intent be ascertainable. Under this
approach the intent of the promisee must be sufficiently obvious that the promisor must
either have known or have had reason to know that he was assuming an obligation that
might be enforced by the third party.
Although, as a practical matter, the "promisee's intent only" and the "promisee's
intent plus promisor's recognition - rules would probably achieve the same result in most
cases," the latter phrasing offers two significant advantages. First, it addresses the fun-
damental concern of sonic courts that the promisor ought not to be burdened with
greater obligations than those for which he contracted. Second, procedurally, it steers the
court toward a more balanced and complete consideration of what intent as to the third
party is fairly attributable to both of the contracting parties. This approach safeguards
" Cases may exist in which the promisor would be the only or primary party interested in
conferring a benefit upon the third party. An example would be divorce settlement agreements
which provide special support for children of the marriage. See cases cited infra notes 146-52. In
these cases that intent of the promisor ought to be enough but, as a practical matter, the agreements
probably would be construed to reflect an intent by both parties to confer a benefit.
7' See American Financial Corp. v. Computer Sciences Corp., 558 F. Supp. 1182, 1185-86 (D,
Del. 1983); Donalson v. Coca-Cola Co., 164 Ga. App. 712, 713, 298 S.E.2d 25, 27 (1982); Pennsyl-
vania Liquor Control Board v. Rapistan, Inc., 472 Pa. 36, 44, 371 A.2d 178, 181-82 (1976).
7' See Williams v. V.I. Water and Power, 672 F.2d 1220, 1228 (3d Cir. 1982); Hillbrook
Apartments, Inc. v. Nyce Crete Co„ 237 Pa. Super. 565, 571-72, 352 A.2d 148, 151-52 (1975).
74
	supra noses 44, 50-60 and accompanying text.
73
	a state strictly required only intent of the promisee and allowed that intent to be proven
entirely by extrinsic evidence that the promisor may not have known about, then such a test might
result in third party 'rights arising in a case where the promisor would not be chargeable with
knowledge of the intent to benefit. For example, imagine that A contracts with B for B to cut and
make into firewood the trees located on lot X. Unknown to B is that C owns lot X and A has promised
C that the trees will be removed. Under a strict "promisee's intent only" rule, C would probably have
standing to ent4ce the agreement against B. As the "promisee's intent only" rule is applied,
however, this result is unlikely because the promisee's intent would have to be shown at least by some
objective evidence in the contracting circumstances if not in the contract itself. See Chmieleski v. City
Products Corp., 660 S.W. 2d 275 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (prospective sublessee, intended to benefit by
lessee but not revealed in any way to lessor-owner, could not be third party beneficiary).
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against courts prematurely ending an evaluation of a contract and its surrounding
circumstances after simply concluding that the promisee intended to benefit the third
party. Requiring that, at a minimum, the promisor have reason to know of the promisee's
intent to benefit the third party should force the courts to view the apparent intent of the
promisee as the promisor would have viewed it — in the light of the circumstances in
which the contract was made. Courts, therefore, would also be guided toward a more
enlightened rule as to the role of extrinsic evidence.
C. The Intent Standard
The courts have phrased the standard of intent that must be shown to confer rights
upon a third party in different ways. The various formulations contain a rather consistent
requirement of intent to confer a "direct" benefit or obligation. 74 This phrasing of the test
for sufficient intent reflects once more the restrictive or conservative concerns of most
courts in this area.' The requirement of direct benefit, however, is much more defensible
than the restrictive rules requiring that intent appear in the contract or that both parties
have an affirmative intent to benefit.
The requirement of "directness" reflects a definite consensus among courts t hat the
distinction between enforceable and unenforceable third party rights depends on the
quality and certainty of the benefit. This requirement also addresses much of t he concern
t hat the intent to benefit be sufficiently evident. For example, in t he case of a true creditor
beneficiary, where the promisor agrees to pay the promisee's debt to a third party, as
found in the landmark case of Lawrence v. Fox, 70 the directness of the obligation from the
promisor and of the benefit to the third party satisfies almost every element of the third
party rules that has been raised so far. In the creditor beneficiary situation, the intent to
benefit would be considered present in the express terms of the contract; any presump-
tion against third party rights would be rebutted since the terms necessarily require a
benefit to the third party;" and finally, the promisee would be deemed to have intended
74 See, e.g., Group Health Inc. v. Schweiker, 549 F. Supp. 135, 144 (S.D. Fla, 1982) (applying
federal common law) ("must demonstrate that it was the intent and purpose of the contracting
parties to confer a direct and substantial benefit"); Taylor Woodrow Blitman Constr. Corp. v.
Southfield Gardens Company, 534 F. Supp. 340, 343 (D. Mass. 1982) ("It is well established under
federal common law that one who is not a party to a contract may nevertheless have enforceable
claims ... if the contract was made for his direct benefit.") (footnote omitted); Holley v. St. Paul Fire
& Marine Ins. Co., 396 So. 2d 75, 80 (Ala. 1981) ("One who seeks recovery in contract as a third-party
beneficiary must establish that the contract was intended for his direct, as opposed to incidental,
benefit."); Stowe v. Smith, 184 Conn. 194, 196, 441 A.2d 81, 82-83 (1981) ("Mhe contracting parties
intended that the promisor should assume a direct obligation to the third party."); Mogensen v.
Martz, 441 N.E.2d 34, 35 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982) (performance of the terms must necessarily render "a
direct benefit intended by the parties"); Teter v. Morris, 650 S.W.2d 277, 282 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982)
(contract must be intended "for the direct benefit of the third party"); Reidy v. Macauley, 57 N.C.
App. 184, 186, 290 S.E.2d 746, 747 (1982) ("[O]ur courts have consistently held that one may not
maintain an action for breach of contract unless the contract was entered into for his or her direct
benefit.").
7' See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
7" In Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N.Y. 268 (1859), A owed C $300; A loaned B $300 in exchange for a
promise to repay the $300 to C in satisfaction of As indebtedness. C was found to be a creditor third
party beneficiary of B's promise to A to pay the $300 to C.
77 In almost every state a party is considered to be third party beneficiary if he can satisfy the
definition of a creditor beneficiary as described in the original Restatement Section 33, supra note 12,
and the often cited 4 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 774 (1951). Although the courts do not always
expressly state it as such, a presumption is taken in favor of third party beneficiary standing if the
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to benefit the third party, and the promisor would be fairly charged with sharing or
recognizing that intent by the promisee.
It is noteworthy that the more direct the benefit to the third party and, corre-
spondingly, the more direct the obligation assumed by the promisor, the more irrelevant
becomes the question of whet her the parties actually intended to confer rights or whet her
the court is filling a gap in the contract. As already suggested, the distinction between
interpretation and gap-filling often becomes vague and tenuous — and perhaps valueless
or impossible as a practical matter." In instances, such as the true creditor beneficiary
cases, where the benefit and performance is direct, courts need not and should not pursue
the difficult search for subjective intent and may simply infer intent from the purpose of
the contract as objectively manifested by the prescribed performances.
Acknowledging I hen that the requirement of direct benefit is a very effective test at
least in the true credit or type of case, two questions arise: first, does t he direct benefit
standard lend itself to general application, and second, should third party rights be
recognized in some instances when the benefit or obligation is something less than direct.
These questions can be answered by surveying the decisions of t he courts, which is t he
function of the second part of this article.'"
Most courts have not applied a simple direct benefit test but instead have modified or
supplemented it in ways that are not always helpful. Many courts have coupled their
direct benefit requirement with a complementary requirement that the benefit not be
incidental." This contrast helps to identify the polar cases, that is, true credit or
- be-
neficiary arrangements as opposed to t he true incidental beneficiary situations typified by
creditor definition can be deemed to apply. See Jacobs Associates v. Argonaut Ins. Co„ 282 Or. 551,
558, 580 P.2d 529, 532 (1978) (en bane) (when there is an express promise to pay the third party
there need he no discussion of "intention to benefit"). In this case it would probably take an express
or nearly express provision denying standing to prevent third party rights from arising. See supra
note 63.
Some courts have also found a presumption in favor of third party beneficiary rights in other
similar situations. See, e.g., Jachim v. Coussens, 88 Mich. App. 648, 653, 278 N.W.2d 708, 710 (1979)
(applying statutory law: "A promise shall be construed to have been made for the benefit of a person
whenever the promisor of said promise has undertaken to give or to do or refrain from doing
something directly to or for said person." M.C.L. § 600.1405(1); M.S.A. § 27A.1405(1)). In this case,
Firestone Tire and Rubber Company settled a lawsuit with the plaintiff's wife related to an accident
resulting from a tire blowing out. As part of the settlement Firestone promised not to bring suit
against the plaintiff unless certain conditions were met. When Firestone brought suit without the
conditions being met, the plaintiff asserted an affirmative defense of release and settlement based on
his status as a third party beneficiary of the settlement between Firestone and his wife. The court
found that despite any subjective motives Firestone may have had, the plaintiff was a third party
beneficiary because the "contract necessarily and directly" benefited him and because "parties are
presumed to intend consequences of a performance of the contract. - 88 Mich. App. at 654-55, 278
N.W.2d at 710.
For similar reasoning without statutory fortification see Hialeah Hospital, Inc. v. Raventos, 425
So. 2d 1205, 1206 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983): Lipshie v. Tracy Investment Company, 93 Nev. 370,
379, 566 P.2d 819, 825 (en bane) (1977): Lansdale v. Chesterfield, 99 Wash, 2d 353, 360-62, 662 P,2d
385, 389-90 (1983).
7M See supra note 48.
" See text accompanying notes 123 -331.
8° See,e.g., Beverly v. Macy, 702 F.2d 931, 940 (11th Cir. 1983); Securities Fund Services Inc. v.
American National Bank and Trust Co. of Chicago, 542 F. Stipp, 323, 329 (N,D, Ill. 1982); Holley v.
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 396 So. 2d 75, 80 (Ala. 1981); Khabbaz v. Swartz, 319 N.W.2d 279,
284 (Iowa 1982); Martin v. Edwards, 219 Kan. 466, 472-73, 548 P.2d 779, 785 (1976); James v. State,
90 A.D.2d 342, 457 N.Y.S.2d 148, 152 (1982).
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illustration 11 to Section 133 of the original Restatement of Contracts.'" In the latter
category of cases the third person is not within the contemplation of the contracting
parties and the benefit derived is not at all direct. This contrast of direct versus incidental
benefit, however, is not particularly helpful in t he majority of litigated cases which fall
between the extremes. Rat her, the distinction has only occasional value and is superfluous
in most instances.
Other constructions of the direct benefit requirement, however, are entirely unhelp-
ful. In West Virginia, for example, the courts have phrased the direct benefit test in terms
of "sole benefit." X1 Using that formulation of the test, West Virginia courts have required
that the contract be entered into for the sole and exclusive benefit of the t bird party. 83
This test is not only overly rest rictive on its face, but, under close scrutiny, probably sets
an impossible standard that would hardly be satisfied by even the true creditor beneficiary
arrangement." In fact, in the creditor beneficiary situation the debtor-promisee also will
receive a substantial benefit from the payment by t he promisor to the credit or-t hircl party
beneficiary that discharges t he promisee's debt. Without such a benefit to the promisee,
the contract would not be made.
Another potentially harmful construction of "direct - benefit is the requirement in
several jurisdictions that the intent to benefit must be "primary" to be sufficiently direct.""
In this context, "primary" could be deemed to require that the benefit to t he third party
he singularly primary or preeminent over any other benefit derived by other parties
under the contract. "Primary," however, could also he construed to mean of sufficient,
hierarchical importance to the contracting parties in contrast to goals or benefits of a
secondary or less essential nature."" If the more restrictive definition first posited is
"B contracts with A to erect an expensive building on A's land. C's adjoining land would be
enhanced in value by the performance of the contract. C is an incidental beneficiary." See RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302, illustration 16 (1981).
" Woodford v. Glenville State College Housing Corp., 225 S.E.2d. 671, 674-75 (W. Va. 1976).
("[U]nder prior cases interpreting W. Va. Code, 55-8-12 [1923], this Court has held that in order for
a contract concerning a third party to give rise to an independent cause of action in the third party, it
must have been made for the third party's sale benefit.") (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Id. at
674. The code provision was enacted to reflect prior court decisions. United Dispatch v. E.J. Albrecht
Co., 135 W. Va, 34, 41, 62 S.E.2d 289, 294 (1950).
" See United Dispatch v. E.J. Albrecht Co., 135 W. Va. 34, 41-46, 62 S.E.2d 289, 293-96 (1950).
" See supra note 76.
as See, e.g., Norton v. First Federal Savings, 128 Ariz. 176, 178, 624 P.2d 854, 856 (1981) (en
bane) ("it must definitely appear that the parties intend to recognize the third party as the primary
party in interest") (quoting Irwin v. Murphey, 81 Ariz. 148, 154, 302 P.2d 534, 538 (1956)); Security
Mutual Casualty Co, v. Pacura, 402 So. 2d 1266, 1267 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) ("that right is limited
to those situations where the provisions of the contract clearly show an intention primarily and
directly to benefit" t he third party); Canyon View Irrigation Company v, Twin Falls Canal Company,
101 Idaho 604, 612, 619 P.2d 122, 130 (1980) ("it must be shown that the contract was made for his
direct benefit, or as sometimes stated primarily for his benefit") (quoting Dawson v. Eldredge, 84
Idaho 337, 372, 414, 418 (1962)); Weems v. Nanticoke Homes, Inc., 37 Md. App. 544, 553 - 54, 378
A.2d 190, 195 (1977) ("it must clearly appear that the parties intend to recognize him as the primary
party in interest") (quoting Mackubin v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 190 Md. 52, 57-58, 57 A.2d 318, 321
(1948)); Hines v. Amole, 4 Ohio App. 3d 263, 268, 448 N.E.2d 473, 479 (1982) ("it must appear that
the contract was made and entered into directly or primarily for the benefit of such third person")
(citation omitted).
A third possibility is that the term "primary" might be read to require that the particular
provision have been inserted primarily for the benefit of the third person. See Engle Acoustic & Tile
Inc. v. Grenfell, 223 So. 2d 613, 619 (Miss. 1969). This limit of the primary requirement to a
provision as opposed to the whole contract might resolve some problems highlighted above but
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accepted, the definition of "primary" involves problems similar to the "sole benefit" test
discussed in the preceding paragraph.' 7 Although "primary" in the sense of being singu-
larly preeminent would allow for the possibility of other parties deriving a benefit, such a
result would requite a finding t hat the benefit to the third party was the most important
reason for contracting. Measuring this standard against the true creditor beneficiary
arrangement," the intended benefit to the creditor-third party is not likely to be more
important than the benefit the debtor-promisee hopes to derive for himself. Similarly, in
of her common cases where courts almost invariably grant third party standing, classifying
he benefit to t he third party as being of greater importance t hat other contracting goals
is difficult." Moreover, ranking the intended benefits often is likely to be a very difficult
or even impossible exercise. if the less restrictive definition of "primary" is accepted, the
primary benefit requirement may be used to distinguish a class of benefits as being of
paramount importance." In this usage, "primary" denotes a general distinction, as in the
direct versus incidental benefit comparison, but offers' no real help in making t he finer
distinctions often needed in third party beneficiary cases. Consequently the supplemental
definition of "direct" as meaning "primary" is not helpful when used in this way.
Other variations of the requirement of a direct benefit are used. 91 The New York
courts have phrased t he test as requiring a direct benefit which is "sufficiently immedi-
ate"; 92
 the Michigan courts have required that the contract "necessarily" benefit the third
party;" the Oklahoma courts have .required that the direct benefit to the third party be
"express" or "unmistakable";" and the courts of Utah have stated the test as requiring a
certainly not all, Further, the courts generally seem not to limit the term in this way. See cases cited
supra note 85.
" See supra notes 82 -84 and accompanying text. Souse cases indeed seem to apply the "primary"
benefit requirement in this manner. See Orkin Exterminating Co„ Inc. v. Robles, 128 Ariz. 132, 134,
624 P.2d 329, 331 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981); Clearwater Key Association -South Beach, Inc. v. Thacker,
431 So. 2d. 641, 645 (Ha. Dist. Ct. App. 1983). The ultimate decisions in these cases were probably
warranted but the application of the "primary" benefit standard in this manner sets an unhelpful
precedent.
5" See .supra note 76.
" For example, consider construction contract surety cases in which laborers or suppliers are
third party beneficiaries of express promises to pay those debts not satisfied by the contractor, but the
owner receives a "primary- benefit through delivery of a lien-free building. See infra notes 257-65
and accompanying text.
" See Canyon View Irrigation Co. v. Twin Falls Canal Co., 101 Idaho 604, 612, 619 1 3 .2d 122,
130 (1980); Schell v. Knickelbein, 77 Wis. 2d 344, 348, 252 N.W.2d 921, 925 (1977).
" The variation allowing for "reliance" to be a factor is discussed infra notes 441-56 and
accompanying text.
92 See New York State Energy Research Sc Development Authority v. Nuclear Fuel Set - vices, Inc.,
561 F. Supp. 954, 979 (W.D.N.Y. 1983).
" Local 80 Sheet Metal Workers International Association, AFL-CIO v. Tishman Construction
Corp,, 103 Mich. App. 784, 789, 303 N.W.2d 893, 895 (1981); jachim v. Coussens, 88 Mich. App.
648, 654, 278 N.W.2d 708, 710 (1979).
" Keel v. Titan Construction Corp., 639 P.2d 1228, 1231 (Okla. 1982). On the Oklahoma
construction of the direct benefit requirement, see also Oil Capital Racing Association v. Tulsa
Speedway, 628 P.2d 1176, 1179 (Okla. Ct. App. 1981) (construing 15 OKI.A. STAT. tit. 15, § 29 (1971):
"A contract, made expressly for the benefit of a third person, may be enforced by him at any time
before the parties thereto rescind it."). The Tulsa Speedway Court stated:
The term "expressly" in a context relevant to this case means "directly" as distinguished
from impliedly or indirectly. Thus the phrase "a contract, made expressly for the
benefit of a third person" refers to a promise made directly for the third party's benefit.
The benefit cannot be enforced if' it has to be implied from the terms of the contract or
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benefit that is "separate and distinct."'' Although these supplemental definitions may help
in some cases, they all fail to offer a relatively hard but versatile measure of when a benefit
is sufficiently "direct" or "necessarily" a part of t he cont ract or so "immediate" as to sat isfy
t he courts that it is proper to interpret or infer from the contract an intention to confer a
right upon the third party. This deficiency is reflected in situations where the benefit
"necessarily" results from performance or is more "immediate" than other possible
benefit s but would he deemed by almost every court to be unenforceable by the third
patty. A good example would be a profit producing contract of a partnership or corpora-
tion which necessarily benefits partners or stockholders in a relatively immediate manner
but will not be judged to confer enforceable I hird party beneficiary rights upon them.'
D. Categorization Test — Creditor, Donee and Incidental Beneficiaries
A last but very significant standard for determining third party beneficiary standing
is the categorization test embodied in Section 133 of the original Restatement of Con-
tracts"' and employed by many courts under the influence of Section 133 or the Corbin
treatise," or as a result of independent evolution. This met hod of determining third party
rights apparently originated in early cases such as Seaver v. Ransom."9 In that case the court
recognized a categorization test limiting recovery to certain public contracts cases and to
contracts benefiting wives, children, recipients of direct promises and creditors.'"" The
court was willing to stretch the test to allow a favorite niece to recover on a contract
promise made for her benefit upon consideration provided by her decedent aunt.' In
results incidentally from its performance. The statute does not require the contract to
expressly stale 1h:a the beneficiary can enforce it, but only t hat the beneficial promise he
express as it is here.
628 1'.2d at 1179.
" Rio Algom Corp. v. Jimco Ltd., 618 P.2d 997, 506 (Utah 1980).
"6 See infra notes 173-77 and accompanying text.
" See supra note 12 for text of RESTATEMENT of Covranurs § 133.
" The Corbin formulation of the categorization lest is nearly identical to the RESTATEMENT OF
CONTRACTS § 133 and can be found at 4 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 774 (1951).
99 224 N.Y. 233, 120 N.E. 639 (1918).
1" Id. at 237-39, 120 N.E. at 640-41.
'"' The Court stated in part:
In New York the right of the beneficiary to sue on contracts made for his benefit is
not clearly or simply defined. it is at present confined: First. To cases where there is a
pecuniary obligation running from the promisee to the beneficiary, "a legal right
founded upon some obligation of the promisee in the third party to adopt and claim the
promise as made for his benefit." ... Secondly. To cases where the contract is made for
the benefit of the wife ... affianced wife ... or child ... of a party to the contract. The
close relationship cases go hack to the early King's Bench case (1677), long since
repudiated in England, of Dutton v. Poole, 2 Lev. 211 (s.c., 1 Ventris, 318, 332)... .
The natural and moral duty of the husband or parent to provide for the future of wife
or child sustains the action on the contract made for their benefit. "This is the farthest
he cases in this state have gone," says Cullen J., in the marriage settlement case of
Borland v. Welch, 162 N.Y. 104, 110, 56 N.E. 556, 557 (1900).
The right of the third party is also upheld in, thirdly, the public contract cases ..
where the municipality seeks to protect its inhabitants by covenants for their bene fit ;
and, fourthly, the cases where, at the request of a party to the contract, the promise
runs directly to the beneficiary although he does not furnish the consideration.... It
may be safely said that a general rule sustaining recovery at the suit or the third party
would include but few classes of cases not included in these groups, either categorically
or in principle.
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teaching this result, the court underscored the primary problem with categorization tests,
namely that such tests do not easily encompass all the diverse situations in which legiti-
mate third party rights may accrue.
The currently predominant and nearly exclusive categorical ordering employed by
the courts is that of creditor, donee and incidental beneficiaries. Those beneficiaries
qualifying as creditors or dunces are considered to have enforceable rights while all those
not fitting into those two categories are deemed incidental beneficiaries and not
sufficiently intended to benefit to have enforceable rights. The categorization method of
determining stanching suffers from two weaknesses. First, some intended beneficiaries may
fall into a gap between the creditor and donee categories and be deemed incidental
because the categorization test either is poorly stated or misapplied. Second, the test of a
donee is often simply a search for sufficient indicia of intent to make a gift and therefore
does not constitute a real improvement over the intent to benefit test, which the categori-
zation device is meant to supplement.
A few courts have recognized the problems inherent in the categorization test and
have cleemphasized its importance, considering it to be a useful aid but not decisive in
determining third party standing•' Many courts, however, continue to require that a
third party qualify as a creditor or donee to have enforceable rights. 103
The concern about improper formulation of the categorization lest would not be
significant for those courts adopting the definitions of creditor and donee provided in
Section 133, since Section 133 was designed to avoid any "gap" into which some intended
beneficiaries might f For those jurisdictions not adopting the creditor and donee
definitions from Section 133, however, the danger of gap cases is more real. In Tennes-
see, for example, courts seem simply to classify the beneficiary as a donee where a
"purpose to make a gift - is present and as a creditor where the performance "will satisfy
an actual or supposed asserted duty." 10' The danger in this sort of simplistic creditor and
donee definition is that a party may intend to confer a right where no duty, actual or
supposed, is asserted and where the circumstances do not supply any evidence of a
familial or otherwise altruistic motive for the making of a gift. A good example is found in
Vikingstad v. Baggott. 1 U" In that case the seller in a real estate contract promised to the
The desire of the childless aunt to make provision for tt beloved and favorite niece
differs imperceptibly in law or in equity from the moral duty of the parent to make
testamentary provision for a child. The contract was made for the plaintiff's benefit.
She alone is substantially damaged by its breach. The representatives of the wife's estate
have no interest in enforcing it specifically.
224 N.Y. at 237-39, 120 N.E. at 640-41.
' 11 ' See Broadway Maintenance Corp. v. Rutgers, 90 N.J. '253, 260, 447 A.2d 906, 909 (1982);
Kemp v. Hudnall, 423 So. 2d 1260, 1262 (La. Ct. App. 1982).
1 " See, e.g., Williams v. Fenix & Scissors, Inc., 608 F.2d 1205, 1208 (9th Cir. 1979) (applying
federal common law); King v. National Industries, Inc., 512 F.2d 29, 33 (6th Cir. 1975) (applying
Kentucky law); New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. City of Madera, 144 Cal. App. 3d 298, 308, 192 Cal. Rptr.
548, 554 (1983); Khabbai v. Swariz, 319 N.W.2d 279, 284 (Iowa 1982); Martin v. Edwards, 219 Kan.
466, 472-73, 548 P.2d 779, 785 (1976); Weems v. Nanticoke Homes, Inc., 37 Md. App. 544, 553, 378
A.2d 190, 195 (1977); Hardware Center, Inc. v. Parkedge Corp., 618 S.W.2d 689, 693 (Mo. CI. App.
1981); Carolina Builders Corp. v. AAA Dry Wall, Inc., 43 N.C. App. 444, 447, 259 S.E.2d 364,
366-67 (1979); Mary Ellen Sandlie Trust v, Pioneer National Title Ins. Co., 648 S.W.2d 761, 762
(Tex. Civ. App. 1983).
141 See infra note 110 and accompanying text.
McCall v. Towne Square, Inc., 503 S.W.2d 180, 184 (Tenn. 1973).
46 Wash. 2d 494, 282 P.2d 824 (1955).
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purchaser that he would return to a third party the money deposit the third party had
made under a prior purchase contract for the same parcel of land. There was no reason to
believe the subsequent purchaser either owed a duty to the third party or had any
apparent desire to make a gift to benefit him.'" In all likelihood the subsequent purchaser
simply sought to defuse any potential action by the third party that might create a cloud
over his title to the land. While t he intent to confer a direct benefit was clear, the third
party in Vikingstad v. Baggott would not clearly fall into the simplistic creditor or donee
categories.
Fortunately, most courts 1 " using the creditor and donee categories as a test for intent
do so with reference to the formulation of Section 133 of the Restatement (First) of
Contracts or similar statements.'" In those formulations the creditor category is given an
expansive definition to include any party to whom the promisee may owe an actual,
supposed, asserted, or even legally barred duty. The donee class is given an even more
expansive definition that includes not only t hose for whom an apparent, true donative
intent to make a gift is present but also any others to whom an intent to confer a right
against the promisor exists. These formulations should not allow any gap between the
creditor and donee categories into which an otherwise intended beneficiary could fall."
Despite the safeguards of t he Section 133 formulation, on occasion the courts either
improperly allow intended beneficiaries to fall into a gap when they should not or
prematurely cease the search for intent because of a prima facie failure by the claimant to
qualify as a creditor or donee. King v. National Industries, Inc.,'" is such a case. King
involved a bankruptcy trustee's challenge to settlement of a claim that a debtor-subsidiary
corporation held against the defendant-parent corporation.'" The underlying contract
was an agreement between the parent corporation and a purchaser of stock in the
subsidiary providing that the parent corporation would guarantee a promissory note in
favor of the subsidiary. 13 When the maker of the note defaulted and judgment proved
uncollectible, the parent became liable to the subsidiary because of its promise to t he
purchaser to guarantee the note)" In resolving the legitimacy of a subsequent settlement
agreement between the three parties, the court concluded that the subsidiary was neither
a creditor nor donee beneficiary of the promise to guarantee the debt it was owed." 3
While the purchaser owed no duty to the subsidiary which would be satisfied by the
promise of t he parent to guarantee the note, the purchaser sought to make t he parent
liable on the note to the subsidiary. This case appears to reflect an instance of a promisee's
intent to confer a right upon t he third party against the promisor. Yet t he Sixth Circuit
panel concluded t hat the subsidiary was not a donee beneficiary because there was no
intent "to make a gift.' Consequently, in the opinion of the court, the subsidiary,
1" Id. at 495-97, 282 P.2d at 825-26.
,See cases cited supra note 103,
10" See text of ti 133 supra note 12.
10 As thus defined both the creditor and donee categories are broader than the labels would
suggest, and the donee category was designed to included/ proper beneficiaries who are not creditor
types.
512 F.2d 29 (6th Cir. 1975).
"2 Id. at 30-31,
13 Id. at 30.
Id. at 30-31.
"' Id. at 32-33.
tut The Sixth Circuit panel decided that Kentucky law properly applied to the case and that the
state law required that a contract must he "made and entered into directly or primarily for the
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qualifying as neither creditor nor donee beneficiary, was necessarily an incidental be-
neficiary and had no claim under the guarantee of the note."' Similar misapplications of
the creditor and donee categorization test resulting in an improper denial of standing can
be found in other cases."'
Most courts manage to avoid the "gap" problem that arises front either improper
formulation or erroneous application of the categorization test frit• intent. Another
deficiency exists, however, in the categorization lest. While the test works well in straight-
forward creditor beneficiary cases, it often offers little help in cases invoking supposed
donee beneficiaries. This deficiency arises because classification as a creditor primarily
depends on the objective finding of a creditor-debtor or similar relationship between the
promisee and a third party. In other words, if the promisee owes a debt or is otherwise
actually, supposedly, or allegedly obligated to the third party, the potential exists for the
promisor to promise to discharge the obligation and consequently create third party
rights. In some cases a somewhat subjective question may remain about whether the
promisor and promisee intended to create a direct obligation in the promisor to the third
party. The objective determination of whether the creditor relationship exists, however,
will serve as a fundamental qualifier and, if found, should create a presumption in favor
of third party beneficiary status that helps resolve any subjective question.'"
In contrast, the donee beneficiary class, as defined in Section 133, does not contain
the element of an objectively provable relationship that limits potential claimants or
creates a presumption of third party rights when found present. While familial relation-
benefit -
 of a third person before he would have rights. 512 F.2d at 32. In further construing the
Kentucky rule, the Court stated that:
-I-he only third parties having such rights are donee beneficiaries and creditor
beneficiaries. One is a donee beneficiary if the purpose of the promisee in buying the
promise is to make a gift to the beneficiary. A person is a creditor beneficiary if the
promisee's expressed intent is that the third party is to receive the performance of the
contract in satisfaction of an actual or supposed duty or liability of the promisee to the
beneficiary. Any others who may incidentally benefit from a contract are no more than
incidental beneficiaries with no enforceable rights under the contract. See generally 4 A.
COSBIN, CONTRACTS § 779C at 40-41 (1951), 2 S. W 11.1.ISTON, CONTRACTS § 356 at
824-27 (3d ed. 1959), RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 133 at 151-52 (1932).
Plaintiff' has argued that [the subsidiary] may properly be considered a donee
beneficiary. Plaintiff has not, however, pointed to any indication that the promisee, [the
purchaser], intended to make a gip  to [the subsidiary] or that the 1966 contract was made
for [the subsidiary's] benefit. Without such a showing, Kentucky law does not permit
[the subsidiary] to sue on the contract.... Neither has there been any showing that
perfortnance of the promise would satisfy any real or asserted duty of the promisee to
[the subsidiary] so as to make [the subsidiary] a creditor beneficiary. We therefore
conclude that [the subsidiary] was not a third-party beneficiary under the 1966 agree-
ment and that it had no enforceable rights under it.
Id. at 33 (footnote omitted) (citations to Kentucky law omitted) (emphasis added).
"? Id. For a case with similar facts reaching a different and more reasonable conclusion, see
Vickers v. First Mississippi National Bank, 458 So. 2d 1055, 1062 (Miss. 1984) (corporation was third
party beneficiary of agreement between new majority stockholder, former stockholders and bank
which provided that bank would make financing available to the corporation).
"" See infra note 122.
"9
 See, e.g., Lipshie v. Tracy Investment Co., 93 Nev. 370, 379, 566 P.2d 819, 825 (1977) ("A
contract to pay a debt to a third person is presumed for his benefit unless it appears that the contract
was not so intended.") (citations omitted); Jacobs Associates v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 282 Or. 551, 558,
580 P.2d 529, 532 (1978) (en bane) (when an express promise to pay a third party has been found the
subjective intent of the promisee is immaterial).
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ships and other similar contexts suggesting a basis for some altruistic mot ive on t he part of
the promisee may aid in classifying a beneficiary as a donee,'" the class is much
broader.' Just as every contract potentially benefits some third parties, all those third
parties may lay claim to donee beneficiary status without showing any particular relation-
ship to the promisee. Most donee beneficiary cases then revolve entirely around a search
for the rather subjective "intent to make a gib to or confer a right" upon the third party.
Classification as a donee is t he equivalent of simply answering the basic question whether
third party rights were intended. The difficult search for evidence of intent to benefit
remains central to delimiting t he broad donee class, and the categorization test helps very
little, if at al1. 122
II. CURRENT TRENDS IN APPLICATION OF THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY RULES
One may properly conclude from the foregoing survey and discussion that the
judicial standards currently used in determining third party beneficiary rights suffer
from significant flaws and are susceptible to improvement. Despite the undeniable
difficulties present in the various formulations, they are still capable of yielding decisions
that reveal trends or areas of consistency that may he instructive in ascertaining the
optimal construction of Section 302 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. Moreover,
identifying areas where the courts seem to reach inconsistent results may also aid in
framing an efficient rule, particularly if one outcome can be determined to be a "better"
result 123 and the new rule is construed to yield that outcome.
4° The existence of a familial relationship does seem to make it easier for courts to find a donee
beneficiary and the requisite intent, see infra notes 140-52 and accompanying text, but the courts
generally have not indicated as a clear presumption in favor of third party rights in these cases as is
found in the true creditor beneficiary cases. But see Saylor v. Saylor, 389 S.W.2d 904 (Ky. 1965)
(rebuttable presumption of intent to create third party right exists where husband opened joint
savings account in wife's name).
121 See REsTicrEmENT OF CosrruncTs § 133, supra note 12, and supra notes 109-10 and accotn-
panying text. The donee class is a "catchall" dims encompassing all intended beneficiaries who are not
creditor types.
' 22 Among the difficult donee cases is Lewis v. Globe Construction Co., Inc., 6 Kan. App. 2d 478,
630 P.2d 179 (1981). The State contracted with the defendant to make highway improvements in
Wichita. The contract provided that the work would be done in a manner that "maintainrecH local
traffic to the businesses between Hillside and Harry [Streets]." Upon failure to keep traffic open,
business owners brought suit against the contractor as third party beneficiaries of the State-
contractor agreement. The court found that the access provision of the contract did not reflect any
"clear intent to benefit any particular person or business" and that the business owners were "neither
'donee' nor 'creditor' beneficiaries." Id. at 486, 630 P.2d at 184. The contract also contained an
express provision negating any third party rights, but the court seemed to rest its decision as well on
the failure to satisfy the categorization test. Id. at 486, 630 P.2d at 184-85.
In McKinney v. Davis, 84 N.M. 352, 503 P.2d 332 (1972), an injured employee was found not to
be a third party beneficiary of an employer-government contract which provided in part, "No
protect the [employer], he must carry workman's liability and compensation insurance on all labor
employed under this agreement. - The court found it "clear" that the employee was not a creditor
beneficiary and also found t hat he was not a donee beneficiary because the contract terms did give
the employer reason to know that the promisee held a purpose to confer a benefit upon the
employee. Id. at 354, 503 P.2d at 334.
i23 A "better" result would he one that would he logically consistent with outcomes in similar
types of cases and one that would thereby aid in establishing clear standards for third party
beneficiary determinations to he applied not only to the common cases but also in the more unique
situations, such as those set out in notes 1-9, supra.
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Courts have reached a consensus on some "easy" cases in third party beneficiary law.
Typical examples are contracts containing rather straightforward promises by one party
to pay a debt owed by the promisee to the third party"' as well as cases where fairly clear
intent to make a gift to the third party through the promised performance is present . 12.5
Consistent trends can also be identified in other cases such as cases involving contracts for
the drafting of wills, contracts of employers which may benefit employees, and contracts
of corporations or partnerships which may benefit the shareholders or partners. Areas in
which the courts have achieved less of a consensus include contracts involving govern-
ment and public services, construction contracts, and real estate transactions. This part of
the article contains a survey and discussion of these types of cases.
A. Promises to Pay a Debt or Satisfy an Obligation
Cases still arise concerning the promise of a promisor to pay a debt owed by t he
promisee to a third party as was t he situation in Lawrence v. Fox. 126 These cases are easy for
the courts when the promise to pay or assumption of obligation is clear. An example is
found in the Florida case off-fin/Rah Hospital Inc. v. Raventas,' 27 involving a contract for the
division and sale of a business. As part of t he sale agreement, the parties agreed to divide
and assume t he obligations of the former business entity. The Florida District Court of
Appeals concluded that the sale agreement included an express promise to pay a third
party and that in such a case the intent to benefit. should be presumed. 12 ' The Massachu-
setts case of Choate, Hall & Stewart v. SCA Service, Inc. 32 " also involved a rather straight-
forward promise to pay a debt. In that case the defendant corporation obligated itself in a
settlement agreement with a former employee to pay all his legal costs resulting from
lawsuits related to his past employment. The court decided that there was an express
promise to pay a third party and that I his promise created rights in the plaintiff' who
served as counsel for the former employee) ."
Cases involving clear assumptions of obligations other than money debts are equally
easy for the courts and are exemplified by cases such as Southwick v. Ace Auto Body Shop,
Inc."' In that case the defendant promised the plaintiff's insurer to repair the plaintiff's
insured automobile. The Missouri Court of Appeals had no difficulty in concluding that
the insured was a third party beneficiary of the contract to make repairs and did not need
1 " See infra notes 126-30 and accompanying text.
1 " Although establishing a group to be called "true donee beneficiary" cases would be difficult, a
consensus of jurisdictions could certainly be achieved upon some types of donee cases, for example,
family based transactions as found in Seaver v, Ransom, 224 N.Y. 223, 120 N.E. 639 (1918), or cases
cited infra notes 140-52.
' 2 ' 20 N.Y. 268 (1859). See supra note 76.
127
 425 So. 2d 1205 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
1L" Id, at 1206. Accord Spiklevitz v. Markmit Corp., 136 Mich, App. 587, 592, 357 N.W.2(I 721,
724 (1984).
1 " 378 Mass. 535, 392 N.E.2d 1045 (1979). See supra note 26.
' Choate, Hall & Stewart v. SCA Service, Inc., 378 Mass. at 546-48, 392 N.E.2d at 1052. The
Court was faced with less than perfectly clear language but concluded that:
[T]he palsies agreed that payments under the clause would he made "directly" to [the
promisee's] counsel.... If payments were to be made to [the promisee], performance
by the defendant would not discharge [the promisee's] obligation to the plaintiff; the
contrary is true when payments are to he made direct to the plaintiff, and it becomes
very plausible to allow the plaintiff his action against the defendant.
Id, at 547, 392 N.E.2d at 1052.
646 S.W.2d 401 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
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to embark upon a search for the often elusive intent of the contracting parties.' 32
Similarly, in the case of McCall v. Towne Square,'" the Tennessee Supreme Court easily
concluded that third party rights existed where the defendant, a construction company,
promised the purchaser of realty lots to build an office building for the plaintiff-seller of
the lots. The seller had agreed to accept the construction of the office building as
compensation for the lots and was taus a third party beneficiary of the construction
Cool ract .' 34
Caution should he exercised in determining whether in fact a promise to pay a debt
or assume an obligation exists in cases of this kind. in the case of House of . Falcon, Inc. v.
Conzalez," the contracting parties agreed upon a division of liability for debts in connec-
tion with the sale of a music publishing business. The plaintiff-third party held a royalty
claim against the former business which was barred by the statute of limitations. The
Texas Court of Civil Appeals concluded that no third party rights were created in the
absence of an express promise to pay which would also serve to revive the time barred
debt.'" According to the court, the contracting parties had promised to pay and had
created third party rights in only those creditors with valid debts. Other cases exist in
which contracting parties entered into agreements concerning debts owed to t bird par-
ties, and perhaps even contemplated their payment, but did not include an ascertainable
promise to pay. Third party beneficiary tights were therefore denied.'"
12 Id. at 403. See also Abney v. Allstate Insurance Co., 442 So. 2(.1 590, 591 (La. Ct. App. 1983)
(insured homeowner was third party beneficiary of contract between insurer and contractor to repair
fire damage to home).
'503 S.W.2d 180 (Tenn. 1973).
13 'Id, at 183-84. "In the instant case, M&M [the plaintiff] falls into the second of the three
aforementioned classes [creditor beneficiary]. This necessarily follows because Towne Square was
clearly under a duty to construct the commercial building for M&M and Bob Smith Construction Co.
promised to perform that duty." Id. at 184. See also Julian Johnson Construction Corp. v. Parranto,
352 N.W.2d 808, 811 (Nlinn. Ct. App. 1984) (developer was third party beneficiary of contract
between township and contractor for construction of roads that township was obligated to provide by
agreement with developers).
13' 583 S.W.2d 902 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
136 Id. at 906. The relevant portion of the contract was a protnise that "[s]ellers agree to be
responsible „ for all royalties owing to composers, publishers and/or publishers' agents under
mechanical licenses, and does hereby agree to indemnify and hold buyers harmless from any liability
... that accrued prior to October 24, 1970. - Id. at 904. The royalties sought by the alleged third party
beneficiary were barred by the statute of limitations and the court found this language insufficient to
revive the debt or to create a new obligation to pay as a third party beneficiary. Id. at 905-06.
!" See, e.g., O'Connell v. Entertainment Enterprises, Inc., 317 N.W.2d 385 (N.D. 1982). When
the employer failed financially, its creditor and a nearby hotel entered into an agreement to assume
the management of the business. The agreement provided that the creditor would have the capacity
to retire debts, The employee, who was owed nearly $15,000 in back salary, sought payment as third
party beneficiary of the debt retirement provision. The court concluded that the debt retirement
provision was included so that the parties could continue operating the business as usual but that
"[a]either First Federal nor Erin Hotels, in either of the written contracts, agreed to assume prior
obligations of Entertainment Enterprises. Although some of the prior debts may have been paid by
First Federal or Erin Hotels, neither was obligated to do so under the written contracts." Id. at 389.
(emphasis added). See also Duncan-Eagnese and Associates, Inc. v. Stoney Creek Valley Sewer Aut h.,
303 Pa. Super. 236, 241, 449 A.2d 666, 668 (1982) (contracts prepared in connection with acquisition
of loan indicated t he loan was obtained to meet obligations under agreement with engineers and
others working on construction project but this circumstance did not reflect an intent to confer a
third party right upon the engineer); Choate, Hall & Stewart v. SCA Services Inc,, 378 Mass. 535,
546-48, 392 N.E.2d 1045, 1052 (1979) (discussion concerning need for express promise to pay third
party).
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From the foregoing discussion it may be concluded that when the promisor promises
to pay a debt or assume an obligation owed by the promisee to a third party the courts will
determine that the . third party has the right to enforce the promise without any require-
ment of a showing that the contracting parties actually contemplated enforcement by the
t hird party. In this true creditor beneficiary type of case courts will presume the intent to
create rights in a t hind party, unless an express contractual provision' or patently clear
circumstances indicate a contrary intention. 13" This presumption of intent is consistent
with those versions of the intent test focusing on a "direct" obligation or benefit. In this
type of case the performance and benefit go directly from the promisor to the t bird party;
t he promisee whose debt or obligation is relieved when the third party is satisfied has a
less direct or derivative benefit. This aspect of t he relatively easy, true creditor beneficiary
cases should he contrasted with other more difficult cases which lack this component of •
directness.
R. Gilt Cases — Including Divorce Settlement Agreements
Some donee beneficiary cases are comparable to the cases discussed in t he foregoing
section and, as in the creditor situation, courts have little difficulty in finding the requisite
intent for recognition of third party rights. The case of a husband who deposits money
into a savings account to be held jointly with his wife is an example. Considering this type
of situation in Saylor v. Saylor,'' the Kentucky Court of Appeals concluded that the wife
was a third party beneficiary of t he deposit agreement which allowed the wife access to the
funds. More particularly, the court concluded that the nature of the joint savings account
raised a presumption of intent to create rights in t he third party±' The particular aspect
of this type of account on which the court focused was essentially a promise by the
batik-depository to pay the funds to the wife as joint holder) ." Such a promise is quite
similar to the promise of the promisor in the true creditor beneficiary type of case.
Other more recent cases have involved promises similar to I he promise in Saylor v.
Saylor and courts deciding those cases have required direct benefit or performance in the
nature of a gift. Situations involved include an agreement that a bank draw certificates of
deposit so that upon the death of the depositor t he certificates would pass to bet niece,' a
13" Express provisions denying third party beneficiary rights will be honored even when the
contract otherwise indicates third party rights. See .supra note 63.
" See, e.g., Jet( v. Phillips & Associates, 439 F.2d 987, 991 (10th Cir. 1971). The creditor-payee
on a promissory note was found not to be a third party beneficiary of a promise to guarantee the note
where the circumstances indicated that the purpose in making the guarantee was to share liability
with original obligors on the note but not to benefit the payee. The court apparently was convinced
that the circumstances negated a direct obligation despite the apparent direct, certain benefit to the
payee.
'" 389 S.W.2d 904 (Ky. 1965).
'" Id. at 906. The court stated:
By his deposit of money a contract was created between Mr. Saylor and the bank. By
causing.die account to be established and maintained in the names of himself and his
wife, in the absence of evidence of the contrary there is a rebuttable presumption that
Mr. Saylor intended to and did make his wife a third party beneficiary of the contract.
42 Id. The court stated that the proper inference is that either party named on the account may
demand money From the account and the hank would he obligated to comply. See also Vaughn v.
Perkins, 576 S.W.2d 257, 261 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979) (husband's making of joint checking account and
certificates of deposit in the name of himself and wife made her a third party beneficiary).
'' Baker v. Bank of Northeast Arkansas, 271 Ark. 948, 951, 611 S.W.2d 783, 874 (Ark. App.
1981); accord Malek v. Patten,	 Mom.	 678 P.2d 201 (1984).
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promise by a vendor to a vendee to execute a deed in favor of a third party upon the
vendee's death,'" and a promise by a promoter of stock car races to the county race track
owner to pay the participating car drivers a percentage of gate receipts.'"
Similar issues have arisen in the context of divorce settlement agreements involving a
promise by one parent to another to provide some support or benefit to their children.'"
The courts of the several jurisdictions that have considered the question have concluded
that third party rights in the child arise when there is a promise to pay the child's college
education expenses,' to name the child as beneficiary of an insurance policy,'" to
establish a trust account for the benefit of the child , 149 or to write a will to benefit a child.' 50
The courts have generally rejected, however, attempts by children to collect on a promise
by the absent parent to make basic child support payments to the parent wit h custody. 15 '
An established line of New York decisions holds that suits by a child for basic support
payments are improper unless the guardian-parent is unable or unwilling for some
reason to assert the right to payment. The reasoning, in part, is that while the basic
support payments are undeniably for the benefit of the child, the parties and society
contemplate enforcement solely by the parent with custody."
Marosites v. Proctor, 59 N.C. App. 353, 354, 296 S.E.2t1 526, 526 (1983). The court found
t hat a third party beneficiary contract could be used to pass property upon death or promise without
conflict with laws governing wills and probate. Id. at 354, 296 S.E.2d at 527.
I ' Oil Capital Racing Association v. Tulsa Speedway, 628 P.2d 1176, 1178 (Okla. Ct. App.
1981).
"9 For two cases not involving children, see In re Spong, 661 F.2d 6, 10 (2d Cir. 1981) (wife's
attorney was third party beneficiary of divorce settlement provision requiring that husband pay her
attorney's fees) and Costanza v. Costanza, 346 So. 2d 1133, 1135 (Ala. 1977) (bank holding invalid
mortgage was not third party beneficiary of divorce property settlement agreement which provided,
in part, that mortgaged property would be sold and proceeds used to satisfy the invalid mortgage—
leaving open the possibility that if the mortgage had been valid the bank would have been a
creditor-type third party beneficiary).
147 See Mitchell v. CombankiWinter Park, 429 So. 2d 1319, 1322 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983);
Stegall v. Stegall, 571 S.W.2d 564, 566 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978).
"" See Orsini v. Commercial National Bank, 639 S.W.2d 516, 518 (Ark. Ct. App. 1982); In re
Estate of Lemer, 306 N.W.2d 244, 246 (S.D. 1981).
"" See McDaniel Title Co. v. Lemons, 626 S.W.2d 686, 690 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); Stebbins v.
Stebbins, 121 N.H. 1060, 1064, 438 A.2d 295, 298 (1981). See also Thorpe v. Collins, 245 Ga. 77, 263
S.E.2d 115 (1980) (father of child born out of wedlock denied summary judgment against claim that
child was third party beneficiary of agreement with mother for father to establish trust and write will
to benefit child).
I" See In re Estate of Lingle, 72 N.J. 87, 95, 367 A.2d 878, 882 (1976); Kuhn v. Kuhn, 281
N.W.2d 230, 236 (N.D. 1979); accord In re Estate of Gosmire,.331 N.W.2d 562, 568 (S.D. 1983)
(agreement between two brothers that one's will would devise property to the other's son).
161 See Cronebaugh v. VanDyke, 415 So. 2d 738, 742 (Fla, Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Drake v. Drake,
89 A.D.2d 207, 209-10, 455 N.Y.S.2d 420, 422 (1982).
1 ." Drake v. Drake, 89 A.D.2d 207, 210-11, 455 N.Y.S.2d 420, 423 (1982) and cases cited
herein. The Drake court stated:
From this may be distilled a simply stated general rule in New York that barring
unusual circumstances,- children have no standing to enforce the periodic support
provisions of their parents' separation agreement although they may enforce other
specific provisions of the agreement clearly made for their exclusive benefit, such as a
promise to pay college tuition or to make the child a beneficiary of a life insurance
policy. The distinction drawn comports with the rules of law applicable to third party
beneficiaries and further is rooted in considerations of public policy designed to
promote familial harmony and foster the parent-child relationship. A parent's contrac-
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In support of the distinction between the child support cases and those cases involv-
ing benefits beyond basic child support, it should he noted that the former involve a direct
performance not to the child but to the custodial parent. Nothing in a typical divorce
settlement suggests that child support payments should be made directly to the child. On
the other hand, the proceeds from an insurance policy, the benefits of a trust agreement,
or t he payment of the child's education cost need not be oracle to a custodial parent. These
benefits are normally paid directly to the child after reaching majority or otherwise
reaching emancipation. The key to a finding of third party rights in these divorce
settlement cases, as in the true creditor and gift beneficiary cases, is the presence of a
promise to give a direct benefit or performance to the third party.
C. Contracts to Drag Wills
Since the 1961 decision of the California Supreme Court in Lucas v. Hamm 153 recog-
nized the right of an intended legatee to bring suit against an attorney who failed to
properly draft a will pursuant to a contract for services with the testator, the courts of
several other jurisdictions have similarly been confronted with the question of whether
such suits slate a valid claim under contract or tort theory or both.'''' The courts have
reached a nearly unanimous, albeit uneasy, conclusion that a cause of action in contract
ought to be recognized."'' The basis for these claims is that the persons to whom the
testator desires to leave bequests are the intended beneficiaries of a contract between the
testator and the attorney for the drafting of a will."'" If the attorney should fail to
properly draft the will and cause a bequest to fail, the intended legatee is deemed to have
third party standing to enforce the contract for the drafting of the will.
This particular type of third party contract action raises some special issues. Recog-
nizing a cause of action in cases of this kind, at least to sonic degree, runs counter to the
established policy that the professional services of an attorney ought to be specifically
tailored to the needs of the client, without fear of lawsuits by third parties."' Moreover, in
these cases mistakes may lay hidden for many years before being discovered upon the
tual promise to pay child support is made with a view toward his statutory duty of
support.
Id. at 212, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 424. The court earlier identified the unusual circumstances that might
allow a child standing as possibly the "disability of one kind or another of one spouse to enforce his
own legal rights." Id. at 211, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 423.
56 Cal. 2d 583, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961).
See Needham v. Hamilton, 459 A.2d 1060, 1062 (D.C. 1983) and cases cited therein.
Courts recently allowing suit by the intended legatee against the attorney on a third party
beneficiary theory include: Garcia v. Borelli, 129 Cal. App. 3d 24, 180 Cal. Rptr. 768 (1982); Stowe v.
Smith, 184 Conn. 194, 441 A.2d 811 (1980); DeMaris v. Asti, 426 So. 2d 1153 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1983); Ogle v. Fuiten, 112 111. App. 3d 1048, 445 N.E.2d 1344 (1983); Millwright v. Romer, 322
N.W.2d 30 (Iowa 1982); Guy v. Liederhach, 501 Pa. 47, 459 A.2d 744 (1983).
The court in Needham v. Hamilton, 459 A.2d 1060 (D.C. 1983), chose not to recognize a third
party beneficiary contract action on the reasoning that the malpractice cause of action was better
suited m limit the class of third parties to which the attorney would be potentially liable. Id. at
1062-63.
See Guy v. Liederhach, 501 Pa. 47, 59, 459 A.2d 744, 750 (1983): "The fact that the
beneficiary is named in the will is not relevant to third party status [sic]. The will is not the contract
but rather that which is contracted for."
1 " See Needham v. Hamilton, 459 A.2d 1060, 1061-62 (D.C. 1983); Guy v. Liederbach, 501 Pa.
47, 62-63, 459 A.2d 744, 752-53 (1983).
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death of the testator.''" While the attorney whose error is discovered after a long period
of time is no less at fault than the attorney whose mistake is quickly discovered, the serious
possibility of errors surfacing decades after performance does cause some instinctive
concern.'" Furthermore, the attorney's liability to an intended legatee is potentially larger
than his liability to t he testator if the breach is discovered before the testator's death, The
testator would arguably be entitled to specific performance or damages in the form of
either restitution of fees paid for preparation of the incorrectly drawn will or the cost of
having t he will revised to effect the testator's wishes.""" The damages to be collected by the
intended legatee could be much larger if the intended bequest is substantial and is
rendered ineffective through t he attorney's error. Since the only logical remedy available
to third party beneficiaries is money damages to satisfy the expectancy loss,' the attorney
could be required to make redress for the portion of the testator's estate which became
misdirected. This outcome may appear harsh but denying a cause of action to the
intended legatee may prevent any remedy for the attorney's breach. The estate may
either be unable or unwilling to enforce the contract to draft the will and even if it did sue
on the contract, damages for the estate probably would be nominal.' 62
Apart from the policy concerns outlined in the preceding paragraph, this type of
action may he analyzed under the test of direct benefit or performance. In performing a
contract to draft a will, the attorney-promisor renders the performance directly to the
testator-promisee. The direct benefit is also arguably received by the testator, who is
satisfied by the prospect that his estate will pass according to his desires. The benefit to the
intended legatees, on the contrary, is contingent, subject to the testator's ability to revoke
the will. Only upon the death of the testator will the benefit to the legatees become
immediate and necessary. This category of cases, therefore, probably qualifies as one in
which neither the performance nor the benefit flows directly to the third party, even
though the ultimate benefit may be substantial.
Allowing third party standing in cases of this kind not only seems inconsistent with
the direct performance or benefit test but also is not supported by an argument that
attorneys contracting to draft a will would be likely to intend to assume a direct liability to
the intended legatees, or even that the testator would seek to extract such a promise.
"" In Guy v. Liederbach, the will was dratted on February 24, 1957, the testator died on October
12, 1972 (15 years and nearly 8 months later), and the law suit against the attorney began on January
23, 1976 (nearly 19 years later). 501 P.2d at 52-53, 459 A.2d at 747.
` 59 The possibility that a claim may lie dormant for decades would raise the same questions of
unfairness that serve as justification for statutes of limitations and the doctrine of lathes. Evidence
may he lost or interested parties may die. See 5A A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1167.
166 This outcome would probably be obtained under normal contract principles since the
testator would have suffered no greater damages than those flowing from having the will improperly
drawn. At any time before the death of the testator he could have the will rewritten to accomplish the
desired distribution of the estate. See Guy v. Liederbach, 501 Pa. 47, 65, 459 A.2d 744, 754 (1983)
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
1 " In Guy v. Liederbach the Pennsylvania Supreme Court majority opinion stated that the
measure of an intended legatee's damages is her loss of expectancy. 501 P.2d at 62, 459 A.2d at 752.
It is difficult to perceive that any other measure of money or equitable damages could apply.
'" Specific performance is not. a feasible remedy since the testator is deceased and cannot
execute a new will. The money damages to the estate would probably be limited to nominal damages
or restitution of money paid to the attorney since the estate has not lost money as a result of the
breach; only the intended legatee has experienced an expectancy loss. Further, even if the estate
could sue for the benefit of the intended legatee, other heirs to the estate could challenge this
spending of the assets since it would not bring any benefit to the estate itself.
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Considering, however, the likelihood that the testator's estate wilt be unable or unwilling
to seek enforcement of a contract to draft a will, the courts seem inclined to prefer
allowing the intended legatee to pursue a third party beneficiary action rather than
permitting the attorney's breach to go without sanction.' 63
D. Employees, Shareholders and Partners
Employees have largely been unsuccessful when they have sought third party stand-
ing on their employers' contracts, except when the employers have contracted with an
employees' union or some other party expressly for the direct benefit of the employees.''
The cases in which employees were denied third party standing largely fall into three
categories: cases in which the employer loses a contract with another party and the
employee seeks to recover against the other party for loss of the opportunity to work;"'
cases in which another party contracts to provide some service to the employer which
affects the work of the employees and fails to perform the service;" and cases in which
'" One might suppose that a preferable solution would be a moderating change in the probate
laws to permit the devise of property according to a testator's wishes despite technical flaws in the
execution of the will. But in light of the current exact requirements of probate law, the lesser evil may
well be to allow suit by the legatee rather than permit the attorney's breach to go unredressed.
It is worth remembering in this context that the legatee must prove a breach by the attorney and
that if the alleged mistake does not constitute an actionable breach then the attorney may yet avoid
liability.
' Employees are considered to be third party beneficiaries of contracts between employers and
employee unions. See Mohr v. Metro East Mfg. Co., 711 F.2d 69, 72 (7th Cir. 1983); Wilks v.
American Bakeries Co., 563 F. Supp. 560, 562 (W.D.N.C: 1983) (citing Section 301 of Labor
Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976)). Employees also may recover as third
party beneficiaries when promises are made that expressly provide for a direct performance or
benefit. See Northwestern National Bank of Minneapolis v. Williamson, 545 F.2d 76, 80 (8th Cir.
1976) (employees were found to be third party beneficiaries of contract provision governing pension
plan continuation in the sale of the employer's business); Lange v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 575 F.
Supp. 371, 372-73 (N.D. Ohio 1983) {employee was third party beneficiary of contract between
employer and real estate agency which provided, in part, that the real estate agency would offer to
buy the homes of transferred employees at fair market value); Farris v. General Growth Develop-
ment Corp., 354 N.W.2d 251, 254-55 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984) (employee of subcontractor was third
party beneficiary of contract between owner and general contractor that expressly required general
contractor to implement safety procedures for those working on construction site).
L" See,e.g., Group Health, Inc. v. Schweiker, 549 F. Supp. 135, 144 (S.D. Fla. 1982) (employees
unsuccessfully sought standing as third party beneficiaries of a terminated contract between the
employer and federal government for the employer to act as provider of medicare services); State v.
Osborne, 607 P.2d 369, 371 (Alaska 1980) (employees were found not to be third party beneficiaries
of employer-house builder's contract with vendor to build a house).
1 €6 See, e.g., Wallace v. Texaco, Inc., 681 F.2d 1088, 1090 (5th Cir. 1982) (employee injured
during onsite transport was not a third party beneficiary of contract between employer-contractor
and defendant to provide transportation); Canipe v. National Loss Control Service Corp., 566 F.
Supp. 521, 528-29 (N.D. Miss. 1983) (injured employee was not third party beneficiary of contract
between employer and defendant requiring defendant to conduct safety and hazard inspections);
Gonzales v. Kil Nam Chun, 465 N.E.2d 727, 729 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) (injured employee determined
not to be third party beneficiary of contract between employer and defendant for the provision of
scaffolding by defendant which collapsed during use); Paradiso v. Apex Investigators & Security Co.
Inc,, 91 A.D.2d 929, 929, 458 N.Y.S.2d 234, 235 (1983) (employee injured in armed robbery was not
a third party beneficiary of contract between employer and defendant for security guard services).
See also Campbell v. Continental-Emsco Co., 445 So. 2d 70, 73 (La. Ct. App. 1984) (decedent
employee was not third party beneficiary of employer's agreement with insurance agent to obtain
liability insurance for business that should have covered fatal accident).
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t he employer promises the other contracting party to do some act which would appear to
benefit the employees and fails to properly perform."'
The case of Paradiso v. Apex Investigators & Security Co., Inc.t all succinctly presents the
recurring grounds for denial of third party standing in these cases. In Paradiso the
plaintiff was the employee of a supermarket and was injured during an armed robbery.
The plaintiff brought suit against the company providing security guards to the super-
market for breach of the contract to provide effective security services. In an extremely
brief memorandum opinion, the majority of the court' 69 concluded that it did not "clearly
appear" from the contract provisions that the parties intended to benefit the plaintiff by
protecting him from physical injury.'" The appellate court granted summary judgment
as a matter of law without considering whether in fact the contract had been breached in a
manner which caused the injury.
In a case such as Paradiso, employees would necessarily benefit from the effective
provision of security services. What seems really to be decisive in cases of this kind,
however, is the view of the courts that a direct benefit is also received by the employer and
that the primary purpose in contracting is to benefit the employer, not the employees."'
Consequently, the benefit to the employees is essentially derivative from the benefit to the
employer. This ranking of benefits causes courts to deny employees third party be-
neficiary standing even though t he potential benefit involved may be substantial. A very
good case could be made under the facts of Paradiso, however, - that the employer is
benefited only to the extent that injury to property and persons is avoided by effective
security services. In this sense the employer is the party who derives an indirect benefit
from the more direct benefit to the employee. This view, however, has not yet attracted a
following.' 72
Shareholders in corporations and members of partnerships, like employees, have
received unwelcome treatment when attempting to enforce the contracts of the corporate
'"? See, e.g., Davis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 677, 680 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (discharged
handicapped employee did not have cause of action on third party beneficiary theory by virtue of
employer contract with government requiring affirmative action for the handicapped); McKinney
v. Davis, 84 N.M. 352, 354, 503 P.2d 332, 334 (1972) (employee was not third party beneficiary of
employer's contract with government requiring the employer to obtain workers' compensation
insurance); Clearwater Construction Co. v. Gutierrez, 626 S.W.2d 789, 791 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981)
(decedent employee and wife were not third party beneficiaries of provision in contract between
employer and U.S. Corps of Engineers which required employer to implement safety controls).
"a 91 A.D.2d 929, 458 N.Y.S.2d 234 (1983).
"9 The court was divided 4-1 with the dissenting judge filing a separate opinion.
" 91 A.D.2d at 929, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 235 (quoting Bernal v. Pinkerton's Inc., 52 A.D.2d 760,
382 N.Y.S.2d 769, ali'd, 41 N.Y.2d 938, 394 N.Y.S.2d 638 (1976)).
' 7 ' The court in State v. Osborne, 607 P.2d 369 (Alaska 1980), reasoned that the employer-
house builder did not enter into contracts to build homes to benefit the employee by creating
employment. 607 P.2d at 371. This reasoning is quite solid but does not necessarily carry over to
cases involving the provision of security or safety services on a job site. For a case with facts similar to
Paradise in which the employee was more properly an incidental beneficiary, see Bizien v. Port
Authority of States of New York and New Jersey, 578 F. Supp. 1093 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). The contract in
that case expressly stated that the security service was to protect property rather than employees. /d.
at 1102. The guards were strictly limited to duties not including the protection of employees or other
persons. Id. at 1101.
72 Another possible way of viewing these cases is that the store may have an obligation to
provide security for persons on the premises and may contract with the security company to assume
that obligation, thereby creating third party beneficiary rights for employees or patrons on premises.
See Brown v. National Supermarkets, Inc., 679 S.W.2d 307, 309-10 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
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or partnership entities.'" In these kinds of cases, as with employees, the putative third
party beneficiaries are nearly certain to benefit from the profitable contracts of their
organizations, but their benefit is distinguished from the more direct benefit to the
organization itself. The Massachusetts Appeals Court, for example, in First Hartford Realty
Corp. v. Corporate Property Investors" 4 considered an action by a former general partner
upon a contract between the partnership and another party. The court concluded that the
general partner was no more than an incidental beneficiary even though "[t]he flow of
funds to the partnership would have redounded to the significant financial benefit of [the
general partner]. 't 75 The court reasoned that the general partner was in that respect "like
a shareholder, who may not claim to be a third party beneficiary of a contract made on
behalf of the corporation in which he owns stock."'" Other courts agree that, in the
absence of an express intent to benefit the shareholders, the benefit is not sufficiently
"direct" to support third party standing."'
E. Government and Public Service Contracts — Including Low-Income Housing Tenant Cases
Under the influence of cases such as H. R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co. ' 78 and the
firs( Restatement of Contracts Section 145,'" third party beneficiary rights under gov-
13 See cases cited infra note 177.
1 " Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1389 (July 17, 1981), 423 N.E.2d 1020 (1981) (applying New York
law).
1 " Id. at 1390, 423 N.E.2d at 1022.
16 Id. at 1390, 423 N.E.2d at 1021.
ln See, e.g., Brooks v. Land Drilling Co., 564 F. Supp. 1518, 1520-21 (D. Colo. 1983) (stock
purchasers were not third party beneficiaries of merger contract between issuer company and
another); Jacobs v. Pabst Brewing Co., 549 F. Supp. 1050, 1067 (D. Del. 1982) (shareholders were not
third party beneficiaries of contract between corporation and its investment counselors); Donalson v.
Coca-Cola Co., 164 Ga. App. 712, 713, 298 S.E.2d 25, 27 (1982) (majority stockholder was not third
party beneficiary of contract between issuer and another corporation for services); Canyon View
Irrigation Co. v. Twin Falls Canal Co., 101 Idaho 604, 613, 619 P.2d 122, 131 (1980) (shareholder-
users of irrigation company system were not third party beneficiaries of contract allowing company
the right to expand).
17" 247 N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896 (1928). The Mach case involved a lawsuit by a plaintiff whose
warehouse was destroyed by fire. The action was brought against the defendant water company on
the theory that ihe plaintiff was is third party beneficiary of the contract between the water company
and the city government for the provision of water to five hydrants; the plaintiff alleged that the
contract was breached in that the water pressure in the hydrants was insufficient to allow proper
extinguishment of the fire. Justice Cardozo, writing for the court, concluded that although all city
contracts benefit the public, more must he shown to give rise to individual third party rights. Id. at
164, 159 N.E. at 898.
179 The text of the section reads:
§ 145. Beneficiaries Under Promises to the United States, a State, or a Municipality.
A promisor bound to the United States or to a State or municipality by contract to
do an act or render a service to some or all of the members of the public, is subject to no
duty under the contract to such members to give compensation for the injurious
consequences of performing or attempting to perform it, or of failing to do so, unless,
(a) an intention is manifested in the contract, as interpreted in the light of the
circumstances surrounding its formation, that the promisor shall compensate
members of the public for such injurious consequences, or
(h) the promisor's contract is with a municipality to render services the non-
performance of which would subject the municipality to a duty to pay damages
to those injured thereby.
The comparable section of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts is Section 313. The section has
been changed to establish clearly that the general rules of third party beneficiary law should apply to
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ernment contracts have often been afforded a different treatment. Simply stated, the
courts have required that a more express indication of intent to assume liability to third
parties be present in certain contracts made with a governmental entity as promisee.' 80
The distinction, however, has not always been properly observed between government
contracts for a public service, which warrant application of the different rule, and those of
a more private nature which do not involve the rendition of services to the general public.
The case of Visintine & Co. v. New York, Chicago & St. Louis R. Co.'s' is a good example of
the latter situation. Visintine involved a government contract with a construction company
requiring preparatory work for the benefit of another company participating in the
construction of a railroad grading. Mach v. Rensselaer,'" involving the rendition of water
supply services throughout a community to all residents, stands as an example of a public
service contract. Some government contracts, however, fall between these categories.
Such cases typically involve what may be described as "hybrid" transactions involving
either public services of a limited scope or a mixture of general public benefits and specific
effects on a relatively limited group.'
The presumption against third party rights arising out of contracts with the govern-
ment should properly be limited to those contracts of a true public service nature. Recent
examples include contracts involving the provision of water to hydrants or fire fighting
government contracts but then preserves, essentially, the provisions of Section 145. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) or CONTRACTS § 313, Reporter's Note (1981); 44 American Law Institute thereinafter
referenced as ALI1 Proceedings 331-33 (1967) (comments of reporter on revised Section 145 during
drafting of the Restatement (Second)). The text of Section 313 of the Restatement (Second) reads:
§ 313. Government Contracts
(1) The rules stated in this Chapter apply to contracts with a government or gov-
ernmental agency except to the extent that application would contravene the policy of
the law authOrizing the contract or prescribing remedies for its breach.
(2) In particular, a promisor who contracts with a government or governmental agency
to do an act for or render a service to the public is not subject to contractual liability to a
member of the public for consequential damages resulting from performance or failure
to perform unless
(a) the terms of the promise provide for such liability; or
(b) the promisee is subject to liability to the member of the public for the damages
and a direct action against the promisor is consistent with the terms of the
contract and with the policy of the law authorizing the contract and prescribing
remedies for its breach.
1 " See, e.g., Dateline Builders, Inc. v. City of Santa Rosa, 146 Cal. App. 3d 520,	 194 Cal. Rptr.
258, 263 (1983); Kornblut v. Chevron Oil Co., 62 A.D.2d 831, 834-35, 407 N.Y.S.2d 498, 501 (1978),
aff'd, 48 N.Y.2d 853, 424 N.Y.S.2d 429 (1979); see also E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 10.4 (1982).
151 169 Ohio St. 505, 160 N.E.2d 311 (1959).
I ' 247 N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896 (1928). See supra note 178.
L" Examples of this "hybrid" type of transaction include: a contract between the government
and an employer requiring affirmative action for handicapped employees, see Howard v. Uniroyal,
Inc., 719 F.2d 1552, 1555 (11th Cir. 1983); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., 579 F. Supp.
1470, 1471 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Davis v. United Airlines, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 677, 679-80 (E.D.N.Y.
1983); an agreement to provide relief services to refugees as a specific group, see Nguyen v. U.S.
Catholic Conference, 548 F. Supp. 1333, 1348 (W.D. Pa. 1982); agreements between the federal
government and railroad corporations requiring affirmative action for minority owned businesses in
awarding contracts for supplies and services, see Organization of Minority Vendors v. Illinois Central
Gulf R.R., 579 F. Supp. 574, 600-01 (N.D. Ill. 1983); a road construction contract requiring that
public have continued access to those specific businesses in the area, see Lewis v. Globe Construction
Co., Inc., 6 Kan. App. 2d 478, 486, 630 P.2d 179, 185-86 (1981); a contract to administer a
worldstudy student financial aid program, see Murphy v. Villanova University, 547 F. Supp. 512, 521
(E.D. Pa. 1982).
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services,' the provision of airport services to the general public,' the supply of utilities
to city agencies for redistribution to consumers,'" and the provision of public transporta-
tion.' The factors present in Moch v. Rensselaer tend to justify a hesitance to recognize
third party rights in these cases. Such factors are the threat of liability to extremely large
numbers of third parties, the absence of any pre-existing duty on the government to
provide the services contracted for, and the absence of a likelihood that the contracting
parties would have sought or intended to impose an obligation on the promisor which
could be enforced by the third parties.'"
These considerations do not suggest that in true public service contracts the contract-
ing government entities did not intend to provide benefits to the public. When a city
negotiates a no-strike agreement with transportation unions the agreement is undoubt-
edly for the purpose of providing continrus transportation services to the public and
promoting the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants. The factors listed in the
preceding paragraph,'" however, suggest that while such benefits are certainly intended,
and not truly incidental, the contracting parties would not have contemplated, or in-
tended if they had considered it, that individual members of the public have standing to
sue for breach.
This presumption against third party rights should not be applied to those contracts
of a government entity that are essentially of a private nature, such as the contract
involved in Visintine. An extreme example of a government contract of a private nature is
found in the Illinois case of Redarowicz v. Ohlendorf.'`i 4 In that case a city entered into an
agreement with a building contractor in which the city agreed to forego legal action based
1114 See New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. City of Madera, 144 Cal. App. 3d 298, 308, 192 Cal. Rptr,
548, 554 (1983) (citizen whose commercial building was destroyed by fire sought third party
beneficiary standing on contract between city and county for latter to provide fire fighting aid in city
fires); Harris v. Board of Water and Sewer Commissioners, 294 Ala. 606, 611, 320 So. 2d 624, 628
(1975) (citizen whose restaurant was destroyed by fire sought third party beneficiary standing on
contract between city and board of water and sewer commissioners for latter to provide water to
hydrants which were discovered to be dry during the fire).
1 " See Santa Monica Airport Association v. City of Santa Monica, 481 F. Supp. 927, 946 (C.D.
Ca]. 1979), aff'd., 659 F.2d 100 (9th Cir. 1981) (association of pilots sought third party standing on
grant agreement between city and Federal Aviation Administration providing for public use of
airport).
1" See New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 690 F.2d 1203, 1211-12,
mod fled, 694 F.2d 421 (5th Cir. 1982) (consumers sought third party beneficiary standing on rate
contract between public utility and wholesaler of natural gas); see also County of Suffolk v. Long
Island Lighting Co„ 554 F. Supp. 399, 409 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (county and resident consumers sought
third party beneficiary standing on agreement between federal agency and utility governing con-
struction of a nuclear power station). But see Koch v. Consolidated Edison Company of New York,
Inc., 62 N.Y.2d 548, 558-59, 468 N.E.2d 1, 6-7 (1984) (plaintiffs — city and public benefit corpora-
tions who purchased.electricity from state power authority were third party beneficiaries of contract
between power authority and defendant utility for transmission and delivery of electricity to the
plaintiffs).
1117 See Burns, Jackson, Miller, Summit & Spitzer v. Lindner, 88 A.D.2d 50, 74-75, 452 N.Y.S.2d
80, 94-95 (1982), aff'd, 59 N.Y.2d 314, 451 N.E.2d 459, 464 N.Y.S.2d 712 (1983); Burke & Thomas,
Inc. v. International Organization of Masters, 92 Wash. 2d 762, 767-68, 600 P.2d 1282, 1285-86
(1979) (businesses sought third party beneficiary standing on contract between municipal transit
authorities and transit union providing that there would be no strikes by the union).
1'11 See Moch v. Rensselaer, 247 N.Y. 160, 165-66, 159 N.E. 896, 897-98 (1928). See also RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 313, Comment a (1981).
1 " See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
19° 92 III. 2d 171, 441 N.E.2d 324 (1982).
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on building code violations in exchange for a promise to make repairs to the plaintiff's
home."' In this case there was a reasonable basis for assuming that the contracting parties
might have agreed to allow the homeowner to enforce directly the contract, if that
contingency had been contemplated, because, as in V isintine , no large class of potential
third party beneficiaries existed and no advantage in allowing the city to control litigation
was apparent . " 2
While courts have little difficulty in deciding cases involving clear public service
obligations or obligations of an obviously private nature, cases involving "hybrid" types of
government contracts"' have often proved difficult for the courts. These limited public
service cases have generated several noteworthy decisions, including the Martinez v.
Socoma Companies, inc." case in California. The Martinez case grew out of a federal
government effort to alleviate widespread unemployment and other related problems
through a program providing financial support and incentives to private industry to
employ the "hard-core unemployed." 195 The defendants entered into contracts with the
federal government which provided that the defendants would receive monetary com-
pensation in exchange for investing money in the renovation of building facilities, train-
ing and employing for at least 12 months a specified number of "certified" disadvantaged
residents of the East Los Angeles neighborhood, and for providing those employees with
opportunities for advancement and stock purchases in the employer corporation." 6 The
defendant companies received money from the federal government pursuant to the
contracts but largely failed to employ any of the residents."'
Members of a limited class of East Los Angeles residents, who were certified as
disadvantaged and therefore eligible for emplOyment under the contracts,' 98 brought an
action against the defendant companies on a contract third party beneficiary theory. The
California Supreme Court denied standing to the plaintiff class in a four to three decision.
'' Id. at 179, 441 N.E.2d at 327-28. Addressing the specific question of whether the owner was
an intended beneficiary the court stated:
The agreement between the city and the defendant specifically enumerates the repairs
that are to be undertaken at the plaintiff's home. As a third party to the agreement it is
intended that benefits accrue directly to the plaintiff through performance of the
contract. Because the identification of the plaintiff as a direct beneficiary is clear, and
the intent of the parties to the agreement is unmistakeable in indicating as much, the
plaintiff is permitted to maintain an action as a third party beneficiary. (citations
omitted).
Id.
"' See also CF Industries v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp,, 448 F. Supp. at 479-80 (based
upon allegations, if proven, purchaser of natural gas would be third party beneficiary of contract
between public utility and gas wholesaler for additional supply of gas to be sold specifically to this
purchaser).
'" See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
'" 11 Cal. 3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1974).
"5 Id. at 398, 521 P.2d at 843, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 587. The program was established pursuant to
1967 amendments to the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, 81 Stat. 688-690, 42 U.S.C. §§
2763-2768, repealed by 86 Stat. 703 (1972).
1 " Martinez v. Socoma Companies, Inc., 11 Cal. 3d 394, 398, 521 P.2d 841, 843, 113 Cal. Rptr.
585, 587 (1974).
"I Id. at 400, 521 P.2d at 845, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 587-88. One defendant company provided only
186 jobs of 650 planned and 139 were wrongfully terminated. The second defendant provided only
90 jobs of 550 planned and all were wrongfully terminated, and the third defendant failed to provide
any of 400 jobs called for under the contract. Id.
18 Id. at 399-400, 521 P.2d at 844, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 587-88.
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The majority opinion focused on three factors in concluding that the plaintiffs were not
hird part y donee beneficiaries.' °' First, the court drew a distinction between the govern-
ment's "intent to benefit" t he public — including the plaintiffs — and any intent to "make
a gift."' Second, the court cited language in the contracts providing for the administra-
tive resolution of disputes with the government as indicative of an intent to provide for
government control over any enforcement action arid not to confer legal rights on the
private individuals." Third, the court emphasized that the programs were designed to
benefit the general public and only "incidentally" benefited the plaintiffs.'
The Martinez court's first and third factors are not persuasive and, in fact, are based
on the same notion that the employment programs were not designed to benefit primarily
t he plaintiff-residents. The court erroneously suggested that these individuals were only
indirectly benefited through a general public purpose program." Applying the direct
benefit test under the popular third party beneficiary rules, the court should have
concluded that the public at large was to derive an indirect benefit through the provision of
jobs directly to the class of persons to which the plaintiffs belonged." If the third party
standing test to he applied were simply that of a "direct benefit or assumption of direct
obligation" to the third party, then most certainly this class of residents would have
standing.
'" The Court used the creditor, donee or incidental beneficiary categorization test from the
orginal Restatement Section 133 for establishing third party rights. No issue was raised at trial as to
the plaintiffs not qualifying as creditor beneficiaries. Id. at 400, 521 P.2d at 844-45, 113 Cal. Rptr. at
588-89.
The majority opinion states, in relevant part:
Unquestionably plaintiffs were among those whom the Government intended to benefit
through defendants' performance of the contracts which recite that they are executed
pursuant to a statute and a presidential directive calling for programs to furnish
disadvantaged persons with training and employment opportunities. However, the fact
that a Government program for social betterment confers benefits upon individuals
who are not required to render contractual consideration in return does not necessarily
imply that the benefits are intended as gifts.
Id. at 401, 521 P.2d at 845, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 589.
291 Id. at 402-03, 521 P.2d at 849, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 589-90.
202 Id. at 407, 521 P.2d at 848-49, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 592-93 ("Thus the contracts here were
designed not to benefit individuals as such but to utilize the training and employment of disadvan-
taged persons as a means of improving the East Los Angeles neighborhood.").
2°' The Martinez majority had to distinguish, or could have overruled, the decision of an
intermediate appellate court in Shell v. Schmidt, 126 Cal. App. 2d 279, 272 P.2d 82 (1954). In Shell,
the plaintiffs, as military service veterans and homebuyers, were successful in claiming third party
beneficiary standing under a contractual arrangement between the builder-vendor and the Federal
Housing Authority (FHA). The arrangement required that the builders receive a priority for
building materials for homes to be sold to veterans in exchange for promises to build the homes
according to agreed specifications and to sell them at no more than an agreed maximum price.
The builder adhered to the maximum price limit but did not follow the building specifications.
The court concluded, inter alia, that the federal program and related agreements between builders
and the FHA were intended for the benefit of the veterans as a class and that the plaintiffs, as
members of the class, had standing to enforce the contract. 126 Cal. App. 2d at 290, 272 P.2d at 89.
"4 See Martinez, 11 Cal. 3d at 409, 521 P.2d at 851, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 595 (Burke, J., dissenting).
The dissenting justice stated:
The majority err in the above conclusion because the congressional purpose was to
benefit both the communities in which the impact programs are established and the
individual impoverished persons in such communities. The benefits from the instant
contracts were to accrue directly to the members of the plaintiff's class, as a reading of
the contracts clearly demonstrates.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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The second factor upon which the majority relied is not so clearly wrong, but is
susceptible to criticism. The dispute resolution provisions established an enforcement
mechanism and provided for certain refunds if the defendant corporations defaulted. 2 05
Although one could infer that. this method was bargained for as the exclusive means of
determining liability, to the exclusion of lawsuits by private residents, the truth is probably
that the contracting parties did not specifically contemplate and intend to provide for any
of the variety of lawsuits that might be brought by residents. 2" Moreover, the lack of
persuasiveness in the majority view is indicated by the fact that the three dissenting
justices were firmly convinced that the damages and dispute resolution provisions were
not intended to preclude recovery by the residents.'" The directness of benefit to the
residents weighs strongly' against this tenuous argument for denying the residents stand-
ing. 208
In sum, the Martinez case involved the sort of government contract providing a
limited scope of •public services which should not be subject to the application of the
Section 145 presumption against third party standing. Furthermore, the direct. perfor-
mance and benefit to the residents inherent in receiving employment, in the absence of an
express or reasonably implied denial of third party standing, should have afforded them
standing and an opportunity to present grounds for recovery under the defendants'
contracts with the government.
Although at least one California court has subsequently reached a decision limiting
the application of the Martinez holding, 209 a division of authority has developed in a series
of cases involving lawsuits by tenants or purchasers of federally regulated low-income
215 Id. at 403-04, 521 P.2d at 847-48, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 590.
2" Suits by the residents might have arisen in several contexts anywhere along the continuum
from application for employment to eventual discharge. It is safe to say that the government would
not have meant to preclude any and all individual suits. For example, an individual might have sued
for discrimination in hiring or promotion.
"7 Id. at 414, 521 P.2d at 855, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 599 (Burke, J., dissenting, and Tobriner and
Mosk, B., concurring in the dissenting opinion) ("These so-called liquidated damages' clauses
nowhere purport to limit damages to the specified refunds. Nothing in the contracts limits the right
to the government or, more importantly, plaintiffs' class, to seek additional relief.").
209 In the Shell case, 126 Cal. App. 2d 279, 272 P.2d 82 (1954), the court was faced with a similar
issue. Under the federal statute, the contractual arrangement expressly provided for two remedies:
the government could prosecute violators and obtain monetary relief for purchasers and the
purchasers could sue directly but only for violations of the maximum selling price fixed by the FHA
and only within one year from the date of the violation. Id. at 286-87, 272 P.2d 86-87.
The court rejected the assertion that these remedies were exclusive, reasoning that `[t]he
fundamental purpose would, in many cases be defeated if the statute were interpreted so as to
deprive the veterans of their normal remedies to the benefit of defaulting contractors — the very
class it was the purpose of the statute to protect veterans against. - Id. at 287, 272 P.2d 87. The court
further stated, lilt is no objection to an action by the third party that the contracting party (here the
government) could also sue upon the contract for the same breach." Id. at 290, 272 P.2d at 89
(citation omitted).
The Martinez majority reasoned that these statements in Shell indicated that relief to the
members of the public was contemplated by the contract of the parties in that case but that in the case
before it the contract included no similar evidence of contemplated individual remedy. 11 Cal. 3d at
404, 521 P.2d at 847-48, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 591.
209 See Zigas v. Superior Court, 120 Cal. App. 3d 827, 174 Cal. Rptr. 806 (1981) (distinguishing
Martinez and following Shell in finding that tenants of federal mortgage insured housing were third
party beneficiaries of provision in contract between landlord and federal government agency limiting
rents that could be charged on reasoning that instant case and Shell involved benefit to limited group
and not general public as in Martinez).
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housing, with some courts reaching conclusions very similar to the conclusion reached by
the Martinez courc"u The government generally acts in the role of mortgage insurer in
these arrangements under the National Housing Act."' As a condition to obtaining the
federal insurance, the owners enter into regulatory agreements with the Secretary of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) requiring, among other things, that the hous-
ing projects be maintained in good repair and condition212
 and that rental charges not
exceed moderate rates established by HUD."' The lawsuits initiated by the tenants
generally have alleged that the landlords violated the regulatory agreements by either
charging excessive rental fees"' or failing to maintain the units in good repair. 215 These
claims are to a large degree the flip sides of the same coin, since the government requires
both a limit on rental fees and the proper maintenance of the property by the landlord.
Because the latter requirement necessarily requires that the landlord devote some reve-
nues to. maintenance, the landlord may either increase rent or decrease maintenance to
generate more profit. The provisions of the regulatory agreement essentially establish
complementary requirements that rents be moderate and that proper funds be expended
in maintenance.
Because the tenants are not parties to the regulatory agreements, standing has
generally been sought on the ground that tenants are third party beneficiaries of the
regulatory agreements between the housing owners and HUD. 215 Some of the cases have
involved challenges by tenants to HUD-approved rent increases and have sought judicial
review of the agency determinations. In these instances the courts have uniformly refused
to review the determinations because they were committed by statute entirely to adminis-
21 " Cases holding that the tenants are third party beneficiaries include Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d
1261 (7th Cir. 1981) and Zigas v. Superior Court, 120 Cat. App. 3d 827, 174 Cal, Rptr. 806 (1981).
Cases holding that the tenants are not third party beneficiaries include Falzarano v. U.S., 607 F.2d
506 (5th Cir. 1979) and Little v. Union Trust Co. of Maryland, 45 Md. App. 178, 412 A.2d 1251
(1980). See also Gonzalez v. City of Mission, 620 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981) (holding that
recipient of funds from federal grant to rehabilitate homes was not third party beneficiary of grant
agreement between city and federal government agency governing operation of housing rehabilita-
tion program).
2" 12 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1750 (1982). The insurance of mortgages is provided for in 12 U.S.C. §
1713.
212 See, e.g., Little v. Union Trust Co. of Maryland, 45 Md. App. 178, 179, 412 A.2d 1251, 1253
(1980) ("Paragraph 7 of the Agreement provided in part: 'Owners shall maintain the mortgaged
premises, accommodations and the grounds and equipment appurtenant thereto, in good repair and
condition.' ").
2 " See, e.g., Harlib v. Lynn, 511 F.2d 51, 53 (7th Cir. 1975) ("The regulatory agreement
included paragraph 4(b): 'Owners shall make dwelling accommodations and services of the project
available to occupants at charges not exceeding those established in accordance with a schedule
approved in writing by the Commissioner."').
211
	 e.g., id.; Angleton v. Pierce, 574 F. Supp. 719 (D. N.J. 1983).
215 See, e.g., Perry v. Housing Authority of City of Charleston, 664 F.2d 1210, 1211 (4th Cir.
1981); Little v. Union Trust Co. of Maryland, 45 Md. App. 178, 180, 412 A.2d 1251, 1253 (1980).
21 " In some cases the claimants have also pleaded other b'ases for relief including a private cause
of action arising under the federal statute, see Perry v. Housing Authority of City of Charleston, 669
F.2d 1210, 1213-14 (4th Cir. 1981); Falzarano v, United States, 607 F.2d 506, 509-11 (5thCir, 1979)
(both denying any private cause of action applying the test of Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975)); or a
constitutional law — due process claim, .see Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1280-81 (7th Cir. 1981)
(finding that tenants did have a due process claim as to rent assistance payments); Angleton v. Pierce,
574 F. Supp. 719, 732 (D. N.J. 1983) (no violation of rights to due process found in plan to convert
rental housing into cooperative ownership units).
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trative discretion."/ In relation to the determination of third party contract beneficiary
standing, the approved rent increase cases are irrelevant. These cases indicate that when
HUD approves the rent increases no breach of the regulatory agreement by the landlord
has occurred. 218 Even if the tenants were clearly recognizable third party beneficiaries
they would have no relief in the absence of a breach. The analysis of third party standing,
therefore, should be carefully separated from the question of alleged breach related to
HUD-approved rent increases. 219 The third party standing analysis revolves around the
question whether the agreement between HUD and the housing owners reflects sufficient
intent to benefit the tenants to confer an enforceable right.
As suggested previously, the courts which have denied third party standing to tenants
have engaged in reasoning very similar to t he reasoning employed by the Marlinez
court."° In Falzarano v. U.S.,221 for example, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
considered a case based on allegations of excessive rent and physical plant disrepair
resulting from illegal appropriation of funds by the landlords."' The plaintiff-tenants
alleged that these acts breached the regulatory agreement between HUD and the owners
and sought standing as third party beneficiaries of that agreement.'" In considering the
third party beneficiary claim, as well as the possibility of a statutory private cause of action,
the court reached the somewhat inconsistent conclusions t hat "Plow and moderate in-
come tenants are indisputably the prime beneficiaries of the National Housing Act,"224 but
that the regulatory agreements "did not disclose an intent to benefit the tenants, excel)! as
they might be incidental beneficiaries; nor can the tenants qualify as either creditor or
donor [sic] beneficiaries." 225 The Falzarano court seemed to be persuaded that the rent
controls were primarily intended to allow HUD to oversee and insure the financial
viability of the projects, with the goal of preventing default and federal liability as
mortgage insurer. 226 While the court's reasoning is not clearly articulated, the Falzarano
opinion can be fairly read as concluding that the more direct, intended benefit of the rent
2" Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506, 512 (5th Cir. 1979). See also Harlib v. Lynn, 511
F.2d 51, 56 (7th Cir. 1975). The statute initially did not provide for any tenant participation in rental
increase hearings. HUD, however, has subsequently promulgated regulations which now afford the
tenants such rights. Id. at 55.
2" See Harlib, 511 F.2d at 55 ("the language ... of title] agreement contemplates rent increases
pursuant to the procedures followed in this case...." Id. at 56.).
210 For example, the Harlib case, 511 F.2d 51 (7th Cir. 1975), although it involved an allegation
of third party beneficiary rights, did not address the standing issue but instead concluded that the
regulatory agreement contemplated rent increases without hearings so that no breach would have
been found even if the third party beneficiaries had standing. Id. at 56.
The court in Angleton v. Pierce, 574 F. Supp. 719 (D. N.J. 1981), apparently relies on cases such
as Harlib, which did not actually involve a standing issue, in support of its denial of standing. 574 F.
Supp. at 735-36.
220 See supra notes 194-208 and accompanying text.
221 607 F.2d 506 (5th Cir. 1979).
222 Id. at 508.
223 Id. The tenants also asserted other causes of action based on an implied right of action tinder
the National Housing Act, breach arising out of the lease agreements, arid the fourteenth itmerid-
ment to the United States Constitution for deprivation of their rights under color of state law.
224 Id. at 509.
222
	 at 511.
229 Id. at 510 ("To safeguard the federal fist against possibly disastrous exposure should the
insured mortgages be foreclosed, the Secretary of HUD is permitted to regulate rents, charges and
methods of operation. An overriding concern is to guarantee that the rents and charges adequately
cover the carrying costs of the projects.").
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control provision was to the federal government as insurer of the mortgage; the benefit to
the tenants was considered merely incidental to t he purpose of protecting the govern-
merit's interest. In reaching this conclusion the court apparently considered the govern-
ment public service contract rule applicable 2" and seemed to ignore the allegation of
breach through failure to maintain the buildings.
An even more recent case, Perry v. Housing Authority qf City of Charleston,' was entirely
concerned with maintenance and safety hazards. 2'29 The court in Petty,  as did the court in
Paha mno, considered claims based on both a statutorily implied private cause of action
and third party beneficiary rights 23° and reasoned that the statute had two beneficiaries—
the states who received assistance for housing projects through the funding programs "as
direct beneficiaries and low-income families as indirect beneficiaries, -"' The court went on
to address specifically the third party claim and concluded that the plaintiffs were at best
incidental beneficiaries of the agreement between the owner and HUD.' This conclusion
was reached very summarily 2" and rested upon the questionable authority of Ealza.rftno
and the inapposite authority found in HUD-approved rent increase cases. 23 "
At least two courts have d isagreed  with the outcomes in Falzarano and Perry and have
concluded t hat tenants are third party beneficiaries of the regulatory agreements between
owners and HUD."' These courts concluded that the benefit to the tenants was the
primary purpose of rental fee limits or similar provisions in the HUD agreements. The
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Holbrook v. Pitt'" rejected an argument to the
contrary as displaying "an astonishing lack of perspective about government social wel-
fare progranns."237
 The court went on to state that "rill tenants are not the primary
227 Id. at 511. The court cited the RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 145. See .supra note 155.
220
 664 F.2d 1210 (4th Cir. 1981).
22" More specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the low-income housing project was in such a
state of disrepair as to pose -hazards to the health, safety and welfare" of Me residents. "The hazards
included, inter alia, the use of lead-based paint, deterioration of the flooring and roofing, inadequate
lighting and security patrols, and inadequate garbage pick-up contributing to infestation by rats and
other vermin." 664 F.2d at 1211.
2311 Id. The plaintiffs also advanced a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivation of constitu-
tional or federally created rights under color of state law. Id.
211 Id. at 1213. In support of this conclusion the court quoted the preamble to the Housing Act
found at 42 U.S.C. § 1437, which reads in relevant part: "OP is the policy of the United States to
promote the general welfare of the Nation by employing its funds to assist the several slates . to
remedy the unsafe and unsanitary housing conditions and the acute shortage of decent, safe and
sanitary dwellings for families of low income...." Id. at 1212,
232 Id. at 1218.
233 The district court had not considered the third party beneficiary claim but the Court of
Appeals considered the law so clear that it decided the issue without remand, Id. at 1218 n.16.
234 Id. at 1218, including Harlib, 511 F.2d 51 (7th Cir. 1975). See supra notes 217-19 and
accompanying text. The Perry court did not directly cite Section 145 of the Restatement of Contracts
but did cite that part of the Falzarano case which did.
233 Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261 (7th Cir. 1981); Zigas v. Superior Court, 120 Cal. App. 3d
827, 174 Cal. Rpir. 806 (1981).
2" 693 F.2d 1261 (7th Cir. 1981). The Holbrook case cliff ers on the facts somewhat from the
other related cases in that it involved rent subsidy payment s to reduce the amount of rent the tenants
were required to pay as part of a program to assist projects with federally insured mortgages, 693
F.2(1 at 1264-65, but the reasoning of this case is very pertinent to the others. The tenants alleged,
essentially:, that the commencement of the rent subsidy payments was improperly delayed and that
the delay constituted a breach of the HUD regulatory agreement of which they were third party
beneficiaries. Id.
' a? Id. at 1271.
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beneficiaries of a program to provide housing assistance payments to low-income families,
the legitimacy of the multi-billion dollar . . . program is placed in grave doubt."' The
California Court of Appeals considering the case of Zigas v. Superior Court of San Francisco
placed particular emphasis on the statement of purpose contained in t he National Hous-
ing Act: "[t]he insurance of mortgages under this section is intended to facilitate particu-
larly the production of rental accommodations, at reasonable rents... . "2:19 The court
went on to conclude that the tenants were intended to benefit from the limits on rental
fees and were entitled to standing to sue as third-party beneficiaries.'" The court convinc-
ingly stated that the limits on rent were "obviously" intended to protect the tenants from
arbitrary increases and not to benefit the government as mortgage insurer. 24 '
The conclusion of the Zigas court regarding limits on rental fees may be extended to
the maintenance requirements set forth in contracts between housing project owners and
HUD. While the government, as mortgage insurer, would ultimately benefit from the
required proper maintenance of the physical plant, that benefit is much less direct and
certain than the benefit to be derived by tenants from such requirements, since the
tenants' healt Ir and safety would be immediately enhanced by proper performance under
this part of the HUD-landlord regulatory agreement.
Leaving aside the conflicting positions taken by different courts regarding these
kinds of contracts, a measuring of the circumstances involved in such contracts against the
relevant components of established third party standing rules is instructive. First of all, no
express denials or affirmations of third party standing are contained in either the
regulatory agreements or the surrounding circumstances. Moreover, there should not be
a presumption against standing in this type of limited scope government contract. The
tenants in these cases stand in a different position from plaintiffs in true public service
cases, such as users of water services or riders of mass transit vehicles, since the tenants are
quantitatively limited and easily identifiable. While the tenants certainly cannot be
categorized as "classic creditor" or "classic donee" beneficiaries, they arguably stand to
"directly," "immediately" and "necessarily" benefit if the promises to limit rents and
maintain the buildings are honored.
As suggested by t he Zigas and Holbrook courts, the tenants will most directly benefit
from faithful performance of the obligations of the owners. In contrast, the potential
benefit to the government, as mortgage insurer, from observance of the maximum rental
n' Id. The court continued:
Congress did not establish the Section 8 housing assistance program merely to limit
claims on HUD's insurance fund that might be occasioned by assignments or foreclo-
sures or HUD-insured mortgages. Congress authorized Section 8 payments "[for the
purpose of aiding lower-income families in obtaining a decent place to live and of
promoting economically mixed housing."
Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(a) (1976)).
239 120 Cal. App. 3d 827, 835, 174 Cal. Rptr. 806, 810 (1981).
240 Id. at 836, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 810. The court distinguished the instant case from Martinez, supra
notes 196-208, on several grounds including, very significantly, that the contracts in Martinez were
deemed by that court to be intended to benefit the public rather than the individuals, whereas in the
instant case, as in Shell, supra notes 203, 208, the purpose was to benefit a narrow and specific group
— low income families needing rental housing. Id. at 838, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 812. When carefully
studied the factual differences among the three cases appear to he without significance.
The court also properly distinguished Falzarano and similar cases, supra notes 217-19 and
accompanying text, on the grounds that they involved HUD approved rent increases. Id. at 840, 174
Cal. Rptr. at 813.
"' Id. at 839, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 812.
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limits and maintenance requirements seems far more tenuous. If rental limits were
greatly exceeded, a shortage of tenants could occur and the shortage might lead to
default. This concern seems not to be manifested in the agreements and surrounding
circumstances. Rather, the motivating concern for rent limitations seems to be to provide
housing that will be affordable to low income residents. Similarly, while proper mainte-
nance of the buildings might ultimately protect the government's security interest in the
event of a default on a project, the tenants would benefit on a daily basis from such proper
maintenance.
Contrasting the tenants' interest with the general public's interest is also helpful to
the analysis. Members of the general public would probably derive some intangible
benefit through the provision of low-income housing to those in need of public assistance,
and certainly would benefit as taxpayers from avoidance of default on the federally
insured mortgages. These benefits, however, are far more remote than the immediate
benefits enjoyed by the particular tenants and would flow indirectly from such benefits.
For all these reasons, the courts that have avoided misapplication of rules relating to
government public service contracts and have decided that tenants of low-income housing
should be deemed recognizable third party beneficiaries have reached decisions that are
more consistent with decisions in cases involving other recognized categories of enforce-
able third party beneficiary rights.
F. Construction Contract Cases
Construction contract cases involve several parties standing in a variety of relation-
ships: owners, attempting to recover for breach of contract by a subcontractor with whom
they have no direct contractual relationship; subcontractors, wishing to recover either
from surety companies or owners for damages resulting from breach by a general
contractor; contractors, attempting to recover for injuries resulting from anot her contrac-
tor's breach of the latter's agreement with the owner; or adjacent property owners,
wishing to recover from contractors for damages resulting from their performance under
the construction agreement. Each of these categories of relationships will be examined in
turn.
1. Owner Versus Remote Subcontractor Cases
In a very significant and often cited case in North Carolina, Vogel v. Reed Supply Co. ,242
the North Carolina Supreme Court considered a claim by the plaintiff ownersthat they
were third party beneficiaries of a subcontract between the general builder and the
defendant. The subcontract provided that the defendant would perform certain duties in
the construction of an apartment building for the owner. 243 In deciding that the owner
was not a third party beneficiary, the court acknowledged that the owner would benefit
from the subcontractor's performance but considered that benefit to be indirect —
accrued only through a more direct benefit to the general builder — and not the sort of
24' 277 N.C. 119, 177 S.E.2d 273 (1970). In Vogel the court expressly approved the Restatement
of Contracts Section 133 formula as correctly stating the law of North Carolina. N. at 127-28, 177
S.E.2d at 278.
243
	 at 125, 177 5.E.2d at 275 (Reed, the subcontractor, was to furnish and erect walls,
subfloor, roof work, windows, doors, and was to paint and perform other similar services).
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benefit intended by the contracting parties to be enforced by a third party. 244 The
reasoning in Vogel is consistent with a strict reading of the established rule that third
parties may enforce a contract only when the benefit is direct. 245
The reasoning in cases reaching the opposite conclusion, however, is also persuasive.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court, for example, reached the opposite conclusion - from the
Vogel court in a recent case involving very similar facts, Keel u. Titan Construction Co.246 The
Oklahoma court reasoned that while the general contractor was a "primary" beneficiary
of its contract with the subcontractor, the owner was equally a "primary" beneficiary and
therefore should be allowed third party standing."' While the Oklahoma court included
the term "direct" in describing the benefit required for third party standing, 248 the court
did not seize upon that aspect of the state rule in this case. The Supreme Court of Alaska
cited Keel in reaching a similar decision allowing an owner third party standing. 249 The
Alaska court emphasized that the contract must be made "expressly for the benefit of a
third person" and that the subcontractor in a construction project must know t hat there is
an owner and that the work is intended to benefit the owner."" The owner in this type of
case also has been found to be a creditor beneficiary on the reasoning t hat t he general
contractor owes a duty to the owner and the subcontractor's performance fulfills part. of
that obligation:2 'a
Both the restrictive position of the North Carolina court and t he more liberal
approach of the Oklahoma and Alaska courts are defensible in some respects. Close
questions like the one presented in this type of case"' bring into focus again the potential
conflict between two basic guiding principles: the idea that parties are presumed to
contract for themselves, so that third party standing is appropriate only when actually
intended by the parties, and the idea that standing ought to he allowed whenever it is
consistent with the manifest purpose of the contraci. 2" For the courts of those states
"44 Id. at 129, 177 S.E.2d at 279. The court stated:
In our view the subcontract here was not intended for the benefit of the plaintiff
landowner. Plaintiff benefits only incidentally or indirectly because performance of the
subcontract was rendered in fulfillment of Reed's obligation to the general contractor.
Hence, any benefit derived from the subcontract by the landowner would necessarily
accrue indirectly, i.e., through the genera] contractor.
245 See also Midwest Concrete Products Co. v. LaSalle National Bank, 94 Ill. App. 3d 394, 397,
418 N.E.2d 988, 990 (1981). The court cited Vogel in concluding that the operator of a sports center
was not a third party beneficiary of a contract between general and subcontractor for the latter to
install racquetball courts in the center. Although the operator would derive benefit from proper
performance, the parties were deemed to contract "entirely in their own self interest," Id.
24" 639 P.2d 1228 (Okla. 1982).
"' Id. at 1231.
24 ' Id. The court was construing 15 O.S. 1971 § 29 which provides: "A contract, made expressly
fin the benefit of a third person, may be enforced by him at any time before the parties thereto
rescind it." The court construed "expressly" to mean "in an express manner; in direct or unmistake-
able terms; explicitly; definitely; directly." (quoting Watson v. Aced, 156 Cal. App. 2d 87, 319 P.2d 83
(1957)).
Syndoulos_ Lutheran Church v. A.R.C. Industries, Inc., 662 P.2d 109 (Alaska 1983).
25"Id. at 114.
251 See Gilbert Financial Corp. v. Steelform Contracting Co., 82 Cal. App. 3d 65, 145 Cal. Rptr.
448 (1978).
252 See Port Chester Electrical Construction Corp. v. Atlas, 40 N.Y.2c1 652, 656-57, 357 N.E.2d
983, 985-86, 389 N.Y.S.2d 327, 330-31 (1976), on the difficulty of applying third party beneficiary
rules to these types of cases.
See supra notes 41-49 and accompanying text.
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adhering to the former principle, standing probably ought to be denied to the owner
because of the presumption against third party standing. But it should be remembered
that alt hough this presumption is widespread, it is quite vulnerable to the argument that it
serves no intrinsically valuable purpose. 254 On the other hand, the courts of those states
operating without such a presumption in third party standing cases should find it more
reasonable to allow standing, since granting standing would be consistent with the con-
tracting parties' basic understanding that the subcontractor must render a proper per-
formance, for the ultimate benefit of the owner, or be liable for breach.'" Standing on the
part of the owner in these cases may he sought either to increase the chances of recovery
by suing multiple parties or because the general contractor is not involved in the litiga-
6°11. 256 In the latter case, if the owner is denied standing, the subcontractor may totally
escape the consequences of having failed to render the performance for which he
received compensation. Consequently, granting standing to the owner seems warranted,
but this standing is not necessarily what the parties contracted for nor is it the result of
finding an indisputably direct benefit or performance running to the owner. As long as
courts vary in their basic presumptions about third party standing these types of close
cases will probably result in conflicting decisions.
2. Surety and Retainage Agreement Cases
State and federal courts seem to have reached some consensus concerning the ability
of unpaid subcontractors to recover as third party beneficiaries of surety contracts. The
courts have given similar treatment to general contractors who wish to recover funds held
under loan agreements that permit the lender to retain a percentage of the construction
funds until t he work is completed. The key to success in these cases is the presence of an
ascertainable promise to pay funds directly to the party seeking third party standing. 1 "7
' 54 See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
55
 The case of Richardson Engineering Company v. I BM,  554 F. Supp. 467 (D. Vt. 1981), aff'd,
697 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1982) presents an analogous but somewhat easier case. In Richardson Engineer-
ing, the subcontractor waived its right to assert a lien against the building under construction for the
owner. The subcontractor asserted that because the waiver appeared in the contract between it and
the general, the owner was not entitled to enforce it. Reasoning that the owner of the building was
clearly the beneficiary of a reduction of the threat of liens, the court rejected this argument. Id. at
471. The placing of a roof on a building or a floor in the building is not quite the same as waiving the
right to a lien but the benefit to the owner seems very substantial in each instance.
256 For example, in Vogel, 277 N.C. 119, 177 S.E.2d 273 (1970), the trial court concluded that the
general was unable to bring suit against the subcontractor because it was not a licensed general
contractor under North Carolina law and therefore could not sue to enforce its contracts. Id. at 124,
177 S.E.2d at 276. The North Carolina Supreme Court, however, reversed and decided that the
general could sue on its subcontract. Id. at 133, 177 S.E.2d at 282. 111 Syndoulus, Lutheran Church v.
A.R.C. Industries, Inc., 662 P.2d 109 (Alaska 1983), the general had abandoned the project without
cause, 662 P.2d at 110, and although the owner sued the general, it probably sought to obtain a
judgment against the subcontractor to increase the likelihood of actual recovery. Finally, in
Richardson Engineering Company v. I.B.M., 554 F. Supp. 467 (D. Vt. 1981), riff 'd, 697 F.2d 296 (2d
Cir. 1982), the third party beneficiary claim was raised as a counterclaim in a suit brought directly
against the owner by the subcontractor. The general apparently was not made a party by the
subcontractor.
257 See, e.g., Taylor Woodrow Blitman Construction Co. v. Southfield Gardens Co., 534 F. Supp.
340, 343-44 (D. Mass. 1982) (general contractor could not recover on retainage held by lender where
finance agreement contemplated benefit to laborers and suppliers but included no promise to pay
the general contractor); Treasure State Industries, Inc. v. Welch, 173 Mont. 403, 407-08, 567 P.2d
947, 949-50 (1977) (third-party material man could not recover on surety bond in absence of a
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Consequently, courts have been careful to distinguish between performance bonds and
payment bonds."' A performance bond usually contains a promise by the surety to
compensate the owner for any consequences of the general contractor's failure to per-
form. A payment bond, on the other hand, usually requires that the surety complete
payment to any suppliers of material or labor who are not fully paid by the general
contractor. While in a payment bond there is a promise to pay directly to a subcontractor,
a performance bond includes no such promise of direct payment. 255 Similarly, in cases
involving loan agreements permitting retainage by the lender of a percentage of progress
payment advances, the courts have considered the presence of a promise to pay directly
either the general contractor or the subcontractor to be decisive of the issue of third party
standing for those parties seeking the retained funds."°
The emerging area of difficulty, and perhaps flexibility, in these cases is the question
of how to interpret the express language of the security or retainage agreement. In the
case of'facob Associates v. Argonaut Ins. Co.,' the Supreme Court of Oregon reversed a well
established line of cases which held that surety contracts couched in "terms of condition,"
rather than language of express promises to pay, did not yield third party rights to
subcontractors. 262 The majority, despite an adverse concurrence and a vigorous dissent,
overruled the trial court's sustainment of a demurrer and decided that the rather "ar-
chaic" language of the bond should be interpreted, as a matter of law, as being equivalent
to a promise to pay. 263 The concurring and dissenting justices proposed a less frontal
assault on the legal precedent and the bond's express language, and instead suggested
"specific promise to pay"); Henson Construction, Inc. v. Reintree Corp., 685 P.2d 1062, 1065-66
(Wash. 1984) (en bane) (sidewalk contractor could not recover as third party beneficiary of perfor-
mance bond posted by plot developer for the benefit of the city to insure that sidewalks would be
made, where bond given contained no promise to pay); Wyoming Machinery Co. v. U.S. Fidelity and
Guaranty Co., 614 P.2d 716, 721 (Wyo. 1980) (subcontractor deemed not to be third party be-
neficiary of surety bond because of absence of a "specific promise to pay").
2"'' See generally Taylor Woodrow Blitman Construction Co. v. Southfield Gardens Co,, 534 F.
Supp. 340, 343-44 (D. Mass. 1982); Cretex Companies, Inc. v. Construction Leaders, Inc., 342
N.W.2d 135, 137-38 (Minn. 1984) and cases cited therein.
2" Circumstances might be such that delivery of a building subject to a lien because of nonpay-
ment of a supplier of labor constitutes a breach of a performance bond. If so, then the surety may he
required to absolve the lien through payment or some other means. Despite the possibility that a
performance bond may indirectly lead to payment, it still will not be read to require direct payment
in the first instance. See Wyoming Machinery v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 614 P.2d 716, 720-21
(Wyo. 1980).
266 See Taylor Woodrow Blitman Construction Co. v. Southfield Gardens Co., 534 F. Supp. 340,
343-44 (D. Mass. 1982) (general contractor could not recover on retainage agreement without
express promise to pay to the general contractor); Westinghouse Electric Supply Co., Inc., 119 N.H.
833, 838, 409 A.2d 1141, 1144 (1979) (third party beneficiary standing "depended upon an express
provision in the contract between the project owner and general contractor providing for both an
amount retained by the owner and payment directly toward claims of suppliers").
261 282 Or. 551, 580 P.2d 529 (1978) (en Banc).
262 Id. at 553-54, 580 P.2d at 529-30. The plaintiff was a subcontractor engineering firm with a
claim for $10,891.94 left unpaid by the general contractor who had been adjudicated bankrupt. The
defendant was surety on the general bond in favor of the owner; the bond recited that the surety's
obligation "shall he void" on the condition that the general "pay all persons, firms and corporations
who perform" on the project but that otherwise the bond would "remain in full force and effect."Id.
The majority cited law in other jurisdictions, 4 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 800, L.P. SIMPSON,
CONTRACTS (2d ed.) 252, n.57, and RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 133, illustration 4, all in support of
its conclusion that words of condition should be construed as an express promise to pay unpaid
laborers, materialmen and subcontractors. 282 Or. at 554-56, 580 P.2d at 530-31.
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that the particular circumstances of the case might support. a conclusion that these parties
intended the words of condition to amount to a promise in this case. 264 Other courts have
also indicated some inclination to find a promise to pay from less than express Ian-
guage. 25'
Art important point to be noted from all of the cases in this subgroup is a disinclina-
tion of the courts to depart from the requirement that the contract contain language
somehow amounting to a promise to pay directly in order to justify third party standing.
Even the majority injacob Associates sought to find such a promise to pay. This element of
promised direct performance is consistent with rules found in other categories of cases
discussed previously266 and is stringently applied even though the putative third parry
beneficiaries might derive a very substantial, but indirect, benefit from other indemnifica-
tion or performance types of surety and retainage agreements.
3. Multi-prime Contractor Cases
Another variety of the construction cases are cases involving not subcontractual
relations but "multi
- prime" contracts or several contracts directly between the owner and
various parties in the construction project. In these situations, one contractor may attempt
to recover from another because of a breach by the other party of its contract with the
owner. Such claimants have received varying responses from the courts. The Supreme
Court of New Jersey, faced with a rather straightforward case in Broadway Maintenance
Corp. v. Rutgers,'" decided that fellow contractors should have third party standing on the
basis of one prime contractor's agreement with the owner to provide coordination for the
other prime contractors.'" In that case, the several contracts with the owner also expressly
included a provision that each contractor would "pay all cost and expenses" incurred by
of her parties due to its delays and permitted the withholding of funds by the owner to be
used for that purpose. 259 At least one other court has found third party standing among
2" The concurring justices offered that the plaintiff should have an opportunity to prove that
the contracting parties' understanding was that the bond included a promise to pay, 282 Or. at 561,
580 P.2d at 533 (Linde, Lent, JJ., concurring), while the dissenting justice stated, "[i]f there is an
ambiguity, because of the archaic form of the bond, as to what the parties intended, it would be
proper to submit proof showing what the parties did intend." Id. at 564, 580 P.2d at 535 (Holman, J.,
dissenting).
2 ' See Matter of Gebco Inv. Corp., 641 F.2d 143, 147 (3d Cir. 1981) (despite absence of express
promise to pay, record demonstrated that contractual parties understood that retainage was for
benefit of subcontractors); Howell v. Worth James Construction Co., 259 Ark. 627, 630, 535 S.W.2d
826, 829 (1976) (circumstances supported interpretation that retainage provision was designed for
benefit of fellow contractor). See also Wyoming Machinery, 614 P.2d 716, 725-27 (Wyo. 1980) (dissent-
ing opinion in 3-2 decision) (distinguishing the express "promise to pay" standard as being more
narrow than the appropriate "intent to benefit" measure, and asserting that in the instant case the
promise to pay was sufficiently expressed or was indicated "by reasonable implication").
26" For example, creditor cases, see supra text accompanying notes 126-239, and gift cases, see
supra text accompanying notes 140
-52.
261 90 N.J. 253, 447 A.2d 906 (1982).
24" Id. at 26!, 447 A.2d at 910-11. One prime contractor was designated as the general contrac-
tor but the other contractors also contracted directly with the owner. No subcontractual relations
existed between these parties. Id. Accord John E. Green Plumbing & Heating, Inc. v. Turner
Construction Co., 742 F.2d 965, 966 n.2 (6th Cir. 1984) (applying Michigan law).
284 90 N.J. at 261, 447 A.2d at 910-11.
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multi-prime contractors with a less express promise," but other courts have split on the
standing question in similar cases.'"
The facts found in the case of Buchman Plumbing Co. v. Regents of University of
Minnesota 272 provide a contrast to those in the Broadway Maintenance case. In Buchman
several prime contractors each entered into agreements with the project owner which
indicated that the work was to be completed within 200 days. The owner agreed to be
liable to each contractor for delay damages it caused and each contractor agreed to
reimburse the owner for any liability to others arising from delays which that contractor
might cause." One contractor brought an action alleging that it was unable to complete
its work in 200 days, and therefore suffered delay damages, because of the failure of a
fellow contractor to render timely performance." The Minnesota court reasoned that
even if the fellow contractor had breached, no third party rights would exist in the injured
contractor because the 200 day completion provision was included for the benefit of the
owner. Moreover, the court was persuaded that proper performance by one fellow
contractor would not fulfill the general obligation of the owner to the contractors to
provide a suitable work site and avoid delay." In the Buchman case each contractor would
undoubtedly benefit from prompt performance by the others but any intention by the
contracting parties to create a direct obligation or confer an enforceable right upon one
contractor against the others was not clear. Unlike the Broadway Maintenance case, there
was no contractual agreement in Buchman to shift the owner's obligations onto one or
more of the fellow prime contractors nor any direct promise to pay other contractors for
damages.
Similar questions have been raised in cases involving an alleged breach by an architect
or other party whose performance affects the performance of the contractors in the
project. The courts have generally agreed with the Buchman reasoning in holding t hat the
architect's contract will not be deemed for the benefit of the contractors because it is
entered into primarily for the benefit of the owner and not to create a direct obligation to
the contractor." These decisions warrant some scrutiny, however, in light of the substan-
tial interest that a contractor may have in the architect's proper performance. In the case
of COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy Engineers, 277 the California Court of Appeals, in overruling
sustainment of a demurrer, found that the general contractor was a creditor beneficiary
of an engineering firm's contract with the owner to produce an environmental impact
report required by state law. The court reasoned that the owner owed a duty to the
contractor to obtain the environmental impact report and had contracted with the
defendant to discharge that duty.' Among the cases cited by the court was the Visintine
2" Shea-S&M Ball v. Massman•Kiewit-Early, 606 F.2d 1245, 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1979). One contrac-
tor was obligated to prevent overflows of water from its construction site into the adjacent construc-
tion site of a fellow contractor. The fellow contractor was found to be a third party beneficiary of that
obligation. Id.
"1 See cases cited in Broadway Maintenance, 90 N.J. at 260, 447 A.2d at 909.
222 298 Minn. 328, 215 N.W.2d 479 (1974).
273 Id. at 332, 215 N.W.2d at 481-82.
271 Id.
275 Id. at 336, 215 N.W.2d at 484-85.
276
	
Williams v. Fenix & Scisson, Inc., 608 F.2d 1205, 1209 (9th Cit. 1979); Engle Acoustic &
Tile, Inc. v. Grenfell, 223 So. 2d 613, 620 (Miss. 1969); Valley Landscape Co., Inc. v. Rolland, 218
Va. 257, 261-62, 237 S.E.2d 120, 123 (1977).
277 67 Cal. App. 3d 916, 136 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1977).
Id. at 923, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 893.
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case from Ohio where a third party contractor was also deemed to be a creditor be-
neficiary of another contractor's promise to the owner to fulfill the owner's duty to
provide preparatory work essential to the third party's perfOrmance. 219
It is reasonable to conclude, then, that in t he absence of an express promise for the
benefit of the third party, the decisive determination in this type of case will be whether
one contractor has assumed a direct or specific obligation owed by t he owner to provide
conditions required for another contractor's performance. 28" This result can be con-
trasted with arrangements where the contractor.or architect performs a duty primarily to
benefit the owner and does not assume a direct, specific obligation to the fellow contrac-
tor."' Because of this distinction, cases such as Buchrnan and Broadway Maintenance are
reconcilable.
4. Promise to Repair Cases
A last area of third party claims in construction contracts typically involves adjacent
property owners who suffer property damage during the course of work done by a
contractor and then seek to recover on the basis of a provision in the construction contract
requiring the contractor to repair any damage caused during the course of perfor-
mance.'" In a rather well established line of cases, the courts have considered such clauses
to amount to a promise to compensate directly the injured property owners and have
allowed third party standing.'" In some cases third party standing has been allowed even
though the contract did not contain a specific promise to pay damages to the injured
party, but instead contained a more simple promise to he responsible for damages in lieu
of the owner.'" This liberality in interpretation is far from Unlimiied, however, and the
courts will most certainly honor a clause expressly denying an intent to create third party
rights even when the other contractual provisions might otherwise support third party
standing. 2 H5 Also, the parties may expressly limit the prmnisor's obligation to indemnifica-
2" 169 Ohio St. 505, 160 N.E,2d 311 (1959), discussed supra note 181 and accompanying text.
"° See, e.g., Shea-S&M Ball v. Massman-Kiewit-Early, 606 F.2d 1245, 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1979)
(prevent water from Hooding into another contractor's work site); COAC, Inc. v. Kennedy En-
gineers, 67 Cal. App. 3d 916, 921, 136 Ca]. Rpt r. 890, 892 (1977) (provide mandatory environmental
impact report).
"' See, e.g., Williams v. Fenix	 Scisson, Inc,, 608 F.2d 1205, 1209 (9th Cir. 1979) (duty to
conduct safety inspections and make recommendations to owner); Valley Landscape Co., Inc. v.
Rolland, 218 Va. 257, 261-62, 237 S.E.2d 120, 123 (1977) (provide plans to owner according to his
desires and conduct supervisory services to insure that plaits are followed).
252 These cases do often involve governmental parties as owners but in light of the limited scope
of "promises to repair" clauses, the special rules for public service contracts, supra notes 178-83 and
accompanying text, should not apply. See Plantation Pipe Line Co. v. 3-D Excavators, Inc., 160 Ga.
App. 756, 758-59, 287 S.E.2d 102, 105 (1981).
2" See Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Massman Construction Co., 402 A.2d 1275, 1277 (D.C.
1979); Plantation Pipe Line Co. v. 3-D Excavators, Inc., 160 Ga. App. 756, 757, 287 S.E.2d 102, 104
(1981); Kemp v. Hudnall, 423 So. 2d 1260, 1262 (La. Ct. App. 1982); St. Joseph Light and Power Co.
v. Kaw Valley Tunnelling, Inc., 589 S.W.2d 260, 271-72 (Mo. 1979).
See, e.g., Plantation Pipe Line Co. v. 3-D Excavators, Inc., 160 Ga. App. 756, 757, 287 S.E.2d
102, 104 (1981) (" [al ny damages to existing structures or utilities shall be repaired or made good by
the Contractor at no expense to the owner"); Kemp v. Hudnall, 423 So. 2d 1260, 1261 (La. Ct. App.
1982) ("contractor ... shall be responsible for all damage done to property or persons").
.2 '15 See, e.g., Lewis v. Globe Construction Co., Inc., 6 Kan. App. 2d 478, 486, 630 P.2d 179, 185
(1981); Richmond Shopping Center, Inc. v. Wiley N. Jackson Co., 220 Va. 135, 142, 255 S.E.2d 518,
523 (1979).
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tion of the promisee rather than create a direct obligation to the third party. 266
The rule established in these cases, that a promise to compensate directly injured
adjacent property owners will give rise to third party rights, lends itself to more expansive
application. In the case of just's Inc. v. Arrington Construction Company' the plaintiff
sought damages not for injury to physical property but for loss of profits resulting from a
blockage of traffic on the road leading to its business site. The construction contract
included a clause requiring that continuous and adequate access to the,businesses near the
project be maintained. 266 The court concluded that this provision established an enforce-
able right in the businesses concerned.'" In reaching this conclusion, the majority
opinion 299 relied on precedent establishing third party standing based on property dam-
age repair clauses.' 9 ' Another extension of this line of reasoning is found in the case of
Leija v. Materne Bros., Inc."' where the Washington Court of Appeals found that safety
requirements in a road construction contract created third party rights in t he traveling
public, because the public would benefit from proper performance of the agreement.
Although the court did not cite the property damage repair clause cases, it employed
similar reasoning. 293
2
'` See, e.g., Simons v. Tri-State Construction Co., 33 Wash. App. 315, 325, 655 P.2d 703, 709
(1983) ("In the instant case 'Fri-State did not agree to pay for or repair damage suffered by third
parties nor did it agree to be liable for the potential damage. Tri-State agreed to indemnify and
defend the City for liability claims, losses or damages.").
saT 99 Idaho 462, 583 P.2d 997 (1978).
1" Id. at 465, 583 P.2d at 1000. Among the relevant contract provisions was this paragraph:
Business Access. The Contractor shall keep the businesses within the project area
continuously advised of his proposed schedule of operations. Access to and from the
various businesses shall be continuously and courteously provided. Movable pedestrian
bridges, sturdily constructed and with adequate handrails, shall be provided where
pedestrian access must be maintained over and across new concrete sidewalks, etc.
id.
2" Id. at 466, 583 P.2d at 1001. The court stated that:
[T]he contract provisions in the instant case obligated the defendant to take certain
precautionary measures for the benefit of a limited class of third parties, the businesses
within the [construction area]. Accordingly, members of that class of third party .
beneficiaries are entitled to sue for the defendant's alleged breach of those contract
provisions.
Id.
290
 The two dissenting justices asserted that this contract was a "public works" contract and
should be subject to rules limiting third party standing its government contract cases, citing Mach v.
Rensselaer, 247 N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 89 (1928) and RESTATEMENT or CONTRACTS § 145 (1932) (see supra
notes 178-79 and accompanying text). Jusrs Inc., 99 Idaho at 471-72, 583 P.2d at 1006-1007
(Donaldson, Shepard, JJ., dissenting). The dissent went on to state that the majority ruling might
open the door for numerous third party beneficiary suits, had misread the language of the contract,
and was improper on policy grounds because the exposure to lawsuit would place an arduous burden
on those contracting with the government. Id. at 473-75, 583 P.2d at 1008-10 (Donaldson, Shepard,
II., dissenting).
2" Id. at 466, 583 P.2d at 1001. The court cited Yellowstone Pipe Line Co. v. Grant Construction
Co., 95 Idaho 794, 795, 520 P.2d 249, 250 (1974) in which the court found that a promise to be
"responsible" for damages gave rise to third party beneficiary rights in an injured property owner.
242 34 Wash. App. 825, 664 P.2d 527 (1983),
243 Id. at 826, 664 1'.2d at 529. The contract provided in part that, the contractor would "be liable
for injuries and damages to persons and property suffered by reason of the Contractor's operations
or any negligence in connection therewith."
Although the court's language was not precise, it went on to lind that third party beneficiary
standing should be had by the traveling public which was intended to benefit from safety precau-
tions. Id. at 829, 664 P.2d at 530.
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An evaluation of the cases in this area reveals that standing has generally been limited
to situations where a promise has been made for a direct performance or benefit to be
received by the third parties. Only by virtue of liberal interpretation leading to a finding
of such a promise have the courts enlarged the number of parties with standing. Such
liberal interpretation reflects, however, a perceptible movement away from the presump-
tion against third party standing and toward a position more in line with the principle that
standing should be allowed whenever it is consistent with the contractual purposes and
goals of the parties."'
G. Real Property Transactions.
Several parties regularly attempt to bring suit as third party beneficiaries of real
property construction, sale, lease or financing agreements. Real estate brokers may bring
suit for unpaid commissions; 295 lessors or lessees of property may bring suit for breach of
the other parties' contracts; 296 and lenders may sue to protect their security interest"' or
may be sued if they fail to go forward on loan commitments.'" The more significant cases
2414 See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text. This principle is also embodied in Section 302
of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, see infra notes 372-75 and accompanying text.
2" Courts are not likely to find that the broker is a third party beneficiary of t he seller-purchaser
contract unless an express provision is included in the contract. Normally the broker has no action
against the buyer and must pursue his action against the seller on the basis of the listing contract
between them. See Reidy v. Macauley, 57 N.C. App. 184, 187, 290 S.E.2d 746, 748 (1982) (broker was
not third party beneficiary of buyer-seller contract but must look to its listing contract with seller);
Tamposi Associates, Inc. v. Star Market Co., Inc., 119 N.H. 630, 633, 406 A.2d 132, 134 (1979)
(broker was not third party beneficiary of lease agreement since he had his own contract with the
lessor); Professional Realty Corp. v. Bender, 216 Va. 737, 739, 222 S.E.2d 810, 812 (1976) (broker
was not third party beneficiary of buyer-seller contract in absence of provision pefrmitting recovery
against buyer; outcome would be different if purchaser had promised commission upon his default);
cf. Maganas v. Northroup, 135 Ariz. 573, 576, 663 P.2d 565, 568 (1982) (en bane) (broker and his
salesman were third party beneficiaries where contract expressly provided for commission); Dworak
v. Michaels, 211 Neb. 716, 724, 320 N.W.2d 485, 489 (1982) (broker was third party beneficiary of
agreement between seller and multi-listing service which specifically provided for broker's commis-
sion).
' Lessors and lessees are generally not deemed third party beneficiaries of the others' contracts
with third parties. See American Financial Corp. v. Computer Sciences Corp., 558 F. Supp. 1182,
1185-86 (D. Del. 1983) (lessor of computers was not third party beneficiary of maintenance agree-
ment between lessee and third party); Fourth & Main Co. v. Joslin Dry Goods Co., 648 P.2d 178, 181
(Colo, Ct. App. 1982) (fellow lessees were not third party beneficiaries of lessor's separate lease with
anchor store); Wing v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 684 P.2d 307, 311 (Idaho Ct. App. 1984) (lessor of
farm was not third party beneficiary of lessee-grower's contract for the sale of crops produced on the
farm); Hardware Center Inc. v. Parkedge Corp., 618 S.W.2d 689, 693 (Mo, Ct. App. 1981) (sublessee
was not bird party beneficiary of provisions in original lease other than the provision allowing for
sublease); May's Family Centers Inc. v. Goodman's Inc., 571 F. Supp. 1012, 1015-16 (N.D. Ill.
1983) (applying Illinois law) (sublessee was third party beneficiary of original lease provision allowing
tOr sublease).
"7 See First National State Bank of New Jersey v. Commonwealth Federal Savings and Loan,
610 F.2d 164, 170-71 (3d Cir. 1980) (permanent lender did not have third party standing on
agreement between borrower and interim lender concerning limits on use of interim funds); Illinois
Housing Development Authority v. M-Z Construction Corp., 110 III App. 3d 129, 137-41, 441
N.E.2d 1179, 1184-88 (1982) and Illinois Housing Development Authority v. Sjostrom & Sons, Inc.,
105 Ill. App. 3d 247, 258-59, 433 N.E.2d 1350, 1358-59 (1982) (both cases concluding that state
agency-mortgagee was not third party beneficiary of contracts between owner and cont ractors in
construction of housing financed under state plan).
2" See Dale v. Groebe & Co., 103 111. App. 3d 649, 653, 431 N.E.2d 1107, 1111 (1981) (seller of
September 1984]	 THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY STANDING	 969
in this area, however, concern the possible standing of the purchaser of a home against a
remote builder299 or some other party who provides a service in the overall transaction,
such as an appraiser, surveyor, or title agency."' Also closely related are cases involving
not a purchaser but a tenant or lessee who holds a particularly important role in a
construction or sales transaction."'
1. Remote Home Builder Cases
The remote builder cases generally involve a purchaser who buys a new home from a
developer-seller and later wishes to bring suit against the builder of the home for breach
of his contract with the developer due to some flaw in construction. The Illinois case of
Altevogt v. Brinkoetter302 posed such a situation. In that case the Illinois Supreme Court
denied the purchaser standing as third party beneficiary because of a lack of intent by the
contracting parties to confer a "direct benefit" on the purchaser." The court acknowl-
edged the widely recognized rule that a third party need not be named in a contract or
even be specifically known to have standing on a contract 304 but gave more weight to the
countervailing principle that mere knowledge by the builder that the house would be
resold by the developer is not enough to confer third party rights on the future pur-
chaser. 3D3 Other courts applying Illinois law have reached consistent decisions. 3" These
cases would seem to require an express statement of intent to create third party rights in
an ultimate purchaser.
land was not third party beneficiary of loan commitment agreement between purchaser and bank);
Khabhaz v. Swartz, 319 N.W.2d 279, 285-86 (Iowa 1982) (same).
z" See, e.g., Waterford Condominium Ass'n v. Dunbar Corp., 104 III. App. 3d 371, 372, 432
N.E.2d 1009, 1010 (1982); Hillbrook Apartments, Inc. v. Nyce Crete Co., 237 Pa. Super. 565, 569,
352 A.2d 148, 150 (1975).
300 See, e.g., Brown v. Sum merl in Associates, inc., 272 Ark. 298, 299, 614 S.W.2d 227, 228 (1981)
(contract to survey land); Hines v. Amole, 4 Ohio App. 3d 263, 263, 448 N.E.2d 473, 474 (1982)
(contract for termite inspection).
351 See Seiler v. Levitz Furniture Co., 367 A.2d 999, 1001 (Del. 1976); People ex rd. Resnik v.
Curtis & Davis, Architects and Planners, Inc., 78 III. 2d 381, 382, 400 N.E.2d 918, 918 (1980);
Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board v. Rapistan, Inc., 472 Pa. 36, 40, 371 A.2d 178, 180 (1976).
"z 85 III. 2d 44, 421 N.E.2d 182 (1981).
30' Id. at 56, 421 N.E.2d at 188.
304 Id. at 55, 421 N.E.2d at 187.
305
	 at 56-57, 421 N.E.2d at 188:
The plaintiffs point to T he allegation of paragraph 6 that Hinton [the builder] knew that
the house was not to be occupied by Brinkoetter [the developer] but would be offered
for sale to other persons. We note initially the absence of any allegation that Brinkoeiter
had informed Hinton that such was his intention prior to the execution of the contract.
Apart from that consideration, we do not believe that Hinton's knowledge that a third
party would occupy the house establishes that the plaintiffs were direct beneficiaries.
Id. (citing Rozney v. Marnul, 43 Ill. 2d 54, 250 N.E.2d 656 (1969) (surveyor not liable to third party
purchasers even though he knew others would rely on the survey report)).
3'd See Waterford Condominium Ass'n v. Dunbar Corp., 104 III. App. 3d 371, 373, 432 N.E.2d
1009, 1011-12 (1982) (purchasers and their association were not third party beneficiaries of contract
between developer and defendant-sellers for construction of condominiums). Accord Slate Printing
Co. v. Metro Envelope Co., 532 F. Supp. 431, 433-34 (N.D. III. 1982) (mere knowledge that paper
goods would be sold to an ultimate purchaser is not enough under Illinois law to create third party
beneficiary rights); Spiegel v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 466 N.E.2d 1040, 1045 (10. 1984) (mere
knowledge that photocopiers would he resold by distributor to ultimate buyer did not create third
party beneficiary rights against original vendor).
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The Illinois Supreme Court, however, had decided in a case antedatingAllevogt that,
in essence, an express statement of intent to create third party rights in an ultimate
purchaser is not required. In that case, People ex rel. Resnik v. Curtis & Davis, 3°7 the contract
between the builder and the owner clearly and expressly indicated that the building and
facilities were being constructed for use by the State of Illinois as a prison but did not
include an explicit statement that third party rights were created in favor of the State. 3"
The court concluded that "[c(onstruction of the prison would directly benefit the State,
the 'User' — not the parties; . the State is a proper party plaintiff because it is a direct
beneficiary clearly identified and intended in the contract befOre us. -3°" The court con-
cluded that the State was a direct beneficiary because (1) the State would occupy and use
the buildings and (2) because that fact was acknowledged in the contract." 10 If' standing
was granted for those reasons, a third party purchasing a home in a new subdivision
development would seem to hold a similar status because (1)the unknown purchaser, not
the developer, will occupy and use the home, and (2) the surrounding circumstances of
the developer-builder contract undeniably acknowledge that a future purchaser will
become the user of the home. The fact that the particular purchaser is not known should
not make a difference and neither should the fact that the intent to resell is derived from
circumstances rather than the contract itself.
The Altevogt case was decided after Resnik and the court did consider the possibility
that the earlier case was controlling precedent. The court, however, viewed the facts of
Resnik as including sufficient indications of intent to create third party rights in the State
even though an express statement was lacking. 3 " The Altevogt court specifically acknowl-
edged that an unknown future purchaser of a home in a subdivision might acquire the
same kind of rights as the tenant in Resnik but indicated that something more than the
developer's obvious intent to resell the home is required.' On the other hand, Resnik
must be read to mean that something less than an express statement to that effect will
suffice. It is difficult to imagine, as a practical matter, what. sort of nonexpress indications
would have satisfied the Altevogt court. that an unknown future purchaser should acquire
third party rights.
Further study ofthe Altevogi and Resnik cases yields additional skepticism about their
consistency. One could conclude that the future unknown purchaser in Altevogt was more
307 78 Ill. 2d 381, 400 N,F..2d 918 (1980).
3" I& at 385-86, 400 N.E.2d at 920.
3" Id. at 386-87, 400 N.E.2d at 920. The state was not a direct party because of a limitation
placed on the state's budget deficit by the state constitution. By establishing the Illinois Building
Authority to contract for the prison and then lease it to the state the budget limit was circumvented.
Id. at 386, 400 N.E.2d at 920.
'I" A decision similar to that in Resnik was reached in Seiler v. Levitz Furniture Co., 367 A.2d
999 (Del. 1976). The owner contracted to build a commercial building specifically for the tenant,
Levitz Furniture Company. l,evitz was found to be a third party beneficiary of the contract between
the architect and owner to plan a building to meet the known tenant's requirement. Id. at 1007. Cf.
Chmieleski v, City Products Corp., 660 S.W.2d 275, 289 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (special sublessee who
was intended to benefit by lessee but not made known to owner-lessor could not qualify as third party
beneficiary),
311 A ltevogt ,  85 Ill. 2d at 55, 421 N.E.2d at 187.
312 Id. at 56, 421 N.E.2d at 187. The Supreme Court stated that the appellate court bad erred to
the degree that its denial of third party standing rested on the lack of identification of the particular
purchasers in the contract, and the court specifically acknowledged that a developer might indeed
intend to confer a right on purchasers but indicated that the developer's intent must he shown on
some basis other than his well-known plan to resell the homes. Id. at 55-56, 421 N.E.2d at 187-88.
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correctly a direct beneficiary than the known tenant in Resnik. Both parties occupied the
respective buildings but the purchaser in Altevogt had a substantial permanent investment
in the home. In contrast, the tenant-user in Resnik could refuse to perform under its lease
arrangement with the owner if the building failed to meet its structural specifications.
Moreover, a tenant can almost always pursue an action against the owner in the event of
breach, while the same cannot be said of a purchaser of a home with respect to a
developer. In both of these types of cases a court could, and perhaps should, find that
multiple parties stand to receive an intended direct benefit from the construction con-
tract. In the Resnik type of case, both the owner and the tenant benefit from a properly
constructed building; in the Altevogt type of case, the developer will receive the benefit of
having the home properly constructed and available for resale and the future purchaser
will have the benefit of . a properly constructed, habitable home. Both parties benefit,
albeit successively, in an intended, direct and substantial manner,
These cases should be distinguished from the situation where the contractual per-
formance is clearly for some purpose other than to benefit the t bird party purchaser.
Mogensen v. Martgia offers an example of this latter situation. That case involved a
contract between the seller of land and a construction company for the latter to perform a
variety of tasks on the land, including removal of tree stumps. The purpose of the
contract was to repair and maintain a system of drain pipes. 314 The subsequent purchaser
of the land, who intended to conduct farming activities, discovered that the tree stumps
had not been removed and that the land was not tillable. Because the purpose of the
contract was not to make the land tillable for the purpose of resale to farmers, the court
correctly denied the purchaser third party standing on the maintenance contract . 3 ' 5 I Et he
owner had sought to make the land tillable to sell it to an unknown farmer, and the
construction company had been aware or had had reason to know of this intent, then
third party rights probably should have been deemed to exist in the ultimate purchaser.
A final point should be made about the remote builder cases. Illinois courts, in light
of the Resnik and Altevogt decisions, would seem likely to grant third party rights on a
construction contract where a developer had a custom home built for a known ultimate
purchaser, even without an express statement of intent to create rights, but would not be
likely to grant such rights to an unknown future purchaser who contracts to buy a home
even as early as the day after the construction contract is entered into by the developer
and builder."' The distinction between the two purchasers seems hardly significant and is
undeniably related to the identity of the purchaser-third party being known at the time of
contracting, a factor which the Illinois Supreme Court has stated should not be deter-
minative.'
313
 441 N.E.2d 34 (Ind. 1982).
3" hi. at 34.
31s
	 at 35.
316 Indeed, in Altevogt the contract to purchase the home was apparently entered into while the
home was still under construction and the developer agreed to have completed certain construction
requirements imposed by t he purchaser. 85 III. 2d at 47-48, 421 N.E.2d at 183-84. The fact that the
purchaser becomes known even while construction is in progress would not call for a different
outcome by the Altevogt court since Illinois law requires that the requisite indicia of intent be present
at the time the contract is executed, not some time thereafter. F.W. Hempel & Co., Inc. v. Metal
World, Inc., 721 F.2d 610, 613-14 (7th Cir. 1982) (applying Illinois law).
3 ' 7 Altevogt v. Brinkoetter, 85 111. 2d 44, 55, 421 N.E.2d 182, 187 (1981) ("It is not necessary that
a contract for the benefit °Fa third party identify him by name. The contract may define a third party
by description of a class, and it is sufficient if [he) may be identified at the time performance is due as
a member of the class to be benefitted.") (citations omitted).
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2. Real Estate Appraisal, Inspection, and Surveying Cases
In the variety of' real property transaction cases which fbcus not on home construc-
tion contracts but on contracts for inspection, surveying, appraisal or other services
related to the sale of homes, the purchaser is often denied standing, but for different
reasons than those given in the remote builder cases analyzed in the previous section. This
distinction results in large part because the prospective purchasers in these cases are
generally known and identified. In the related services cases, the decisive factor for the
courts which grant standing seems to be knowledge by the contracting parties that the
purchaser will benefit from the service. Such knowledge will be sufficient to create third
party rights without an express statement to that effect,' In the case of Stotlar v. Hester, 3 ' 9
for example, the New Mexico Court of Appeals reversed a trial court decision granting
summary judgment to an appraiser who was sued by the purchasers of a home. The
purchasers alleged that the appraisal was erroneous and caused them to suffer dam-
ages. 3" The appraiser had been employed by the sellers and conflicting evidence was
presented as to whether the sellers indicated that the purpose of the appraisal was to
facilitate the sale of the home or merely to refinance the sellers' mortgage. 32 ' The appeals
court concluded that the purchasers would be third party beneficiaries if it could be
shown that the sellers intended the purchasers to benefit from the appraisal and the
appraiser had reason to know of that intent.. 322
The difficulty that purchasers encounter in these types of cases is that courts are
often inclined to conclude that the purpose of the service contract is not to benefit the
purchaser of the home. An example of this reasoning is found in Alva v. Ckninger, 323 a
1981 North Carolina decision which also involved a presale appraisal of a home. The
appraiser had been hired by the lending institution"' and he returned a favorable report
on the home. After moving into the home the purchasers found serious structural defects
related to a "slope-
 in the house; the home apparently had been built on a land fill and the
settling had caused the home to slant in a manner that created a variety of problems. 325
Although testimony was offered that the appraised value was grossly erroneous and that
the appraiser should have discovered the defects, 328
 the court denied the purchasers
318 See Brown v. Summerlin Associates, Inc., 272 Ark. 298, 300, 014 S.W.2d 227, 229 (1981)
(special master's finding that purchaser was not third party beneficiary of survey contract between
seller and defendant was not clearly erroneous and therefore not reversible, but basis for finding
third party standing existed and the court, if it were seized with quest ion, might have done so); Hines
v. Amole, 4 Ohio App. 3d 263, 268, 448 N.E.2d 473, 479 (1982) (purchasers were third party
beneficiaries of termite inspection contract between inspector and realtor acting as agent for seller).
92 N.M. 26, 582 P.2d 403 (N.M. Ct. App. 1978).
"° Id. at 31, 582 P.2d at 408. The purchasers alleged they were damaged in that the appraisal
reported the wrong square footage and failed to allocate a deduction for poor roof condition. Id.
32"
	 at 30-31, 582 P.2d at 407-08.
3" Id. The court stated, "to be third party beneficiaries, [the appraiser) must have had reason to
know that the {sellers] intended such a benefit for prospective purchasers of their property. This
intent may be shown by extrinsic evidence if not stated in the contract." Id. Accord Stagen v.
Stewart-West Coast Title Co., 149 Cal. App. 3d 114, 119, 196 Cal. Rptr. 732, 735 (1983) (in dictum
court stated that when abstractor knows that abstract is for third person liability will arise).
323
	 N.C. App. 602, 277 S.E.2d 535 (1981).
32 ' Id. at 604, 277 S.E.2d at 537-38. The purchaser paid the cost of the appraisal to the lender
who then entered into the contract for the appraisal. Id.
335 Id. at 604-05, 277 S.E.2d 537-38. Among the problems were cracks and bumps in the floor
and doors which closed themselves. Id.
326 Id. at 605-06, 277 S.E.2d 537-38. Testimony of three other appraisers indicated that the
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standing in their suit against the appraiser. 3" The court reasoned that the lender had
requested the appraisal for the limited purpose of assisting in its processing of the loan
application and that the purchasers received a merely incidental benefit from the apprai-
sal to t he extent that it affected the lender's decision to grant or deny the loan. 328 These
grounds for denying standing in Alva and other similar cases'129 are phrased in a manner
consistent with most third party beneficiary rules. That is, courts reason that the contract-
ing parties' purpose for the service performed involved a direct benefit or performance to
someone other than the purchaser of the realty.
Thinking critically about the reasoning in the Alva case, one recognizes that a lender
could conceivably hire its own appraiser entirely for its own internal evaluation and
assume responsibility for the correctness of the appraisals. This type of arrangement
would be tantamount to appraisal conducted by t he lender's employee. Third party rights
would most certainly not arise out of this type of arrangement because the circumstances
would deny any basis for contemplating direct liability by the appraiser to t he purchaser.
Actual cases, however, present a different situation. The appraiser and the lender con-
tract with  acute awareness that the purchaser's transaction will be greatly and directly
affected by the appraisal. Not only is the appraiser's report a factor in the lender's
decision, but the report also undeniably influences the purchaser's overall transaction. A
strong argument can be made that, where the appraiser is aware that an appraisal is
required in connection with the sale of realty, the purchaser is intended to derive a direct
and substantial benefit from proper performance of the contract for appraisal services
and therefore is entitled to third party beneficiary standing. This is the type of reasoning
used by t he court in &attar v. Hester" and seems to be consistent with of her types of cases
emphasizing direct benefit and performance as a basis for finding third  party rights as
discussed throughout this review of recent decisions,"'
111. CONSTRUING SECTION 302 OF THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
The rule found in Section 133 of the Restatement of Contracts332 on third party
beneficiary rights has been widely accepted by the courts,' The courts have been notably
defects should have been discovered at the time of the appraisal and that the value of the property
should have been $38,500 instead of the $53,500 value assigned in the original appraisal. Id.
" 7 Id. at 608-09, 277 S.E.2d at 539.
32S Id. at 608, 277 S.E.2d at 539.
92 ' See Norton v. First Federal Savings,•128 Ariz. 176, 178, 624 P.2d 854, 856 (1981) (en bane)
(purchasers were not third party beneficiaries of developer's performance bond required by city to
guarantee construction of streets, sewers, water line and other improvements; city required bond to
protect itself' from the cost of improvements if developer refused or defaulted in performance);
Walters v. Mader, 83 Cal. App. 3d 1, 33, 147 Cal. Rptr. 655, 675 (1978) (purchaser was not third
party beneficiary of contract between lender and insurance company for insurance title report
because sole purpose of insurance contract was to protect lender against impairment of security);
Mary Ellen Sandlie Trust v. Pioneer National Title ins. Co., 648 S.W.2d 761, 762 (Tex. Civ. App.
1983) (purchaser was not third party beneficiary of contract for tide report; report was not to be
issued to purchaser but to be used in writing title insurance policy).
3" See supra notes 319-22 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 123-330 and accompanying text.
' See supra note 12 for text of Section 133.
3" Connecticut appears to he the only state expressly rejecting the Restatement of Contracts
Section 133 rule on third party rights. See Data General Corp. v. Citizens National Rank, 502 F. Supp.
776, 785 (D. Conn. 1980) (citing Colonial Discount Co. v. Avon Motors, Inc., 137 Conti. 196, 200-02,
75 A.2d 507, 510 (1950)). The Connecticut test is simply "whether the intent of the parties to the
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slow to accept and adopt Section 302 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts as a
replacement for the earlier standard. 334 Nonetheless the newer formulation has begun to
gain increasing importance in light of its adoption as reflecting the law, at least in part, in
Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Permsylvania. 335
 Section 302 has also been commented on
or construed in the opinions of several federal courts as well as courts in at least eleven
other jurisdictions.' A review of those cases where Section 302 has been cited would
quickly reveal that the courts are not in agreement on whether or in what manner Section
302 differs from Section 133 and other pre-existing rules on third party beneficiary
standing."'
The conflicting readings of Section 302 reveal a present need for a careful interpreta-
tion to determine how its rule should be applied. A proper assumption would undoubt-
edly he that the drafters intended the section to improve and clarify the Section 133
formulation.'" Its natural goals, therefore, would he to preserve the better part of the
existing rules and their applications and to effect changes that would encourage courts to
eliminate inconsistencies both within and among the various jurisdictions. Using the
original Section 133 as a point of reference, the substance of Section 302 and its available
drafting history will be reviewed to ascertain the hard or certain changes built into it, the
deficiencies in the section, and those areas where the section is pliable and lends itself to a
useful interpretation.
A. The Drafting History of Section 302
The original Restatement of Contracts formulation on third party beneficiary stand-
ing was framed in a manner which comported with contemporary court rules on the
rights of third party beneficiaries.'" The Restatement served only to identify a consensus
norm rather than establish an ideal rule."" As such, the formulation necessarily suffered
from many of the same deficiencies present. in the judicial formulations and it fell short of
serving as an optimal guide to practitioners and courts in the period following publication
of the first Restatement, a period during which this relatively new basis for claimant
standing was given an increasing application.'"
In addressing Section 133 during the drafting of the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts, the American Law Institute (ALI) participants were keenly aware of the
contract was that the promissor should assume a direct obligation to the third party. - Id. The court in
Colonial Discount, while maintaining the distinction between its test and Section 133, surmised that, as
a practical matter, the difference was more apparent than real. 137 Conn. at 202, 75 A.2d at 510.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, Volume I V-Appendix at 349-85 (1981 & Supp. 1983)
for cases reflecting states either adopting or favorably citing Section 133.
334
 The current version of Section 302 first appeared in draft form in 1973. The complete
Restatement (Second) of Contracts was completed in 1979. See supra note 12. Only Massachusetts,
Pennsylvania and Minnesota have expressly adopted the Section 302. See supra notes 25-27. The
reaction of other states is included in the Appendix to this article, infra.
"' See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
a3"
 See infra Appendix.
387 See infra Appendix.
3" See Farnsworth, ft/pet-herds in the Redaction of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 81 CoLum. L.
REV. 1, 5-6 (1981) (citing Wechsler, The Course of the Restatements, 55 A.R.A. J. 147, 149 - 51 (1969)).
a" See E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 10.2 (1982).
344 See 4 A. CORIHN, CONTRACTS § 772 (1951).
34
 A very succinct history of contract third party beneficiary law is found in E. FARNSWORTH,
CONTRACTS § 10.2 (1982). The recognition of third party rights in American courts apparently first
became noticeable in the mid-19th century. Id.
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difficulties encountered by the courts in attempting to differentiate between those third
party beneficiaries with standing to enforce a promise and those lacking such standing.
Indeed, the Reporter-342 for the ALI indicated in one instance that the revision of Section
133 was "one of the more dramatic changes" made in drafting the Restatement (Sec-
ond). 343 This section was apparently the only one to have been discussed in more than one
annual meeting of the ALL 344 Despite the basic changes in terminology,'" an analysis of
the revision and the present reaction of the courts strongly indicate that the changes were
not so substantial or obvious as to provide clear and immediate help for the courts where
help was, and still is, indisputably needed.
The deficiencies in the revision of Section 133 may have resulted in large part from
the conservative approach of the ALI in revising the Restatement of Contracts. In
identifying the spirit of the revising drafters, the Reporter indicated that the participants
had "handled the original Restatement tenderly, as befits a classic. -346 This approach was
generally warranted, considering that the Restatement of Contracts was the first restate-
ment completed and had enjoyed tremendous success."" In the instance of the third party
beneficiary rights, however, the new drafters may have been remiss in not making a
greater departure from the first Restatement.
The definition of third party beneficiaries contained in Section 133 of the original
Restatement required that the putative beneficiary be classified as a creditor, donee or
incidental beneficiary.345 The essence of the creditor category was that the promisor's
performance to the third party should satisfy some duty owed by the promisee to the
third party.TM 9
 The donee category not only encompassed those instances in which an
apparent purpose on the part of the promisee to make a gift to the third party was
present, but also included a "catchall" class of situations where neither a duty to the t hird
party nor a true donative intent was present but still an apparent purpose to confer upon
the third party some right to performance from the promisor could he found.''"
342 The reporter for the Restatement (Second) of Contracts during the relevant time period was
the late Judge Robert M. Braucher of Massachusetts. For an account of the contribution of judge
Braucher, see Von Mehren, Preface: Robert Braucher and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 67
CORNEI.L L. REV. 631 (1982).
343 44 ALI Proceedings 304 (1967).
344 The discussion of Section 133 began in the 1967 meeting, 44 ALI Proceedings 304-14, and
was concluded in the 1969 meeting, 46 ALI Proceedings 330-31.
348 The major change in new Section '302 was the abandoning of the creditor and donee
categorization distinction. See 44 ALI Proceedings 304 (1967); RESTATEMENT' (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 302, Reporter's Note-Volume II at 445 (1981). For texts, see supra note 12.
348
 44 ALI Proceedings 304 (1967). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, Foreword-
Volume I at VII (1981):
The Reporters, their Advisers and the Institute approached the first Restatement with
the respect and tenderness that are appropriate in dealing with a classic. As the work
proceeded it uncovered relatively little need for major substantive revision, in the sense
of changing the positions taken on important issues although the Uniform Commercial
Code inspired a number of significant additions.
Id.
347 See Farnsworth, Ingredients in the Redaction of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 81 CoLum . L.
REV. 1, 1-2 (1981).
348 See supra note 12 for text of Section 133.
34"
	 creditor category included not only actual obligations but also supposed or asserted
obligations and obligations that may have been barred by statutes of limitation, by discharge in
bankruptcy, or by the Statute of Frauds. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 133(1)(b) (1932), supra note
12.
35° RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 133(1)(a) and comment c (1932).
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The revising drafters saw significant problems in the donee and creditor categoriza-
tions. 35 ' Such categorization problems were the principal reason for the revision of this
section.''2 According to the Reporter, the "catchall" provision of the donee definition
included instances where the "donee" label was entirely inappropriate.' The Reporter
also indicated a similar problem with the creditor class in t hat it included not only persons
who truly stood as creditors, t hat is, persons to whom a debt was owed by the promisee,
but also others who were merely owed a "supposed" or "asserted" duty or obligation by
he promisee and therefore were not creditors in the usual sense."
The categorization problem thus appears to have been the primary motive for
revising the formulation of Section 133. This revision consisted in large part of changing
from the creditor and donee categories to a single description of persons having rights as
"intended" beneficiaries.' Only while attempting to define the new intended beneficiary
category did the drafiers begin to focus on the more significant problem faced by the
court s in applying Section 133 and similar rules, that is, the determination of standards
for deciding when there is sufficient indicia of the parties' intent to benefit to justify
granting a third party standing to enforce the promise." 5"
In the ensuing discussion,''' the Reporter observed that the "basic spirit" of this
' I See REsrATENtENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAci s, Chapter 19 — Introductory Note - Volume II at
438-39 (1981) ("[Slince the terms 'donee' beneficiary and 'creditor' beneficiary carry overtones of
obsolete doctrinal difficulties, they are avoided in the statement of rules in this chapter.").
"2 44 ALI Proceedings 305-07 (1967). Another reason fm. and consequence of removing the
creditor-donee distinction was the elimination the distinction made between the two groups as to the
time when rights would vest in a third party beneficiary. Id. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
Cl/VTR/SC-FS § 311, Reporter's Note-Volume 11 at 969 (1981); E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 10.6
(1982).
'" 44 ALI Proceedings 305 (1967). The reporter stated:
111f you look at 133, subsection (1)(a), the last four lines include the case where there is
no intention to make a gift at all, and where the word donee is entirely inappropriate.
This happens in cases, for example, of construction bonds for the benefit of laborers
and materialmen, where the promisee of the bonds has no direct contractual connec-
tion with the beneficiaries, but it is not at all a gift situation. It comes up again in the
mortgagee case, where land subject to a mortgage is transferred to a succession of
grantees, and among the grantees there is a grantee who does not assume and agree to
pay the mortgage debt. In such a case, if there is then a later promise to assume and pay
the mortgage debt, you have, I think what might well be within (1)(a), the case where
there is an intention to confer upon the beneficiary a right to some performance,
neither due nor supposed or asserted to be due from the promisee to the beneficiary,
but there would be no appropriateness in the word gift or in the word donee as applied
to that situation.
"4 Id. at 306 ("where the promise is to pay a supposed or asserted debt, ... then it's very
doubtful whether that is properly described as a creditor beneficiary. It's a non-creditor be-
neficiary.").
'" See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 133 (Tentative Draft No. 3, April 18, 1967). The
1967 draft was as follows:
§ 133. Intended and Incidental Beneficiaries. (1) Unless otherwise agreed between
promisor and promisee, a beneficiary of a promise is an intended beneficiary if (a) the
performance of" the promise will satisfy a duty of the promisee to the beneficiary; or (b)
the promisee manifests an intention to give the beneficiary the benefit of the promised
performance and recognition of a right to performance in the beneficiary is appropri-
ate to effectuate the intention of the parties. (2) An incidental beneficiary is a be-
neficiary who is not an intended beneficiary.
"" See text accompanying notes 97 - 122, supra.
3s7
 44 ALI Proceedings 307-14 (1967).
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section, both in the original and in t he revised Restatements, was that the "manifested
intent" of the parties, rather than their "actual intent," ought to determine who "get[s]
rights by virtue of a promise between two other parties." 336 In determining what indicia of
manifested intent should be sufficient for this purpose, the drafters unfortunately chose
to return, in large part, to the creditor and donee categories, merely omitting those
labels." An "intended" beneficiary was described in revised Section 133(1)(a), as pre-
sented in the 1967 discussions, as what amounted to a narrowed, true creditor class. 36° In
other words, revised Section 133(1)(a) was drafted to give standing to a third party who is
owed an actual duty by the promisee and is to receive from the promisor a performance
which would satisfy t hat duty."' Revised Section 133(1)(b) generally corresponded with
t he donee description contained in former Section 133 in that it included as "intended"
beneficiaries all parties to whom the promisee manifests an intent to give the benefit of the
promisor's performance. 362 The only real change in the donee definition was the inclusion
of those classified as quasi-creditors under the former rule." The change in labeling was
primarily addressed to "gap" or miscategorization problems due to the difficulty in
identifying parties as creditors or donees. 3" Such problems, however, were more appar-
ent than real, since the courts applying the original formulation were able, with few
exceptions, to overcome the risk of miscategorization. 3 "5 The real difficulty that courts
encountered was in establishing clear standards for determining whether sufficient evi-
dence of the parties' intent to benefit was present to qualify a third party as a donee
beneficiary within the categorization test.'
The new formulation addressed this latter difficulty only to a limited extent. The
Reporter indicated that the chronic problems in establishing standards of intent were
addressed by the change in the language defining the enlarged donee class. 367 This
definition was changed from a requirement in original Section 133(1)(a) t hat t he promisee
intend to make a gift to the beneficiary or to confer upon him a right to performance" to
a requirement that the promisee "manifest an intent to give the benefit" and that
3''9 Id.. at 307.
359 See RESTATEMENT (SEcoNn) OF CONTRACTS § 133(1)(a) and (h) (Tentative Draft No. 3, April
18, 1967), text supra note 355; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OE CONTRACTS § 302, comments b and c
(1981).
36° RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 133( I)(a) ("Tentative Draft No. 3, April 18, 1967),
text supra note 323. The section would no longer encompass those claimants with mere asserted,
supposed or barred obligations. See supra note 317. The reporter described the remainder with actual
obligations as the "hard core creditor beneficiary cases." 44 ALI Proceedings 307 (1967).
36 ' This rule would be subject to the obvious limit that the parties may expressly agree not to
create rights in a third party. See supra note 63.
362 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 133(1)(b) (Tentative Draft No. 3, April 18, 1967),
text supra note 355.
363 See 44 ALI Proceedings 307 (1967). The reporter stated "we put all the others [other than
hard core creditors] together in (1)(b)."
3" See supra notes 102-07 and accompanying text.
3" See supra notes 102-19 and accompanying text.
' See supra notes 119-22 and accompanying text.
'" 44 ALI Proceedings 307 (1967). By virtue of narrowing the creditor class to the hard core
creditor cases, supra note 360, the revised section established that intent would be deemed present if
the creditor relationship could be objectively established and the parties had not expressly provided
otherwise. The intent problem then primarily would relate only to non-creditor circumstances where
the intent cannot be established by an objectively provable relationship among the parties. See supra
notes 119-22 and accompanying text.
369 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 133(1)(a) (1932), text supra note 12.
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recognition of a right to performance be appropriate to "effectuate" t he common intent
of the contracting parties. 3" This change was meant to suggest that the requisite proof of
intent ought to be the "more factual indicia."37° The new definition emphasized "man-
ifest" rather than "actual," but unspoken, purpose, or intent.'" The drafters apparently
took the view that problems in applying the donee definition could be relieved by looking
for objective rather than subjective indicia of intent.
The change in the donee definition was also designed to address the related question
of whether gap filling is appropriate in this area. 372 The drafters noted that parties often
do not actually consider whether or not the third party beneficiary should have legal
standing to pursue a right to performance. 373 The revised Restatement section, therefore,
is not structured to require that there he some actual contemplation of third party rights
by the contracting parties, with a consequent denial of standing if such actual intent
cannot be found. The section is rather intended to provide a standard to determine
whether third party standing is consistent with the goals of the parties when they have
failed to provide for it explicitly in the contract. 3" It is notable that in this respect the
revised definition does not embody any presumption against third party rights, contrary
to most state rules.'"
The emphasis on manifest or objective evidence of intent in the drafting history of
the revised section suggests a realistic perception of the courts' function in deciding third
party beneficiary cases. Neither the text, the commentary, nor the illustrations or any
other portions of the revised section, however, go very far toward establishing clear
norms for deciding when a sufficient basis exists in the manifest intent of the parties to
warrant third party standing. The one clear exception to the foregoing statement is found
in the case where t he promisor assumes an obligation to satisfy an actual money debt owed
by the promisee to the third party."' In this narrow, true creditor situation, third party
rights are presumed. In all other cases, the section fails to address the difficulties experi-
enced by the courts in evaluating the sufficiency of the parties' intent.
As has been suggested,'" the change in Section 133 was only a minimal change. The
change in terminology not only failed to address adequately the major problem of the
intent standard, but also, as the ALI participants themselves acknowledged, failed to
989
 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 133(1)(b) (Tentative Draft No. 3, April 18, 1967),
text supra note 355.
3" 44 ALI Proceedings 307-08 (1967).
311 Id. The reporter stated that "[rpm basic spirit of the original Restatement, and of this one, is
that it is not the actual intent that counts. It is the manifested intent." Use of the word "intended" was
not meant to resurrect concerns with the unspoken mental reservations of the parties. Id. at 307.
372 See 44 ALI Proceedings 308 (1967).
The reporter stated:
In these cases often the problem is one of whether the remedy is one which carries out
the intention of the parties or whether the remedy sought is one which is likely to
interrupt what the parties were trying to do. We all know that commonly the parties to a
contract do not clearly foresee and provide for what happens in the event of a
breakdown of the contractual relationship. Their natural focus is on performance, not
upon breach.
Id. at 308.
"3 Id.
374 Id.
3" See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
3" As finally adopted the creditor class was limited to those involving an actual money debt.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302(1)(a) (1981), text supra note 12.
377 See supra notes 355-63 and accompanying text.
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eliminate completely the lesser categorization problem.' The deficiency in the distinc-
tion between intended and incidental beneficiaries is that the parties, or more simply the
promisee, may intend a third party to receive a benefit but not intend that party to have
standing to enforce the promise.'" This type of third party, although intended to receive
a benefit, would be characterized as an incidental beneficiary not only under the original
Section 133 and similar state rules,""" but also under revised Section 302 of the Restate-
ment (Second). 3"
Two participants suggested that a different term ought to be used to distinguish
between those beneficiaries with standing to enforce the promise and those without.
standing. One participant suggested that "designated beneficiary" ought to be used."
This term was dismissed, and properly so, because it offered no real improvement over
the term "intended." This conclusion is correct because a beneficiary may be designated to
benefit, just as he may be intended to benefit, and yet the parties may not intend that the
designated third party have standing to enforce the promise. 383 The second term sug-
gested was "protected beneficiary."' Participants acknowledged that this term had been
used to make the sought after distinction and the Reporter indicated that it would he
considered by the advisory group." The term, however, was not the subject of detailed
discussion during the 1967 proceedings and when the discussion of Section 133 was
resumed in the 1969 proceedings the Reporter indicated that the search for a term better
than "intended beneficiary" had been fruitless."'" In addition, the Reporter. stated, while
"intended beneficiary" contained some weaknesses, the advisory group seemed convinced
that the term was suitable." No comment from the ALI participants was made in
response."
Perhaps one reason why the term "intended beneficiary" seemed acceptable was, as
the Reporter pointed out during the 1967 proceedings, the term "fit with a great deal of
judicial usage."' What may have seemed to the participants to be a reason supporting
37" See 44 ALI Proceedings 309-10 (1967) (discussion from floor) and 46 ALl Proceedings 331
(1968) (comments of reporter).
' 79 See 44 ALl Proceedings 309 (1967) (comment of judge Ervin Sandor Fulop of New jersey).
See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
" 1 See comments of reporter 44 AI.1 Proceedings 309-10 (1967):
Well, I think I indicated that t here was some trouble with the word "intended" .... An
incidental beneficiary is defined here as one who is not an intended beneficiary [A
third parry] may fit ... the case of intention to give benefit of the promised perfor-
mance to the incidental beneficiary, and still not fit the other half, where the recogni-
tion of a right would be appropriate to carry out the intention of the contracting
parties.
Id.
3"2
	 ALL Proceedings 309 (1967) (suggestion of Judge Ervin Sandor Fulop of New Jersey).
3"3 This term also may have raised yet another- problem. See 44 ALI Proceedings 308-09 (1967)
(response of the reporter to Judge Fulop's suggestion). Use of the term "designated" would seem to
require that the third party somehow be expressly identified as a person intended to benefit and
express identification is normally not a requirement. See RESTATEMENT CONTRACTS § 139 (1932);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) Or CONTRACTS § 308 (1981); 4 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 781 (1951).
44 ALI Proceedings 310 (1967). The suggestion was made by Professor Coleman Karesh of
South Carolina.
385 id,
'"6
 46 ALI Proceedings 331 (1969).
387 ht
5K Id. at 332.
3
" 9
 44 ALI Proceedings 310 (1967).
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use of the "intended beneficiary" designation, however, may in fact have been a reason
against its increased use as a result of its incorporation in the Restatement. The term
"intended beneficiary" embodies too much of the difficulties generated by the older
standards. The revising drafters almost certainly missed a good opportunity to help
resolve the difficulties in this area when they failed to adopt a much different label, such
as "protected beneficiary," which would have been more likely to effect a greater change
in the approach to third party beneficiary standing because it would represent a greater
departure from the older standards. The consequences of this failure to make a more
distinct departure have become apparent in light of recent reaction by the courts to the
changes incorporated in the revised Restatement as now found in Section 302. 3"
B. The Elements of Section 302
The revised Restatement rule on third party standing, as finally approved, 39 ' re-
sulted, at worst, in only one change of questionable value: the movement away from the
creditor and donee categorization test and its threat of miscategorization problems. 392
Given its most favorable reading, however, the section may be construed as having
resolved some significant problems. The early judicial interpretations of Section 302,
however, have not been entirely favorable and threaten to rob the revised section of any
ameliorating effect. 393 Relevant questions, then, are what exactly are the elements con-
tained in the new formulation of Section 302, and how may it best interact with the rules
that preceded it.
The actual text, or black letter portion, of the section is changed in several ways. First,
the preamble is changed so that new Section 302 gives proper emphasis to the possibility
that the parties may expressly affirm or deny the existence of the third party rights. 394
39° See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text and infra Appendix.
39 ' At the time of the 1969 proceedings the text had been altered in two ways from the 1967
draft, supra note 355. First, the creditor-type definition in subsection (1)(a) had been narrowed even
further from an actual duty (as opposed to an asserted or supposed duty as in the original Section
133) to simply a monetary obligation, and second, the requirement that recognition be "appropriate
to effectuate the intention of the parties" was moved into the preamble so as to apply to (1)(a)
creditor-type cases as well as the (1)(6) donee and other types. The draft before the 1969 ALI
meeting read:
§ 133. Intended and Incidental Beneficiaries. (1) Unless otherwise agreed between
promisor and promisee, a beneficiary of a promise is an intended beneficiary if recogni-
tion of a right to performance in the beneficiary is appropriate to effectuate the
intention of the parties and either (a) the performance of the promise will satisfy an
obligation of the promisee to pay money to the beneficiary; or (h) the promise manifests
an intention to give the beneficiary the benefit of the promised performance. (2) An
incidental beneficiary is a beneficiary who is not an intended beneficiary,
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (Tentative Draft No. 4, April 25, 1968).
The final version printed as Section 302 is identical to the version printed in the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (Revised and Edited version of Tentative Drafts Nos. 1-7 (1973)). The only
additional change from 1969 draft was that subsection (1)(b) was changed to require that "circum-
stances indicate that the promisee" intend a benefit rather than the earlier versions' requirement that
"the promise" manifest an intent to benefit the third party. See supra note 12 for text of final version
of Section 302.
392 See supra notes 97-118 and accompanying text on the extent of the miscategorization
problem.
3
"3 See .supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text and infra Appendix.
3"4 The section is limited in application by its caveat, "[u]nless otherwise agreed by the parties."
See supra note 12 for text of final version of Section 302.
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Although original Section 133 did not explicitly recognize the deference to he accorded
express provisions of the parties, no doubt exists that such deference was to be read into
the section and that the courts did honor such express provisions. 3s '"
A second change in Section 302 is the suggestion in the preamble that the basic test
for establishing third party standing, in the absence of an express provision, is that
recognition of the right to performance be appropriate to effectuate the intention of the
parties. This language is relevant to the common law rules in two closely related ways.
First, the language should he read not to embody any basic presumption against third
party rights.'" Second, the drafters realistically acknowledged that the third party he-
neficiary cases are almost exclusively cases involving gaps in the parties' contractual
provisions.337 The approach of the revised statement is not to apply a presumption that
disallows third party standing when there is no discoverable actual intent, that is, when a
gap exists in the contract, but instead to provide that third party rights should he allowed
whenever the grant of standing is consistent with the contractual terms and furthers the
goals of the contracting parties. 350 This determination is made by looking at the contract,
in light of the circumstances, but does not involve a search for the individual subjective
intent of the contracting parties.'
The third issue raised by this preambulatory provision is whether it requires that
both parties intend to create third party rights. 4" Indeed, one court has already construed
Section 302 to require that both contracting parties manifest individual intent to benefit
the third party."' While the phrasing of the text leaves itself open for this sort of
interpretation,462 the drafting history refutes the idea that a search for individual subjec-
tive intent is at all proper. 403 It is very important for courts to recognize that Section 302 is
not meant to impose the restrictive requirement that there be evidence of both parties'
individual intent, as some state law rules have required, 404 but rather is meant to focus on
the shared intent as reflected in the agreement and surrounding circumstances. In
addition to the drafting history, this reading is supported by the reference in Subsection
302(1)(b) to the promisee's intent only in relation to non-creditor cases.'t05 This provision
suggests that one need look for evidence of an individual party's intent only in that
context and not as a general matter. The preamble would require, however, that when the
promisee's individual intent is relevant that it he manifest and attributable in some way to
the promisor. The promisor must either share, have knowledge of, or have reason to
know of the promisee's intent to benefit the third party. This reading would he consistent
with the preferred state law on this aspect of the rule. 406
39' See supra note 63.
39' See supra notes 41-49 and accompanying text for state law rules, and supra notes 372-75 and
accompanying text for drafting history of Section 302.
397
 See supra notes 372-75 and accompanying text.
3" See 44 ALI Proceedings 308 (1967).
399 Id.
400 See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text for state law variations on this aspect of the
rule.
401 See Williams v. Virgin Island Water & Power Authority, 672 F.2d 1220, 1227-28 (3d Cir.
1982). The court embarked on a search for evidence of the intent of each party rather than looking
to the mutual intent as reflected by the contract under the circumstances.
402 See supra note 12 for text of Section 302.
4°3 See supra note 371 and accompanying text.
4" See supra note 66.
405 See supra note 12 for text of' Section 302.
468 See supra note 73 and accompanying text. Requiring manifest individual intent by both
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In addition to the initial requirement that the mutual intent of the parties be
advanced by recognition of third party standing, Section 302 requires that one of two
alternative requirements be satisfied. The first alternative is that the performance by the
promisor satisfy a money debt owed by the promisee to the third party.'" The second
option is that the circumstances indicate that the promisee intends to give the third party
the benefit of the promise."° These subsections obviously preserve to a large degree the
categorization test of the earlier' rules. Before addressing that aspect of these subsections,
however, it should be noted that both sections contemplate the reading of the contract in
light of the surrounding circumstances.'" The consideration of the circumstances is also
consistent with the preamble's phrasing. Section 302 offers no basis for limiting the
evidence considered to the express terms of the contract, as sonic states have done,'"
Those states adopting Section 302 should therefore be prepared to drop such a restrictive
requirement.'" •
Returning to the discussion of t he categorization aspects, Subsection 302(1)(a) estab-
lishes a rather clear standard when combined with the preamble's requirements. If the
promisor undertakes to pay a debt of the promisee io a third party, then the third party
will have standing to enforce the promise provided that the parties have not expressly
agreed otherwise and this right to enforce the promise is consistent with or furthers the
mutual intent of the parties as evidenced by the terms of the agreement in light of the
surrounding circumstances. This rule comports fully with the common law rules" 2 and
establishes a clear test for a limited class of transactions — the true creditor beneficiary
type.
Subsection 302(1)(b) yields a less definite standard. Read together with  the preamble,
it establishes that a third party, in a non-creditor status, will have standing if the promisee
indicates an intent to give the benefit of the promisor's performance as a gift to the third
party, provided that the parties have not expressly agreed otherwise and that this result is
consistent with or furthers the mutual intent of the parties as evidenced by the terms of
the agreement in light of the surrounding circumstances. Except for its inclusion of some
persons previously classified as creditor beneficiaries,' this subsection reflects no true
change from the donee definition in original Section 133. And the provisions dictate that
parties is overly restrictive but some knowledge on the part of the promisor probably should be
required to prevent unfair surprise. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302, illus. 9
(1981); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 133, illus. 7 (1932) (suggesting that knowledge attributable to
the promisor is important but nut requiring his individual subjective intent to benefit).
407 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302(1)(a) (1981), supra note 12.
405
 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) or CONTRACTS § 302(1)(b) (1981), supra note 12.
4" Section 302(1)(6), supra note 12, the broader provision, specifically mentions t hat the circum-
stances ought to be considered, Section (1)(a) applies to those situations where a debt is owed by the
promisee to the third party. To prevent proof of such a debtor-creditor relationship by extrinsic
evidence, and consequently to allow it to go unrecognized unless expressly stated in the terms of the
contract, would be illogical, The relevance of the surrounding circumstances in reading Section 302
is consistent with an increased emphasis on the importance of the contracting context as found
generally in the Restatement (Second). See Braucher, interpretation and Legal Effect in the Second
Restatement of Contracts, 81 Cot.um. L. REV. 13, 14 (1981).
4 ' See supra notes 50 -62 and accompanying text.
4 " Pennsylvania is such a state, having traditionally required that the intent to benefit be
expressed in the contract itself, see, e.g., Duncan-Lagnese and Associates, Inc. v. Stoney Creek Valley
Sewer Authority, 303 Pa. Super. 236, 239, 449 A.2d 666, 667 (1982), but having recently adopted the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302. See supra note 25.
4 " See supra notes 126.30 and accompanying text.
413 See supra notes 360.63 and accompanying text.
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for this broadest category of third party beneficiaries the test is still the difficult and vague
"intent to benefit."
Despite the lack of improvement, in the test for non-creditor beneficiaries, the text. of
Section 302, most favorably viewed as a whole, does reflect a change in basic approach.
Original Section 133 required that a party qualify as a donee or creditor beneficiary in
order to recover." 4 In contrast, Section 302 requires that a third party qualify as an
intended beneficiary to have standing.''' In both the original and revised formulations,
failure to qualify as one of those beneficiaries results in classification as an incidental
beneficiary without standing to seek enforcement of a promise from which some benefit
might otherwise be derived.'" The structure of Section 133 suggested, however, that the
courts attempt to fit an alleged third party beneficiary into a donee or creditor group
based on the characteristics of the parties and the agreement. This approach would
ultimately involve a search for the intent of the parties, or at least the promisee, but the
focus was on categorization as the decisive test. Section 302 suggests, on the other hand,
that the primary inquiry ought to be whether recognition of standing in the third party
beneficiary would be appropriate to effect the intent of the parties as indicated by the
agreement. In making this determination, the courts should look for creditor status or
donative intent on the part of the promisee only as part of the possible evidence that third
party rights ought to be allowed. Other indicia may possibly exist. The change from the
categorization approach should eliminate the danger that an otherwise qualifying be-
neficiary might fall into the "gaps" that might exist between or outside of the creditor and
donee categories. Those courts adopting Section 302 ought to embrace this change in
basic approach.
This threat of miscategorization or falling into "gaps," however, as stated before, was
not the major problem in applying the original formulation."v Developing and consis-
tently applying standards for measuring intent to benefit was the major problem."" The
text of Section 302 suggests ascertaining such intent ought to be determinative, but offers
little help in identifying relevant criteria. The comments to Section 302 also largely fail in
this respect.
The comments in the Restatement (Second) are more developed than those in the
original Restatement. This difference is largely attributable to the expectation, held when
the original Restatement was drafted, that the ALI would approve a treatise amplifying
the otherwise succinct Restaternent. 4 ' 9 At the time the Restatement (Second) was drafted
the revisers sought to expand the comments to explain more fully the underlying policies
and reasons for the rules and the purposes to be served by them." 6
All but one of the interpretive comments to the original Section 133 either addressed
categorization concerns or identified the fundamental presumptions of the Section. 42 '
414 See supra note 12.
415 See supra note 12.
410 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 315 (1981) and RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §
147 (1932).
417 See supra notes 97 - 110 and accompanying text.
419 See supra notes 119-22 and accompanying text.
" See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, Volume I-Foreword at VIII (1981); 44 ALI
Proceedings 304-05 (1967) (comments of reporter).
420 44 ALI Proceedings 304-05 (1967) (comments of reporter).
421 Five short comments are appended to original Section 133. Comment a explains that a
contract may consist of several promises, some perhaps giving rise to third party rights while others
might not; comment b defines "performance" as the doing or forbearance of acts; comment c
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The remaining comment merely served to disprove the notion t hat a third party should
necessarily receive direct performance from the promisor in order to receive standing as a
beneficiary.422 The comment offered as an example the possibility that the promisor
might contract with the promisee to pay a debt owed by a third party-debtor to a third
party-creditor; in this case the third party-debtor is a third party beneficiary with standing
even though promised performance does not run directly to him. This caveat, that direct
performance to the beneficiary is not necessarily required, is the only clear aid in the
comments to Section 133 to finding the requisite intent to benefit.
The illustrations to Section 133, 422
 however, do provide more helpful guidance. The
illustrations in which standing is found all involve a direct performance by the promisor
to the third party."' The presence of this common characteristic strongly suggests t hat
while the performance need not always be direct, direct perfiirmance to the third party is
nonetheless extremely important evidence that there is sufficient intent. to benefit to
require the recognition of third party beneficiary rights. This conclusion is further
substantiated by the often cited illustrations 4425
 and 942" which indicate that in construc-
tion bond or surety cases t he key should be whether the surety is obligated to pay third
parties directly or merely to indemnify the promisee against claims of third parties. The
use of direct performance as an indicator of sufficient intent is subject to the caveats
contained in illustrations 5 427 and 12,428 which suggest that direct performance, as when a
explains that the donee class included both "gift" cases and other cases where the promisee man-
ifested an intent to confer a right to the performance; and CODIDICIII e distinguishes property gift
cases involving delivery of the goods to the beneficiary from the third party contract cases. RESTATE-
MENT OF CONTRACTS § 133, comments a, b, c, e (1932).
422 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 133, comment d (1932):
A contract for the benefit of a third person usually provides that performance shall be
rendered directly to the beneficiary, but this is not necessarily the case. A promise to
discharge an indebtedness of one whom the contract is made to benefit, will provide for
payment to the creditor of he beneficiary, not to the beneficiary himself who owes the
money.
Id.
123 Thirteen illustrations accompany Section 133. The first firer illustrations give examples of
donee beneficiaries; illustrations five through ten primarily address creditor type beneficiaries;
illustrations eleven and twelve give examples of incidental beneficiaries: and illustration thirteen
explains that under Section 133(3) the trustee gala trust rather than the trust beneficiary would have
standing as a contract third party beneficiary. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 133, illustrations 1-13
(1932).
42' Only illustration 11 to Section 133, which identifies a true incidental beneficiary, does not
involve a direct performance by the promisor to the third party. See infra note 430 and accompanying
text.
'25 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 133, illustration 4 (1932):•
D contracts to build a house for A. A obtains from B a bond in which B promises A that
all D's creditors for labor and materials who may acquire a lien on the house shall be
paid. C is such a creditor of D's. C is a donee beneficiary.
[Also founcl at RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302, illustration 12 (1981).]
426 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 133, illustration 9 (1932):
B promises A for sufficient consideration to pay whatever debts A may incur in a
certain undertaking. A incurs in the undertaking debts to C, D and E. If, on a fair
interpretation of B's promise, the amount of the debts is to be paid by B to G, D and E,
they are creditor beneficiaries; if' the money is to be paid to A in order that he may be
provided with money to pay C, D and E, they are at most incidental beneficiaries.
[Also found at RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302, illustration 3 ( 1 981).]
427
 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 133, illustration 5 (1932):
A conveys Blackacre to B in consideration of B's promise to pay $15,000 as follows:
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promise is made to buy an insurance policy or an automobile from a particular dealer,
need not create third party beneficiary rights when no creditor status exists, when an
absence of intent to benefit the dealer is obvious from the circumstances, arid when some
other reason for specifying the particular dealer is apparent. 429
The remaining illustrations to Section 133 otherwise largely serve to make categoriza-
tion distinctions between the donee and creditor classes with the exception of illustration
11.4" In this illustration not only is there an absence of direct performance, but also any
benefit that the third party would enjoy would he entirely derivative from a more
immediate benefit to the promisee. Additionally, and perhaps conclusively, the apparent
circumstances are lacking any indication that the contract was entered into to benefit the
third party. Any benefit to the third party is truly incidental. This illustration is distin-
guishable front the hypothetical case in comment d which exemplified a case for standing
despite the absence of a direct performance."' Two important differences found in the
comment d case are that the main purpose of contracting appears to be to satisfy a debt
owed by the third party and that the resulting benefit of having the debt paid is arguably
direct."' Standing would seem entirely improper in an illustration 11 type case where the
performance is not direct, the benefit is entirely derivative, and the circumstances offer
no indication that the parties contracted with a purpose of benefiting the third party.
This review of comments and illustrations to Section 133 strongly supports a conclu-
sion that direct performance should normally be the determinative test for determining
third party standing but that a direct benefit may also warrant standing, and that in the
absence of direct benefit or performance exceptional cases may arise where the purpose
$5000 to C, A's wife, on whom A wishes to make a settlement, $5000 to D to whom A is
indebted in that amount, and $5000 to E, a life insurance company, to purchase an
annuity payable to A during his life. C is a donee beneficiary; I) is a creditor beneficiary;
E is an incidental beneficiary.
[Also found at RESTATEMENT (SECOND) Or CONTRACTS § 302, illustration 8 (1981).]
12" RESTATEMENT or CONTRACTS § 133, illustration 12 (1932):
B contracts with A to buy A a new Gordon automobile. The Gordon Company is an
incidental beneficiary. Though the contract cannot be performed without the payment
of money to the Gordon Company, the payment is not intended as a gift nor is the
payment a discharge of a real or supposed obligation of the promisee to the beneficiary.
[Also found at RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302, Illustration 17 (1981).] This illustration
was relied upon by the Supreme Court of Alaska in Ellis v. City of Valdez, 686 P.2d 700, 704 (Alaska
1984). The court decided that the plaintiff, who owned the airport, could he no more than an
incidental beneficiary of a legislative grant agreement between the City of Valdez and the State of
Alaska to provide money to city for purchase of the airport where the purpose of legislat lye grant was
to encourage municipal ownership of airport facilities and not to benefit the airport owner,
425 It is possible, although perhaps not common, that a person [night require purchase from a
specific dealer in order to confer a benefit upon that dealer. See R.A. Weaver & Associates, Inc. v.
Haas & Haynie Corp., 663 F.2d 168, 174-75 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (general and subcontractor reached
agreement for use of slate upon premise that it would be purchased from third party, exclusive
distributor whose cooperation was required in getting owner approval); cf. Dravo Corp. v. Robert B.
Kerris, Inc., 655 F.2d 503, 511 (3(1 Cir, 1981) (third party standing denied to dealer whose name
brand units were expressly required by subcontract where evidence indicated the brand of units was
specifier] merely to require use of lower cost goods).
43° RESTATEMENT or CONTRACTS § 133, illustration II (1932): "B contracts with A to erect
an expensive building on A's land. C's adjoining land would be enhanced in value by the perfor-
mance of the contract. C is an incidental beneficiary." [Also found at RESTATEMENT (SECOND) or
CONTRACTS § 302, illustration 16 (1981).]
431 See supra note 422 and accompanying text.
4" Id.
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of benefitting the third party is so obvious that standing should be allowed. 433 This
conclusion is largely consistent with the state law rules actually applied. 434
The comments and illustrations to the new Section 302 further substantiate the
conclusions drawn from the comments and illustrations to the original Section 133.
Continent a, much like comment d to Section 133,435 indicates that neither direct perfor-
mance nor direct benefit is an absolute requirement for third party standing. 436 This
suggestion, again, should be read in light of the Section 302 illustrations. These illustra-
tions include all of those from t he original Section 133 plus several consistent additions
and all involve findings of intended beneficiary status only where either the performance
or t he benefit could he considered direct."'
Comment b to Section 302 also substantiates a conclusion that was to be drawn from
the original Section 133 rule. When a true creditor or similar status is held by the putative
third party beneficiary, a strong presumption should exist that third party standing was
intended because such standing is appropriate to carry out the intent of the parties. 43 "
Unfortunately, comment c' 9 does not establish any clear presumptions that should apply
4 '3
 The drafters of the Restatement (Second) could hardly be unfamiliar with the thought that
direct performance should be an important factor since the decisions of the courts very often focused
on that element and one writer had proposed, in a widely cited comment on the third party
beneficiary rules, that direct performance should always be the determinative factor. See Note, The
Third Party Beneficiary Concepi: A Proposal, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 406, 425-28 (1957). The drafters would
undoubtedly have Perceived the undue restrictiveness of the latter proposal but perhaps in attempt-
ing to avoid such a restrictive rule adopted an equally faulty approach, the modified categorization
test, This article suggests, in part, that. a better approach would have been to build upon the direct
performance test rather than to attempt to establish an effective categorization test.
1" See .sepia notes 123-331 and accompanying text.
"' See supra note 422.
43"
	 (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302, comment a (1981) reads in part:
Section 2 [of the Restatement (Second)) defines "promisee" as the person to whom a
promise is addressed, and "beneficiary" as a person other t han the promisee who will be
benefited by performance of the promise.... Either promisee or beneficiary may but
need not he connected with the transaction in other ways: neither promisee nor
beneficiary is necessarily the person to whom performance is to be rendered, the
person who will receive economic benefit, or the person who furnished the considera-
tion.
Id.
" Section 302 has twenty illustrations, Thirteen of the illustrations are directly based on the
thirteen illustrations to Section 133 of the original Restatement of Contracts with minor modifica-
tions to reflect the change from the "creditor/donee" labels to the "intended" beneficiary term for
those with standing. Four of the new illustrations (numbers 4, 6, 10. 14) involve what may easily be
called direct benefit or performance as a basis for finding third party beneficiary rights. New
illustration 15 incorporates third party warranty rights as required under Uniform Commercial
Code § 2-318. The other new illustrations, numbers 18 and 19, portray a lack of third party standing
in hypothetical situations in which the performance is not direct and the benefit is clearly derivative
from a more immediate benefit to the promisee. RF-STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302,
illustrations 1-20 (1981).
4" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302, comment h (1981) indicates that when the
contract contains a promise to pay the promisee's dcht, "a direct action by the [creditor] beneficiary
against the promisor is normally appropriate to carry out the intention of promisor and promisee,
even though no intention is manifested to give the beneficiary the benefit of the promised perfor-
mance." The last part of this statement is undoubtedly intended to mean that standing is appropriate
even without an express statement by the parties that such was intended.
439
	 (SECOND) or CONTRACTS § 302, comment c (1981) reads:
Gilt promise. Where the promised performance is not paid kr by the recipient, dis-
charges no right that he has against anyone, and is apparently designed to benefit him,
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in the broader and more difficult non-creditor circumstances. 14° One is left to the conclu-
sions which may be drawn from the text and illustrations in establishing an intent
standard for non-creditor beneficiaries, that is, that direct performance or benefit to the
third party are the most reliable indicia of third party standing in non-creditor cases.
An exception is that in comment d the revising drafters make a significant but highly
questionable departure from the popular construction of the original Restatement of
Contracts Section 133 by offering a "reliance" standard for measuring intent."' In this
comment, the drafters suggest that if the circumstances include either a promise to pay a
debt owed by the promisee to a third party or a manifestation of intent. to give the third
party the benefit of a promised performance, then the third party is an intended be-
neficiary if he would be reasonable in relying on the promise: 142
The suggestion that reasonable reliance should be a measure for determining third
party standing is objectionable for two reasons.' First, courts are not likely to be able to
apply a reasonable reliance standard any more easily than the more traditional intent
standard. Instead, the reasonable reliance standard, at best, appears to involve anevalua-
lion of essentially the same contract terms and surrounding circumstances as in the
traditional intent test. This addition of a differently labeled theory for determining third
party standing is sure to engender more confusion in this area."' A second basis for
the promise is often referred to as a "gift promise." The beneficiary of such a prOmise is
often referred to as a "donee beneficiary:" he is an intended beneficiary under Subsec-
tion (1)(b). The contract need not provide that performance is to be rendered directly
to the beneficiary: a gift may be made to the beneficiary, for example, by payment of his
debt. Nor is any contract or communication with the beneficiary essential.
44' See supra notes 119-22, 412-13 and accompanying text.
441 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302, comment d (1981) reads in part:
Either a promise to pay the promisee's debt to a beneficiary or a gift promise involves a
manifestation of intention by the promisee and promisor sufficient, in a contractual
setting, to make reliance by the beneficiary both reasonable and probable.... In such
cases, if the beneficiary would he reasonable in relying on the promise as manifesting an
intention to confer a right on hint, he is an intended beneficiary.
"z Id.
"3 Although the Reporter's Note to Section 302, comment d, suggests some cases in which the
reliance theory may have been deemed helpful, other courts have appeared to reject reliance
arguments. See, White v. Alaska Ins. Guaranty Ass'n., 592 P.2c1 367, 369 (Alaska 1979) ("A third
party cannot make himself a creditor beneficiary merely by acting in reliance upon a contract.");
Brown V. Summerlin, 272 Ark. 298, 300, 614 S.W.2d 227, 229 (1981) ("Nothing at all was said
between the parties to indicate that appellant had a right to rely on that survey ... no doubt, lie
expected to benefit from it but mere expectation is insufficient to give rise to that of an intended
beneficiary."); Garcia v. Truck Ins. Exchange, 204 Cal. Rptr. 435, 941 n.5, 682 P.2d 1100, 1105 0,5,
36 Cal. 3d 426 (1984) (putative beneficiary cannot create rights by acting in reliance on contract)
(citing 4 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 779R (1951)).
"4 The confusion, indeed, has already begun. In Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board v. Rapis-
tan, Inc., 472 Pa. 36, 45, 371 A.2d 178, 182 (1976), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court interpreted
Section 302 (then Section 133 of Rev. ed. Tentative Drafts 1-7, 1973] and comment el to require t hat
"a third party is an intended beneficiary only if he can reasonably rely on the contract as manifesting
an intent to confer a right on him." When the same court later adopted Section 302 as establishing a
standard for third party beneficiary rights, see supra note 25, the majority opinion did not mention
the reliance test even though the intermediate appellate court had considered reasonable reliance to
be required. See Guy v. Liederbach, 279 Pa. Stiller. 543, 552, 421 A.2d 333, 337 (1980), aff'd in part
and read in part, 501 Pa. 47, 459 A.2d 744 (1983). The dissent of Chief Justice Roberts to the
SupreMe Court decision, however, emphasized that the case then under consideration (suit by an
intended legatee against an attorney who improperly drafted a will) was not one in which the third
party beneficiary could have had reasonable reliance. Guy v. Liederbach, 501 Pa. 47, 65, 459 A.2d
744, 754 (1983) (Roberts, C.j., dissenting). •
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objecting to the reliance standard is that mere reliance by a third party should not be used
to bind a promisor to full performance. At most, the promisor should be liable for the
usual reliance measure of relief if he has contracted in such a manner or otherwise given
the third party a basis for reasonable reliance on a contract that otherwise does not
warrant third party beneficiary standing;"'
Returning to the first point, a reliance standard would involve the very same consid-
erations as the intent test. The reliance test as structured by Restatement (Second) of
Cont racts Section 90 suggests that the important factors are the reasonable foreseeability
by the promisor that the third person might act or forebear from acting based on the
promise and actual, justifiable reliance by 1 he third person.'" Both aspects of this test
depend on t he degree to which the terms and circumstances manifest an intent to confer a
right on t he third party. The reliance test, therefore, like the Section 302 standard,
revolves on objective factors' and arguing that reliance is justifiable would be difficult
when the terms and circumstances fail to give some basis for concluding t hat recognition
of third party rights is consistent with the goals of the contracting parties.
The alternative to reading the reliance test as equivalent to the intent test is to suggest
that reliance of a less objective and more subjective nature should be enough in warrant
third party right The additional obligation on the promisor by virtue of third party
standing is sufficiently substantial that mere subjective reliance, unsupported by an
objective basis, should not be sufficient for standing under the third party beneficiary
doctrine.'"" This conclusion also relates to the second basis for rejecting the reliance
approach.
In the courts of Nevada the reliance test, phrased as foreseeable rat her than reasonable reliance,
has already appeared in a confusing way. In its decision in Lipshie v. Tracy Investment Co., the Supreme
Court stated that for third party beneficiary rights to exist "ultimately it must be shown that the third
party's reliance thereon is Foreseeable. -
 93 Nev. 370, 379, 566 P.2d 819, 824 - 25 (1977). The Supreme
Court cited its earlier decision in Lear v. Bishop, 86 Nev. 709, 476 P.2d 18 (Nev. 1970) in support,
but a close reading of the Lear a, Bishop case indicates that reliance was not suggested as an alternative
third party beneficiary test but as an extension of the promissory estoppel doctrine to third parties.
IS. at 714, 476 P.2d at 22. In contrast, the Lipshie opinion seems to construe foreseeable reliance as an
essential part of the third party beneficiary test.
♦45
 See 13na.,,TATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 and comments h and c (1981).
-1" Id. See also E, FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 2.19 (1982).
447 See E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 2.19 (1982).
" REsTATENIENT (Srcoxn) OF CONTRACTS § 90, comment c seems to acknowledge the possibility
of justifiable reliance in some instances when the third party beneficiary intent standard is not met.
illustrations 5-7 to § 90 offer examples. Illustration 6, for example, reads:
A executes and delivers a promissory note to 11, a bank, to give B a false appearance of
assets, deceive the banking authorities, and enable the bank to continue to operate.
Alder several years B rails and is taken over by C, a representative of B's creditors. A's
note is enforceable by C.
It is difficult to imagine that C in this hypothetical situation could qualify as a third party beneficiary
under Section 302, Section 133, or other traditional standards.
For a case involving facts that may have given rise to reasonable reliance but not third party
beneficiary rights, see Braten v. Banker's Trust Co., 60 N.Y.2d 155, 456 N.E.2d 802, 468 N.Y.S.2d
861 (1983). The defendant allegedly made a promise to the borrower-corporation in the presence of
the borrower's suppliers that the defendant would continue to extend credit. No promise was made
that the suppliers would he paid, but they may have been reasonable in continuing credit to the
corporation in reliance on the representation of t he bank. This possibility, however, is not discussed
in the opinion.
14" See Beverly v, Nlacy, 702 F.2d 931, 941-42 (11th Cir. 1983) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
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The second objection to the reliance test is that the language in comment d to Section
302 seems to suggest t hat the promise ought to be fully enforceable'against the promisor
if justifiable reliance can be shown. This suggestion is inconsistent withh the general tenor
of Section 90 that reliance interests ought to be redressed only as necessary to prevent
injustice.' Section 302 fails to contain any cross-reference to Section 90 and its limits on
liability."' The cases to date which have considered reliance theories for determining
third party standing have not acknowledged any such limit on liability,'"
If one assumes that reliance might be justifiable in circumstances where the parties
have failed to satisfy the traditional intent standard,453 to give the reliance interest of the
third person greater protection than the limited remedy available to t he promisee under
Section 90 would be anomalous.'" A third party by the very nature of his relationship to
the transaction should receive no more than the standard, limited reliance protection.'"
This caveat notwithstanding, if the contract and the surrounding circumstances provide
manifest evidence sufficient to offer a clear basis for reliance, then the third party will
very likely achieve normal third party rights under Section 302 and its third party
beneficiary test. lithe justifiable reliance is based on a different or lesser standard,'"' then
the relief afforded should not be full enforcement of the promise but only so much
enforcement as necessary to prevent injustice. This protection is better governed by the
Section 90 formulation on reasonable reliance than the Section 302 standards.
CoNTRAcrs § 302, comment d). The Court considered reliance as a factor in determining third party
standing but clearly indicated that reliance alone would not be enough.
Other federal cases considering the reliance test fail to indicate how this measure differs from
the intent standard. The cases deny or find reasonable reliance on the same grounds that intent to
benefit would be deemed present or lacking. See Pstragowski v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 553 F.2d
1, 5 (1st Cir. 1977) (wife could not reasonably rely on husband's employment contract for benefits
since her benefit depended entirely on his continued employment and the continuation of their
marriage, both of which were necessarily uncertain); Commercial Ills. Co. v. Pacific-Peru Construc-
tion Co., 558 F.2d 948, 953-54 (9th Cir. 1977) (reasonable reliance by reinsurer found upon express
term of bond agreement in which contractor promised to indemnify surety and any reinsurer);
Taylor Woodrow Blitman Construction Corp. v. Southfield Gardens Co., 534 F. Stipp. 340, 343-44
(D. Mass. 1982) (reliance on the part of the contractor was not reasonable because the relevant
promises were expressly for the benefit of laborers and materialmen, not the contractor).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(1) (1981) provides:
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbear-
ance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or
forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.
The remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice requires.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(1) (1981).
"' At least one other writer has observed the possible inconsistency between Section 90 and
Section 302 regarding reliance by a third party. See Knapp, Reliance in the Revised Restatement: The
Proliferation of Promissory Estoppel, 81 CoLum. L. Rev. 52, 61 n.59 (1981). See also Metzger & Phillips,
The Emergence of Promissory Estoppel as an Independent Theory of Recovery, 35 RUTC.ERS L. REV. 472,
543-44 (1983) (interpreting Section 90 provisions as not allowing for non-intended beneficiary, third
party reliance).
452 See cases cited supra notes 444 and 449.
" See supra notes 446-49 and accompanying text.
4" See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) or CONTRACTS § 90(l) and comment d (1981).
4" Some recent writings have questioned the relegation of the reliance interest to a lesser
position in the remedial hierarchy and have suggested that expectancy relief should be available, and
perhaps is presently available as a practical matter, in reliance cases. See, e.g., Feinman, Promissory
Estoppel and Judicial Method, 97 H ARV. L. REV. 678, 685 -88 (1984).
' See supra note 448 and accompanying text.
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IV. SUMMARY
A. The Failings of Section 302
In summary, the new third party standing test as stated in Section 302, 4 " and as
amplified by the comments and illustrations to the section, suffers from two clear failings.
The lest does offer, however, a vehicle for taking t he best from the state law rules as they
have been observed to be stated 4 "" and applied in the foregoing discussion.'" The first
failing of' Section 302 is the move from the creditor-donee-incidental categorization test,
with its t hreat of "gap" cases,"" to the new intended-incidental categories which still
remain partly inappropriate and misleading"' and are so closely aligned with the older
categories that many courts have riot perceived any change. 462 The second failing is the
introduction of reasonable reliance as a test for establishing third party beneficiary rights.
When used properly, the reasonable reliance test would involve the same considerations
the traditional intent standard involves. The introduction of this "different." name for the
standard, however, creates the real risk of additional confusion as courts wrestle nor only
with the "intent to benefit" test but with the "reasonable reliance" rubric as wel1.463 Indeed
the decisions of the courts have already reflected t he potent ial for COlifusion. 4" Moreover,
if third party reliance should serve as a basis for recovery, the principles established by
Section 90 and similar rules, including the principle permitting recovery only to the
extent necessary to avoid injustice, should govern. 465
B. The Optimal Cons/na/ion of Section 302
On the positive side, Section 302 lends itself to a construction consistent with (he best.
of the state law rules. The section, as phrased and as understood in light of its drafting
history, carries no presumption against third party standing. 4 ' Rather, the section is
designed to render decisions consistent with t he parties' manifest intent when such intent.
can be found. But in the event of a gap in the parties' agreement, where third party rights
were not contemplated, Section 302 endorses a neutral framework for deciding whether
recognition of third party rights would be consistent with the manifest intent and goals of
the contracting parties. 467
The revised section expressly and implicitly requires that courts look to surrounding
circumstances in determining whether standing should be had. 46" This section is thus at
odds with those jurisdictions requiring that the indicia of intent be totally or partially
expressed in the contract."' Section 302 requires that third party beneficiary standing be
consistent with the mutual intent of the parties as manifested by the agreement, but does
4y7 See supra note 12.
4" See supra notes 41-122 and accompanying text,
4" See supra notes 126-331 and accompanying text.
1" See supra notes 97-118 and accompanying text.
"' See supra notes 378-88 and accompanying text.
462 See infra Appendix.
4
'"' See supra notes 443-49 and accompanying text.
' See .s•upra. note 444.
46 See supra notes 448-50 and accompanying text.
4" See supra notes 396-98 and accompanying text.
'" Id.
468 See supra notes 409-11 and accompanying text.
4"" See supra notes 50-59 and accompanying text.
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not require that evidence of both parties' individual, subjective intent be presented.°'°
Thus, the section is pliable in this respect and should be read to require the less restrictive
showing that the promisor have reason to know that third party standing might be
warranted by the contractual promises."'
The text of the section establishes a clear intent standard only for the true creditor
type cases"2 but analysis of the illustrations establishes standards for the non-creditor
cases: direct performance to the beneficiary should normally be sufficient to establish
third party standing; 473 where a benefit, rather than the performance, can he considered
direct to the beneficiary or is an obvious purpose for which the contract was made —as in
the case were a debt is paid on behalf' of the beneficiary — t hen standing should also be
proper;4" but where neither the performance nor the benefit is direct, and the benefit
received is not an apparent purpose for contracting and is derived only from a distinctly
more immediate benefit to the promisee or some other party, then third party standing is
inappropriate.'"" These rules are subject to the general limits that express provisions or
patently clear circumstances may vary the outcome in some cases. In applying the Section
302 intent standards, the existence of creditor or naturally donative relationShips may be
helpful but the approach of the courts should not be to attempt to fit putative be-
neficiaries into one of lite categories with t he absence of a "fit" resulting in classification as
an incidental beneficiary without standing. 76
C. Applying Section 302 to the Common Crises
I. Creditor Beneficiary Cases
Section 302, as construed above, will produce results consistent with the common law
rules in the case of t rue creditor beneficiaries.' Subsection (1)(a) would grant standing
unless the parties otherwise expressly agreed that no third party rights would arise or the
circumstances were such that the court was convinced that such recognition was not
proper to effectuate the intern of the parties. In practically every case where a promisor
agreed to pay the debt or fulfill the clear duty of' t he promisee to a third party, however,
that third party would have standing.'"
2. Gift Cases
The true gift cases"" are also easily decided under Section 302 as amplified by the
illustrations. Where t he promisor promises to give a direct performance and benefit to the
third party, and the circumstances are such that donative intent is expressed or easily
inferred, for example in family relationships, then t hind part y standing should he had. 4 "°
See supra notes 400-06 and accompanying text.
.17t
See supra test accompanying note 412.
' See supra notes 424-29, 437 and accompanying text.
474 See supra note 422 and accompanying text.
4" See supra notes 930-32 and accompanying text,
4T' See supra notes 414-16 and accompanying text,
- ' 77 See supra notes 126 - 30 and accompanying text.
4m See supra note 438 and accompanying text.
4" See supra notes 140-52 and accompanying text.
"" See supra notes 436 - 37 and accompanying text.
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3. Intended Legatees on Contracts to Draft Wills
The cases involving attempts to gain third party standing by intended legatees on
contracts to draft wills present the same difficulties under Section 302 as they have under
the state law rules.'" In these cases the performance of the attorney drafting the will is
given directly to the testator-promisee and not to the intended legatees. The difficult
question is whether the benefit to the intended legatees is direct in the sense of being
immediate or is only derived from the more direct benefit to the testator.
On this question courts could split even when applying the best construction of
Section 302, but the author would side against third party standing because the benefit is
probably too tenuous to be considered sufficiently direct and it is also difficult to conclude
t hat standing is consistent with the mutual contracting purposes of the parties. The
testator has the unrestricted freedom to revoke the will at any time before death.
Contrasting the intended beneficiary of an irrevocable trust with the legatee of a will may
help illustrate the point. An attorney drafting an irrevocable trust should be keenly aware
of the immediate benefit to the trust beneficiary and the effects of an error in drafting.
This degree of immediacy and certainty in the benefit in that type of trust case is absent in
the cases of contracts to draft wills. This lack of immediate and certain benefit supports
denying relief under a contract third party beneficiary theory, although relief' may be
available through some other the.ory or cause of action.
4. Employees, Shareholders and Partners
Employees, shareholders and partners would generally fare no better under the
improved Section 302 than they would under the state law rules. 4 N2 These putative third
party beneficiaries would normally be denied standing on t he contracts of their related
business entities, absent an express provision for their benefit, because the performance is
not direct and the benefit is derivative of a more immediate benefit to the business entity.
The possible exception to this outcome would be in employee cases where the
employer contracts wit h a third party to provide some direct service to the employee, such
as security guard services on business premises. 463 In this case, the argument can be made
t hat the benefit is direct to the employee because he is saved from the harm threatened by
robbery or other violence. The benefit to the employer is at least partly derivative from
the benefit to the employee because the employer is relieved of the expense and difficulty
related to employee injury. Consequently, where the benefit or performance to the
employee can be characterized as direct, third party rights should be presumed unless
rebutted by express provisions to the contrary or circumstances clearly denying grounds
for third party standing.
5. Government Contract Cases
In applying Section 302 to cases involving the government,"" distinguishing between
the true public service contracts and other contracts to which government entities are
parties is important. In the public service cases the higher requirements for showing
intent to qualify as a third party beneficiary would be properly applied.;"' The normal
"' See supra notes 153.63 and accompanying text.
1" See supra notes 164-77 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 168-72 and accompanying text.
"4 See supra notes 178-92 and accompanying text.
° See supra notes 178-89 and accompanying text.
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rules would control and would require a search for either direct performance or benefit
to the third parties when applying Section 302 to the other government. contracts. In the
government mortgage-insured housing cases" this rest should result in a finding of third
party standing for tenants who benefit from limits on rent, provision of subsidies for rent,
or maintenance and safety requirements under regulatory agreements between the
landlord-owners and the federal government. This result should obtain because this type
of contract is not a public service contract and the pecuniary and health benefit to the
tenants are immediate and direct. The tenants would be required to establish a breach,
but should have standing under the regulatory agreements.
6. Construction Contract Cases
The decisive factor in most of the construction contract cases .'" would be the nature
of the promised performance. In those cases involving surety arrangements' or prom-
ises to repair damages" caused during construction, the key under Section 302, as under
the existing state law rules,' will be whether the promisor promised to pay the putative
beneficiary directly or merely promised to indemnify the promisee. In these cases if the
performance is not direct then the benefit will be indirect as well and the injured third
party will recover only through the promisee.
The construction cases involving multi-prime contractors"' with separate contracts
with the owner probably ought to give rise to third party rights only if the proper
performance of one contractor is a prerequisite to the ability of the other contractors to
perform and the contracting circumstances indicate an arrangement by which the con-
tractor assumes an obligation that otherwise would be owed by the owner. Third party
rights would not arise if the owner retained his obligation to the contractors to provide a
proper work site. Thus, when one contractor must provide some performance or service,
for example controlling excess water, that is of direct and immediate benefit to the others
and fulfills a duty that would otherwise be incumbent on the owner, then third party
rights ought to exist unless the express agreements or manifest circumstances reflect a
different intent on t he part of the contracting parties.
A very difficult question arises in the last category of construction cases in which
owners seek standing against non-privity subcontractors. 412 The general contractor in
these cases is usually something more than a mere conduit. If the subcontractor renders
faulty performance, the general contractor will have an obligation to the owner to correct
the problems before delivery of the completed building or project. If the breach causes
additional costs in terms of time or money, the general contractor initially will feel the
effects. The overriding obligation of the general contractor to tender a completed per-
formance prevents a clear conclusion that the owner is directly affected. Therefore, if
standing should he found, it should not be because of the directness of the performance
or the owners' benefit but because it is deemed consistent with the goals of the contracting
parties. It is quite arguable that suit by the owner for breach, as opposed to suit by the
general contractor, would normally be consistent with the purposes and goals of the
4 ' See supra notes 209-41 and accompanying text.
4 "7 See supra notes 242-94 and accompanying text.
4" See supra notes 257-66 and accompanying text.
4" See supra notes 282-94 and accompanying text.
4" See supra notes 257-60, 282-94 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 267.81 and accompanying text.
"2 See supra notes 242-56 and accompanying text.
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contracting parties since the subcontractor will always be aware that the owner ultimately
is the party with the greatest interest in his proper performance. This difficult class of
cases is probably one upon which courts will continue to be divided.
7. Real Property Transactions
In the real property transactions, Section 302 provides a solid answer for those cases
involving an appraisal, survey, inspection, or other services related to a contract to
purchase a home.'" In these cases both the home purchaser and either the seller or
lender receive a direct benefit from having a correct appraisal or similar service. The
third party purchaser's benefit from proper performance by the promisor-appraiser,
surveyor or inspector is no less direct than t he benefit to the promisee-lender or seller.
Third party standing ought to be disallowed only when the express terms or the circum-
stances deny standing, such as when the purpose of the appraisal, survey or inspection is
not made known to t he promisor so that he is not chargeable with reason to know that
there is a third party purchaser who might benefit.
A last difficult question, even for the improved Section 302, is the case of the home
purchaser who wishes to sue the remote builder.'" The benefit to the ultimate purchaser
of having a well-built home is substantial, but it is difficult to describe the builder's
performance as being direct. Nor is the benefit direct at the time of performance,
although it later becomes immediate in the sense that a quality home will be of most
immediate benefit to t hose who live in it. Acknowledging the absence of a clearly direct
benefit or perforrnanc.e and therefore resorting to the general principles of Section 302, it
is probably fair to say that when the builder knows the home will be resold, recognition of
third party standing in the home owner is consistent with the purposes and goals of the
contracting parties. If the home were occupied by the developer then he would have a
cause of action if the building contract was breached. Resale of the home should probably
not be deemed to bar suit by the ultimate purchaser, even though the performance and
the benefit are not directly given to purchaser. This case, however, presents another close
question upon which courts are likely to disagree even when applying the most useful
construction of Section 302.
CoNCLUSION
The courts have traditionally decided third party beneficiary standing cases by using
t he rather vague test of "intent to benefit" in conjunction with collateral rules developed
in attempts to fortify the intent standard. While Section 133 of the original Restatement
of Contracts did not serve as a way out of those confused and difficult intent tests, Section
302 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts has the potential for serving such a
function.
The objective of this article is to offer an interpretation of Section 302 that highlights
the helpful provisions and warns against the potential pitfalls. Section 302 could have
been written to go further in making a departure from the flaws of the traditional rules,
but when best construed the section can be used to establish clear, useful standards for
determining third party beneficiary standing. The challenge for those states adopting
Section 302 is to perfect its rule by uncovering those clear, useful standards which lie
4" See supra notes 318-31 and accompanying text.
499 See supra notes 302-17 and accompanying text.
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within the text and supporting materials of the section. The resulting construction of
Section 302, when studiously applied to third party beneficiary cases, should yield stan-
dards that are consistent with the best parts of existing state law rules and that provide
effective guidance in I hose cases where t he exist ing state law rules have been inadequate.
APPENDIX
Listed below are decisions of courts in which Section 302 has been adopted, used or
commented on in a manner which reflects whether the section has been deemed compar-
able, in whole or in part, with prior law. The section has been cited in other cases without
any interpretative reading.
California - The court in Gilbert Financial Corp. v. Steelform Contracting Co., 82
Cal. App. 3d 65, 70-71, 145 Cal. Rptr. 448, 451 (1978), read Section 302 as constituting an
improvement over the categorization test of Section 133, but the court in Walters v.
Mader, 83 Cal. App. 3d 1, 31-32, 147 Cal. Rptr. 655, 674-75 (1978) viewed the change as
being entirely semantic. Subsequently, the court in Allan v. Bekins Archival Service, Inc.,
154 Cal. Rptr. 458, 463 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979), observed that the creditor-donee distinction
was beginning to disappear in CalifOrnia. There appears to be, however, no more recent
cases supporting this conclusion.
Delaware - The federal court in American Financial Corp. v. Computer Services
Corp., 558 E. Supp. 1182, 1185 (D. Del. 1983) (applying Delaware law) read Section 302
to require that evidence of both parties' intent to create third party beneficiary rights be
present.
Illinois - The Supreme Court of Illinois, in both Altevogt v. Brinkoetter, 85 Ill. 2d
44, 54-56, 421 N.E.2c1182, 187 (1981) and Resnik v. Curtis & Davis Architects & Planners,
Inc., 78 Ill. 2d 381, 384-85, 400 N.E.2d 918, 919-20 (1980), implicitly has read Section 302
to be consistent with its traditional third party beneficiary rule found in Carson, Pirie
Scott & Co. v. Parrett, 346 Ill. 252, 259, 178 N.E. 498, 501 (1931).
Iowa - The Supreme Court seemed to question severely, if not reject, the elimination
of the categorization standard in Section 302 in its opinion in Khabhaz v. Swartz, 319
N.W.2d 279, 284-85 (Iowa 1982). The Court of Appeals has followed Khabbaz v. Swartz
and continued to apply t he Section 133 categorization test. Bain v. Gillispie, 357 N.W.2d
47, 50 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984).
Kansas	 The Kansas courts have cited Section 302 while applying the Section 133
categorization test, indicating a failure to appreciate a significant difference between the
two versions. See Martin v. Edwards, 219 Kan. 466, 472-73, 548 P.2d 779, 785 (1976);
Lewis v. Globe Construction Co., Inc., 6 Kan. App. 2d 478, 486, 630 P.2d 179, 185 (1981).
Maryland - The Court of Special Appeals viewed Section 302 as containing a
"liberalized" standard. Weems v. Nanticoke Homes Inc., 37 Md. App. 544, 556-57, 378
A.2d 190, 197 (1977). But in White v. General Motors Corp., 541 F. Supp. 190, 194 (D.
Md. 1982) (applying Maryland law) the court perceived no change from Section 133 other
than the dropping of the creditor and donee labels.
Massachusetts - Section 302 has been adopted as reflective of the state's law, Rae v.
Air-Speed, Inc., 386 Mass. 187, 194, 435 N.E.2d 628, 632 (1982); Choate Hall & Stewart
v. SCA Servs. Inc., 378 Mass. 535, 545-46, 392 N.E.2d 1045, 1051 (1979). The cases offer
no general interpretation of the section but the court in Rae used the reasonable reliance
measure of comment a to Section 302 in reaching its decision.
Minnesota -The Supreme Court of Minnesota replaced its former categorization test
by adopting the Section 302 rule in Cretex Companies v. Construction Leaders, Inc., 342
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N, W.2d 135, 139 (Minn. 1984). In doing so, the court also sought to dispel the reading of
its prior decisions that would limit third party rights to cases where the promisee owed a
duty to the third party.
New Jersey - The Supreme Court of New Jersey has favorably cited Section 302 in
indicating that the contractual intent rather than the categorization test should be deter-
minative in third party beneficiary decisions. Broadway Maintenance Corp. v. Rutgers, 90
N.J. 253, 260, 447 A.2d 906, 909 (1982).
North Carolina - The courts of North Carolina have interpreted Section 302 as
working no change from Section 133. Reidy v. Macauley, 57 N.C. App. 184, 186, 290
S.E.2d 746, 747 (1982); Alva v. Cloninger, 51 N.C. App. 602, 608-09, 277 S.E.2d 535, 539
(1981). In Snyder v. Freeman, 300 N.C. 204, 211, 266 S.E.2d 593, 604 (1980), the
Supreme Court fully applied Section 302 without recognizing that the section was differ-
ent from Section 133 which the court formally adopted in Vogel v. Reed Supply Co., 277
N.C. 119, 127-28, 177 S.E.2d 273, 278 (1970).
North Dakota - In First Federal S & L Ass'n v. Compass Investments, 342 N.W.2d
214, 219 (N.D. 1983), Section 302 is cited in conjunction with Section 133 and prior state
law without noting possible differences in the standards.
Pennsylvania - The Supreme Court adopted Section 302 in its opinion in Guy v.
Liederbach, 501 Pa. 47, 51, 459 A.2d 744, 746 (1983), not in overruling but merely
supplementing its prior law. The prior prevailing law was stated in Spires v. Hanover Fire
Ins. Co., 364 Pa. 52, 56-57, 70 A.2d 828, 830 (1950), and had required that both parties
express an intent to benefit the third party in the contract itself' before third party rights
would arise. The court offered no clear guidance for resolving the inconsistencies be-
tween the Spires rule and Section 302.
The court also failed to indicate whether reasonable reliance was essential for third
party rights under Section 302 as it had suggested in its earlier decision in Pennsylvania
Liquor Control Board v. Rapistan, Inc., 472 Pa. 36, 44, 371 A.2d 178, 181-82 (1976), and
as that decision had been interpreted by other courts in Holt. Hauling & Warehousing
Systems, Inc. v. Rapistan, Inc., 448 F, Supp. 991, 994 (E.D. Pa. 1978) and Guy v.
Liederbach, 279 Pa. Super. 543, 551, 421 A.2d 333, 336 (1980), of 'd in part and rev'd in
part, 501 Pa. 47, 51, 459 A.2d 744, 746 (1983).
Utah - In 1978 the Supreme Court used Section 302 and commented that it
established a modern rule arid represented an improvement over the categorization test
of Section 133 in Clark v. American Standard, Inc., 583 P.2c1 618, 620 (Utah 1978).
Subsequently in Tracy Collins Bank & Trust Co. v. Dickamore, 652 P.2d 1314, 1315
(Utah 1982), the court cited Section 302 in support of its application of the creditor and
donee categorization test without comment on any differences in the rules or reference to
its earlier decision in Clark.
Virgin Islands - The Third Circuit Court of Appeals applied Section 302 without
comment on possible differences from Section 133 but did construe Section 302 to
require the intent of both contracting parties in Williams v. Virgin Island Water 8c Power
Authority, 672 F.2d 1220, 1227 (3d Cir. 1982).
Federal Common Law - The federal courts have not reached a consensus on the use of
Section 302 under the federal common law. Some courts have continued to use the
creditor and donee categorization test or other prior standards. See, e.g. , Williams v. Fenix
& Scission, Inc., 608 F.2d 1205, 1208 (9th Cir. 1979); Falzarano v. U.S., 607 F.2d 506, 511
(5th Cir. 1979); Rogue Valley Stations v. Birk Oil Co., 568 F. Supp. 337, 349 (D. Ore.
1983); Group Health, Inc. v. Schweiker, 549 F. Supp. 135, 144 (S.D. Fla. 1982).
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Of those federal courts applying Section 302, some have emphasized its adoption of a
reasonable reliance approach. Commercial lns, Co. v. Pacific-Peru Construction Corp.,
558 F.2d 948, 953-54 (9th Cir. 1977); Taylor Woodrow Blitman Construction Corp. v.
Southfield Gardens Co., 534 F. Supp. 340, 343 (D. Mass. 1982). Another court has
deemphasized the reliance factor in determining third party rights. Beverly v. Macy, 702
F.2d 931, 940 (11th Cir. 1983).
Some federal courts have applied the section as an improved standard but without
reference to the reliance factor. See Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1270 (7th Cir. 198 1);
Davis v. United Airlines, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 677, 680 (E.D.N.Y. 1983); Harris v. Waikane
Corp., 484 F. Supp. 372, 378-79 (D. Haw. 1980); Hebalt v. U.S., 428 F.2d 1334, 1338 (Ct.
Cl. 1970).
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